Description
This paper studies an infinite-horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to the principal.
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Contributors
- Chandrasekher, Madhav (Author)
- W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor)
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2015-01-01
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Identifier
- Digital object identifier: 10.3982/TE833
- Identifier TypeInternational standard serial numberIdentifier Value1555-7561
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Chandrasekher, Madhav (2015). Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 10: 11-49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE833