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This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that

This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information.

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    Date Created
    • 2011
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  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2011
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-85)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Economics

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    by Ran Shao

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