ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
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- All Subjects: Business Administration
Description
While scan-based trading (SBT) is a growing trend in the retail industry, evidence suggests that many SBT initiatives have contributed only to the retailers’ bottom line at the suppliers’ expense. This research attempts to disclose some of the causes of SBT failure as a collaborative inventory management initiative and identify SBT’s integrative potential using both positivistic and normative research methodologies.
In the first chapter, SBT contracts are analyzed through the lens of Agency Theory. By focusing on unique inventory ownership and risks considerations resulting from retailers managing supplier-owned inventory without bearing the cost of inventory shrinkage, the effect of SBT on inventory shrinkage is examined empirically using a data set from a packaged bakery manufacturer. The results show that inventory shrinkage tends to be higher under SBT contracts compared to traditional vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contracts. The study highlights a potential loss in efficiency in food supply chains reflected in higher shrinkage under SBT contracts.
The second chapter aims to identify conditions under which SBT contracts could be mutually beneficial for retailers and suppliers. Using stylized game theoretic models involving a retailer and a supplier of a product with limited shelf life, the study finds that, while inventory shrinkage may be amplified under SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts due to the decreased retailer’s incentive to manage inventory at the store, SBT could help suppliers minimize inventory overage and underage under high demand uncertainty. The integrative potential for SBT contracts, thus, lies in the trade-off between inventory shrinkage and forecasting accuracy.
In the third paper, the role of bargaining power on the performance of SBT contracts is examined. Based on the bargaining literature, it is hypothesized that perceptions of bargaining power can be reshaped in the bargaining process through concession tactics. The results of a negotiation experiment show that, while powerful retailers do tend to have the upper hand in negotiating SBT contracts, weak suppliers could ameliorate or even overcome retailer power by offering services as a concession in a way that the product-service bundle improves the value of their offerings in the eyes of the retailers.
In the first chapter, SBT contracts are analyzed through the lens of Agency Theory. By focusing on unique inventory ownership and risks considerations resulting from retailers managing supplier-owned inventory without bearing the cost of inventory shrinkage, the effect of SBT on inventory shrinkage is examined empirically using a data set from a packaged bakery manufacturer. The results show that inventory shrinkage tends to be higher under SBT contracts compared to traditional vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contracts. The study highlights a potential loss in efficiency in food supply chains reflected in higher shrinkage under SBT contracts.
The second chapter aims to identify conditions under which SBT contracts could be mutually beneficial for retailers and suppliers. Using stylized game theoretic models involving a retailer and a supplier of a product with limited shelf life, the study finds that, while inventory shrinkage may be amplified under SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts due to the decreased retailer’s incentive to manage inventory at the store, SBT could help suppliers minimize inventory overage and underage under high demand uncertainty. The integrative potential for SBT contracts, thus, lies in the trade-off between inventory shrinkage and forecasting accuracy.
In the third paper, the role of bargaining power on the performance of SBT contracts is examined. Based on the bargaining literature, it is hypothesized that perceptions of bargaining power can be reshaped in the bargaining process through concession tactics. The results of a negotiation experiment show that, while powerful retailers do tend to have the upper hand in negotiating SBT contracts, weak suppliers could ameliorate or even overcome retailer power by offering services as a concession in a way that the product-service bundle improves the value of their offerings in the eyes of the retailers.
ContributorsChoi, Min (Author) / Rabinovich, Elliot (Thesis advisor) / Richards, Timothy (Committee member) / Grebitus, Carola (Committee member) / Dooley, Kevin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Platform business models have become pervasive in many aspects of the economy,particularly in the areas experiencing rapid growth such as retailing (e.g., Amazon and
eBay) and last-mile transportation (e.g., Instacart and Amazon Flex). The popularity
of platform business models is, in part, due to the asset-light prospect which allows
businesses to maintain flexibility while scaling up their operations. Yet, this ease of
growth may not necessarily be conducive to viable outcomes. Because scalability in a
platform depends on the intermediary’s role it plays in facilitating matching between
users on each side of the platform, the efficiency of matching could be eroded as growth
increases search frictions and matching costs. This phenomenon is demonstrated in
recent studies on platform growth (e.g. Fradkin, 2017; Lian and Van Ryzin, 2021; Li
and Netessine, 2020). To sustain scalability during growth, platforms must rely on effective platformdesign to mitigate challenges arising in facilitating efficient matching. Market design
differs in its focus between retail and last-mile transportation platforms. In retail
platforms, platform design’s emphasis is on helping consumers navigate through
a variety of product offerings to match their needs while connecting vendors to a
large consumer base (Dinerstein et al., 2018; Bimpikis et al., 2020). Because these
platforms exist to manage two-sided demand, scalability depends on the realization of
indirect network economies where benefits for users to participate on the platforms
are commensurate with the size of users on the other side (Parker and Van Alstyne,
2005; Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009). Thus, platform design plays a critical role in
the realization of indirect network economies on retail platforms. Last-mile transportation platforms manage independent drivers on one side andretailers on the other, both parties holding flexibility in switching between platforms.
High demand for independent drivers along with their flexibility in work participation induces platforms to use subsidies to incentivize retention. This leads to short-term
improvements in retention at the expense of significant increases in platforms’
compensation costs. Acute challenges to driver retention call for effective compensation
strategies to better coordinate labor participation from these drivers (Nikzad, 2017;
Liu et al., 2019; Guda and Subramanian, 2019). In addition to driver turnover,
retailers’ withdrawal can undermine the operating efficiency of last-mile transportation
platforms (Borsenberger et al., 2018). This dissertation studies platforms’ scalability
and operational challenges faced by platforms in the growth.
ContributorsWang, Lina (Author) / Rabinovich, Elliot (Thesis advisor) / Richards, Timothy (Committee member) / Webster, Scott (Committee member) / Guda, Harish (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021