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How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual

How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost.

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    Date Created
    • 2014-07-11
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    • Digital object identifier: 10.1038/srep05666
    • Identifier Type
      International standard serial number
      Identifier Value
      2045-2322
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    Zhang, Hai-Feng, Wu, Zhi-Xi, Tang, Ming, & Lai, Ying-Cheng (2014). Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading - an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 4, 5666. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05666

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