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Borda's social choice method and Condorcet's social choice method are shown to satisfy different monotonicities and it is shown that it is impossible for any social choice method to satisfy

Borda's social choice method and Condorcet's social choice method are shown to satisfy different monotonicities and it is shown that it is impossible for any social choice method to satisfy them both. Results of a Monte Carlo simulation are presented which estimate the probability of each of the following social choice methods being manipulable: plurality (first past the post), Borda count, instant runoff, Kemeny-Young, Schulze, and majority Borda. The Kemeny-Young and Schulze methods exhibit the strongest resistance to random manipulability.

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    Date Created
    • 2010
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    • Vita
    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2010
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-74)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Mathematics

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    by Andrew Jennings

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