Description
I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives.
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Contributors
- Zhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author)
- Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor)
- Babenko, Ilona (Committee member)
- Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member)
- Stein, Luke (Committee member)
- Arizona State University (Publisher)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2017
Subjects
- Finance
- Executives--United States--States--Psychology.
- Executives
- Executives--Rating of--United States--States.
- Executives
- Executives--Salaries, etc.--United States--States.
- Executives
- Executives--Supply and demand--United States--States.
- Executives
- Employee competitive behavior--United States--States.
- Employee competitive behavior
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Note
- Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2017Note typethesis
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 53-56)Note typebibliography
- Field of study: Business administration
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Statement of Responsibility
by Hong Zhao