ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
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- Creators: Mobasher, Barzin
This paper finds that asymmetry of information in business models is the motivation of the gaming for all participants, through analyzing the differences of various business models of securities brokerage services. Further, various incentive mechanisms under different circumstances result in diverse strategies of gaming. It varies development paths of securities companies. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to theoretically deduce the most reasonable and optimal securities companies’ incentive mechanism.
This paper intends to identify the principle component factors influencing securities brokerage services via questionnaire investigations towards 75 branches under the same securities company and 13 different securities companies, respectively. In addition, based on historical data, the paper aim to explain rationales between adjustments of incentive mechanisms and market shares of securities brokerage services.Lastly, combining author’s personal experience of various incentive mechanisms and development tracks in four securities companies that hopefully presents valuable information and clues for deducing the optimal securities company incentive mechanism.
There are two critical agency relationships in securities brokerage services. One is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are directors of branches. The other is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are securities marketers or brokers. Because of such operational setup, information is highly asymmetrical between all parties. It brought prominent problems regarding agency relationship and motivation aspects.
Under the certain circumstances, implementation of Incomplete Contracting Theory with franchising models in securities companies is quite useful. Specifically, for the former relationship between securities companies and marketers, the motivation effects of sub-license franchising are better than bonus compensation structure. Fixed salaries without bonus have the worst stimulating effects in such business model. For the latter relationship between securities companies and directors of branches, the agents focus on long term residual value claim rights, since it coincides with agents’ appraisals, focusing on incremental market shares and profit drawings.
To test the above proposition, I conduct the empirical analysis in three steps. In the first step, I investigate foreign banks’ management model by surveying 13 major foreign banks locally incorporated in Mainland China. The results suggest that these 13 foreign banks can be categorized into three distinct groups based on their management model: intergrators, customer-followers, and parent-followers. The results also indicate that intergrators have the highest level of localization while parent-followers have the lowest level of localization.
In the second step, I conduct DEA (Data Envelope Analysis) and CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity Analysis) to assess the operating efficiency of these 13 foreign banks. The assessment is conducted in two ways: 1) the inter-group comparison between foreign banks and local Chinese banks; 2) the intra-group comparison between the three distinct groups of foreign banks identified in the first step. The results indicates that the principal factor driving the operating efficiency of both local Chinese banks and foreign banks is the comprehensive technical efficiency, which includes both the quality of management and the quality of technical elements. I also find the uptrend of technical efficiency of the integrators is more stable than that of the other two groups of foreign banks.
Finally, I integrate the results from step one and step two to assess the relevance between foreign banks’ localization level and operating efficiency. I find that foreign banks that score higher in localization tend to have a higher level of operating efficiency. Although this finding is not conclusive about the causal relationship between localization and operating efficiency, it nevertheless suggests that the management model of the higher performing integrators can serve as references for the other foreign banks attempting to enhance their localization and operating efficiency. I also discuss the future trends of development in the banking industry in China and what foreign banks can learn from local Chinese banks to improve their market positions.