ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
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- Creators: Doupe, Adam
Description
Honeypots – cyber deception technique used to lure attackers into a trap. They contain fake confidential information to make an attacker believe that their attack has been successful. One of the prerequisites for a honeypot to be effective is that it needs to be undetectable. Deploying sniffing and event logging tools alongside the honeypot also helps understand the mindset of the attacker after successful attacks. Is there any data that backs up the claim that honeypots are effective in real life scenarios? The answer is no.Game-theoretic models have been helpful to approximate attacker and defender actions in cyber security. However, in the past these models have relied on expert- created data. The goal of this research project is to determine the effectiveness of honeypots using real-world data. So, how to deploy effective honeypots? This is where honey-patches come into play. Honey-patches are software patches designed to hinder the attacker’s ability to determine whether an attack has been successful or not. When an attacker launches a successful attack on a software, the honey-patch transparently redirects the attacker into a honeypot. The honeypot contains fake information which makes the attacker believe they were successful while in reality they were not.
After conducting a series of experiments and analyzing the results, there is a clear indication that honey-patches are not the perfect application security solution having both pros and cons.
ContributorsChauhan, Purv Rakeshkumar (Author) / Doupe, Adam (Thesis advisor) / Bao, Youzhi (Committee member) / Wang, Ruoyu (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
The use of reactive security mechanisms in enterprise networks can, at times, provide an asymmetric advantage to the attacker. Similarly, the use of a proactive security mechanism like Moving Target Defense (MTD), if performed without analyzing the effects of security countermeasures, can lead to security policy and service level agreement violations. In this thesis, I explore the research questions 1) how to model attacker-defender interactions for multi-stage attacks? 2) how to efficiently deploy proactive (MTD) security countermeasures in a software-defined environment for single and multi-stage attacks? 3) how to verify the effects of security and management policies on the network and take corrective actions?
I propose a Software-defined Situation-aware Cloud Security framework, that, 1) analyzes the attacker-defender interactions using an Software-defined Networking (SDN) based scalable attack graph. This research investigates Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks using a scalable attack graph. The framework utilizes a parallel graph partitioning algorithm to generate an attack graph quickly and efficiently. 2) models single-stage and multi-stage attacks (APTs) using the game-theoretic model and provides SDN-based MTD countermeasures. I propose a Markov Game for modeling multi-stage attacks. 3) introduces a multi-stage policy conflict checking framework at the SDN network's application plane. I present INTPOL, a new intent-driven security policy enforcement solution. INTPOL provides a unified language and INTPOL grammar that abstracts the network administrator from the underlying network controller's lexical rules. INTPOL develops a bounded formal model for network service compliance checking, which significantly reduces the number of countermeasures that needs to be deployed. Once the application-layer policy conflicts are resolved, I utilize an Object-Oriented Policy Conflict checking (OOPC) framework that identifies and resolves rule-order dependencies and conflicts between security policies.
I propose a Software-defined Situation-aware Cloud Security framework, that, 1) analyzes the attacker-defender interactions using an Software-defined Networking (SDN) based scalable attack graph. This research investigates Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks using a scalable attack graph. The framework utilizes a parallel graph partitioning algorithm to generate an attack graph quickly and efficiently. 2) models single-stage and multi-stage attacks (APTs) using the game-theoretic model and provides SDN-based MTD countermeasures. I propose a Markov Game for modeling multi-stage attacks. 3) introduces a multi-stage policy conflict checking framework at the SDN network's application plane. I present INTPOL, a new intent-driven security policy enforcement solution. INTPOL provides a unified language and INTPOL grammar that abstracts the network administrator from the underlying network controller's lexical rules. INTPOL develops a bounded formal model for network service compliance checking, which significantly reduces the number of countermeasures that needs to be deployed. Once the application-layer policy conflicts are resolved, I utilize an Object-Oriented Policy Conflict checking (OOPC) framework that identifies and resolves rule-order dependencies and conflicts between security policies.
ContributorsChowdhary, Ankur (Author) / Huang, Dijiang (Thesis advisor) / Kambhampati, Subbarao (Committee member) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Bao, Youzhi (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020