Three Essays in Humanitarian Operations Management

Nonprofits and humanitarian organizations play a critical role in the modern world. Yet, to operate sustainably, they often encounter challenges including financial insecurity and operational obstacles. My dissertation investigates nonprofits' decisions and strategies for delivering sustainable services from the perspectives of financial security and operations in short- and long-term horizons.The first chapter is focused on the role of governance quality in nonprofits' donation income. Donors, generally, support charities that maintain higher program spending ratios (PSR). Yet, PSR does not reflect charities' actual social impact, and a focus on PSR may eventually limit their capacity in providing humanitarian aid. Since 2008, as a result of a policy change by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, nonprofits are able to better display their governance quality. My empirical investigation shows that governance quality is now an important factor in driving donations to nonprofits, although PSR still remains a key driver. Results suggest that nonprofits should consider improving their governance quality in their strategies for securing donation income, although that may lead to lower PSRs.
Pressures resulted from the focus on PSR encourage nonprofits to prioritize strategies that enable them to report higher program expenses. In the second chapter, I empirically examine one of these strategies, grant provision, that allows nonprofits to increase their reported program expenses without having to spend their funds on their own programs. I find that providing grants to other organizations enables nonprofits to earn more revenue and make a bigger social impact in the long term, but this strategy increases the administrative burden needed to make an impact.
Given the challenges in coordination and lack of effective coordinated response in humanitarian operations, in the third chapter, I develop a non-cooperative game theoretical model to analyze horizontal coordination among non-governmental organizations in disaster relief operations in centralized and decentralized models. I show that coordination does not always maximize social welfare, and time inefficiencies due to bureaucracies involved in coordination mechanisms are substantial obstacles against higher levels of coordination, especially in urgent response operations. I also show that decentralization of coordination mechanisms increases both coordination levels and social welfare.