ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
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- Creators: Hedman, Kory W
power, gas , communication networks. Ensuring the security of these
infrastructures is of utmost importance. This task becomes ever more challenging as
the inter-dependence among these infrastructures grows and a security breach in one
infrastructure can spill over to the others. The implication is that the security practices/
analysis recommended for these infrastructures should be done in coordination.
This thesis, focusing on the power grid, explores strategies to secure the system that
look into the coupling of the power grid to the cyber infrastructure, used to manage
and control it, and to the gas grid, that supplies an increasing amount of reserves to
overcome contingencies.
The first part (Part I) of the thesis, including chapters 2 through 4, focuses on
the coupling of the power and the cyber infrastructure that is used for its control and
operations. The goal is to detect malicious attacks gaining information about the
operation of the power grid to later attack the system. In chapter 2, we propose a
hierarchical architecture that correlates the analysis of high resolution Micro-Phasor
Measurement Unit (microPMU) data and traffic analysis on the Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) packets, to infer the security status of the grid and
detect the presence of possible intruders. An essential part of this architecture is
tied to the analysis on the microPMU data. In chapter 3 we establish a set of anomaly
detection rules on microPMU data that
flag "abnormal behavior". A placement strategy
of microPMU sensors is also proposed to maximize the sensitivity in detecting anomalies.
In chapter 4, we focus on developing rules that can localize the source of an events
using microPMU to further check whether a cyber attack is causing the anomaly, by
correlating SCADA traffic with the microPMU data analysis results. The thread that
unies the data analysis in this chapter is the fact that decision are made without fully estimating the state of the system; on the contrary, decisions are made using
a set of physical measurements that falls short by orders of magnitude to meet the
needs for observability. More specifically, in the first part of this chapter (sections 4.1-
4.2), using microPMU data in the substation, methodologies for online identification of
the source Thevenin parameters are presented. This methodology is used to identify
reconnaissance activity on the normally-open switches in the substation, initiated
by attackers to gauge its controllability over the cyber network. The applications
of this methodology in monitoring the voltage stability of the grid is also discussed.
In the second part of this chapter (sections 4.3-4.5), we investigate the localization
of faults. Since the number of PMU sensors available to carry out the inference
is insufficient to ensure observability, the problem can be viewed as that of under-sampling
a "graph signal"; the analysis leads to a PMU placement strategy that can
achieve the highest resolution in localizing the fault, for a given number of sensors.
In both cases, the results of the analysis are leveraged in the detection of cyber-physical
attacks, where microPMU data and relevant SCADA network traffic information
are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system
information and/or operations.
In second part of this thesis (Part II), the security analysis considers the adequacy
and reliability of schedules for the gas and power network. The motivation for
scheduling jointly supply in gas and power networks is motivated by the increasing
reliance of power grids on natural gas generators (and, indirectly, on gas pipelines)
as providing critical reserves. Chapter 5 focuses on unveiling the challenges and
providing solution to this problem.
This research presents three topology control (corrective transmission switching) methodologies along with the detailed formulation of robust corrective switching. The robust model can be solved off-line to suggest switching actions that can be used in a dynamic security assessment tool in real-time. The proposed robust topology control algorithm can also generate multiple corrective switching actions for a particular contingency. The solution obtained from the robust topology control algorithm is guaranteed to be feasible for the entire uncertainty set, i.e., a range of system operating states.
Furthermore, this research extends the benefits of robust corrective topology control to renewable resource integration. In recent years, the penetration of renewable resources in electrical power systems has increased. These renewable resources add more complexities to power system operations, due to their intermittent nature. This research presents robust corrective topology control as a congestion management tool to manage power flows and the associated renewable uncertainty. The proposed day-ahead method determines the maximum uncertainty in renewable resources in terms of do-not-exceed limits combined with corrective topology control. The results obtained from the topology control algorithm are tested for system stability and AC feasibility.
The scalability of do-not-exceed limits problem, from a smaller test case to a realistic test case, is also addressed in this research. The do-not-exceed limit problem is simplified by proposing a zonal do-not-exceed limit formulation over a detailed nodal do-not-exceed limit formulation. The simulation results show that the zonal approach is capable of addressing scalability of the do-not-exceed limit problem for a realistic test case.
A DC based heuristic, i.e., a greedy algorithm, is developed and applied to improve the computational time for the TC problem while still maintaining the ability to find quality solutions. In the greedy algorithm, an expression is derived, which indicates the impact on the objective for a marginal change in the state of a transmission line. This expression is used to generate a priority list with potential candidate lines for switching, which may provide huge improvements to the system. The advantage of this method is that it is a fast heuristic as compared to using mixed integer programming (MIP) approach.
Alternatively, AC based heuristics are developed for TC problem and tested on actual data from PJM, ERCOT and TVA. AC based N-1 contingency analysis is performed to identify the contingencies that cause network violations. Simple proximity based heuristics are developed and the fast decoupled power flow is solved iteratively to identify the top five TC actions, which provide reduction in violations. Time domain simulations are performed to ensure that the TC actions do not cause system instability. Simulation results show significant reductions in violations in the system by the application of the TC heuristics.