ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
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Description
This study questioned how the Navajo Nation was going to mitigate and/or adapt
to Global Climate Change. By employing a Diné philosophy based research methodology this study seeks to holistically reframe the lens that the Navajo Nation conceptualizes Global Climate Change. The study uses a comprehensive review of literature that pertained to four research questions. The research questions are: 1) What do Diné oral histories say about climate change? 2) How is the Navajo Nation going to mitigate and adapt to changes to the climate using Western knowledge? 3) How can Diné research methodologies help inform policies that will mitigate and adapt to climate change? 4) What type of actions and frameworks can the Navajo Nation use to generate meaningful policy? The study utilizes a Diné philosophy based analytical framework to focus on how climate change will affect the Diné peoples' A) spirituality, B) economic sustainability, C) family-community, and D) home-environment. The findings are: a) the Navajo spiritual ceremonies are process models that can be used to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change, and they must continue to be practiced. b) The economic development section revealed that economic security is not found solely in resource development, but in the security of ceremonial knowledge. The burden of the Navajo government however, is not to promote labor, but the ability for people to live into old age. c) Because families and communities drive Diné philosophy, Diné families and communities must remember how to treat each other with respect. The collective survival of the Navajo Nation always depended on this teaching. d) The findings of the home-environment section is that Diné have to acknowledge that their lives are fragile in the face of global climate change, and the only way that they can live happily is to trust the power of the stories of the ancestors, and seek to embody the Diné philosophy. This study succeeded as an honest attempt to apply an Indigenous Diné methodology to reframe Global Climate Change into a phenomenon that is survivable.
to Global Climate Change. By employing a Diné philosophy based research methodology this study seeks to holistically reframe the lens that the Navajo Nation conceptualizes Global Climate Change. The study uses a comprehensive review of literature that pertained to four research questions. The research questions are: 1) What do Diné oral histories say about climate change? 2) How is the Navajo Nation going to mitigate and adapt to changes to the climate using Western knowledge? 3) How can Diné research methodologies help inform policies that will mitigate and adapt to climate change? 4) What type of actions and frameworks can the Navajo Nation use to generate meaningful policy? The study utilizes a Diné philosophy based analytical framework to focus on how climate change will affect the Diné peoples' A) spirituality, B) economic sustainability, C) family-community, and D) home-environment. The findings are: a) the Navajo spiritual ceremonies are process models that can be used to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change, and they must continue to be practiced. b) The economic development section revealed that economic security is not found solely in resource development, but in the security of ceremonial knowledge. The burden of the Navajo government however, is not to promote labor, but the ability for people to live into old age. c) Because families and communities drive Diné philosophy, Diné families and communities must remember how to treat each other with respect. The collective survival of the Navajo Nation always depended on this teaching. d) The findings of the home-environment section is that Diné have to acknowledge that their lives are fragile in the face of global climate change, and the only way that they can live happily is to trust the power of the stories of the ancestors, and seek to embody the Diné philosophy. This study succeeded as an honest attempt to apply an Indigenous Diné methodology to reframe Global Climate Change into a phenomenon that is survivable.
ContributorsAtencio, Mario (Author) / Killsback, Leo K (Thesis advisor) / Tippeconnic, John (Committee member) / Lee, Lloyd L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
In this dissertation, I argue that the original development of Natural Law Theory (NLT) by the Stoics of the second and first centuries B.C. was not merely an outpouring or natural byproduct of an earlier philosophic achievement in Plato and Aristotle, but a reaction to it, specifically, an effort to correct certain problems that had surfaced as a result of discussion within and challenges to the broader eudaimonistic tradition. Prior to Cicero's writings in particular, the term "natural law" appears only occasionally in the philosophic texts, and never as a term signifying a coherent and developed moral theory. A central part of my argument will be to demonstrate the negative thesis that neither Plato nor Aristotle defended a version of NLT - a claim that current scholarship does not universally accept. The primary reason for my claim, I argue, is that neither Plato nor Aristotle accepted a conception of nature (physis) that contained a normative element that could be understood in terms of law (nomos) and its accompanying notions of command and obligation. This negative thesis is important because it clarifies the central modification the Stoics make on the eudaimonistic tradition, namely, the advancement of a distinct theory of nature, one in which they identify physis with "Divine Reason." The "theological conception" of physis, as I shall call it, entails a breakdown of the nomos-physis dichotomy that had been central to Greek thought for centuries prior and thereby makes possible the birth of NLT.
ContributorsVierra, Thomas (Author) / White, Michael J. (Thesis advisor) / Humphrey, Ted (Committee member) / Dagger, Richard (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Do emotions help explain our behaviors? Can they condemn us, excuse us, orr mitigate our moral responsibility orr blameworthiness? Can they explain our rationality and irrationality, orr warrant such attributions? Can they be justified orr warranted? Are they constitutive aspects of our consciousness, identity, characters, virtues, orr epistemic status? The answer to these questions, at least to a significant extent, depends on what emotions are. This illustrates the importance of what emotions are to academics across multiple disciplines, as well as to members of governing bodies, organizations, communities, and groups. Given the great importance of emotions to various aspects of our lives, this dissertation is about the relevance of the topic of emotion as an area of study for the discipline of philosophy. This dissertation is also broadly about the need to bridge the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between various distinct disciplines, thereby contributing to the process of unifying knowledge across the various disciplines within the realm of academia.
The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC).
The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC).
ContributorsMun, Cecilea (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Shiota, Michelle (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a method of gathering evidence if it has established some agreed-upon standards regarding how to evaluate uses of this method. Existing meta-philosophical disputes take the nature of intuitions to be their starting point. This is a mistake. My concern is not the epistemic status of intuitions, but rather how metaphysicians appeal to intuitions as a form of evidence. In order for intuitions to play a viable role in research they must be subject to certain constraints, regardless of whether they allow individual researchers to know that their theories are true. Metaphysicians are not permitted to use intuitions as arbitrarily having different evidential status in different circumstances, nor should they continue to use intuitions as evidence in certain disputes when there is disagreement amongst disputants about whether intuitions should have this evidential status.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
ContributorsMusgrave, Shea (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Nestor A. (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This project examines and challenges the West's generally accepted two category approach to the world's belief systems. That is, it will deconstruct the religion / science `paradigm' that has developed over the past two centuries. It will argue that the dichotomy between the two categories was created by modernity for the purpose of establishing an exclusive view believed to be based on knowledge. This exclusive view, philosophical naturalism (science), was set in opposition to all alternative views identified as religion. As the exclusive view, though constructed on a defective foundation of knowledge, philosophical naturalism, nonetheless, became the privileged interpreter and explainer of reality in the academy of the Western world.
As a work in the area of epistemology and the philosophy of religion, this project will challenge philosophical naturalism's claim to knowledge. The approach will be philosophical and historical critically assessing both modernity's and postmodernity's basis for knowledge. Without a rational basis for exclusive knowledge the popular dichotomy dissolves. The implications of this dissolution for `religious studies' will be addressed by offering an alternative scheme that provides a more plausible way to divide the world's belief systems.
As a work in the area of epistemology and the philosophy of religion, this project will challenge philosophical naturalism's claim to knowledge. The approach will be philosophical and historical critically assessing both modernity's and postmodernity's basis for knowledge. Without a rational basis for exclusive knowledge the popular dichotomy dissolves. The implications of this dissolution for `religious studies' will be addressed by offering an alternative scheme that provides a more plausible way to divide the world's belief systems.
ContributorsTussing, Rodney W (Author) / Cady, Linell (Committee member) / Anderson, Owen (Committee member) / Gereboff, Joel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Libertarians affirm the right to liberty, i.e., the right to do what one wants free from interference. Libertarians also affirm the right to private property. One objection to libertarianism is that private property relations restrict liberty. This objection appears to have the consequence that libertarianism is an incoherent position. I examine Jan Narveson's version of the libertarian view and his defense of its coherence. Narveson understands the right to liberty as a prohibition on the initiation of force. I argue that if that is what the right to liberty is, then the enforcement of property rights violates it. I also examine Narveson's attempt to support private property with his distinction between interference with and mere prevention of activity and argue that this distinction does not do the work that he needs it to do. My conclusion is that libertarianism is, in a sense, impossible because conceptually unsound.
ContributorsSchimke, Christopher (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / Blackson, Thomas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
I present in this dissertation a theory of moral disillusion. In chapter 1 I explain moral innocence and its loss. I show that becoming morally responsible requires shattering the illusion that one is not an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. The morally responsible individual must understand that she can be an agent of wrongdoing. In chapter 2 I explore the nature of the understanding that accompanies the different phases of disillusion. I show that moral disillusion is an ability, not to follow moral principles, but to question them. In chapter 3 I argue that another phase of disillusion involves an acquaintance with evil. One shatters the illusion that only malicious individuals can be evildoers. Morally good people can also bring about evil. I conclude that evil is the exploitation of the extremely vulnerable. In chapters 4 and 5, I analyze more complex phases of moral disillusion. These stages are characterized by an understanding that one can be an agent of unchosen evil, that one might bring about evil even when pursuing the morally best course of action, and that one can be morally responsible for doing so. In order to understand unchosen evil and the tragedy of inescapable moral wrongdoing, the individual sees that moral responsibility ought to track what we care about, rather than what we believe. In chapter 6 I show that Kierkegaard's conception of the self is a philosophy of moral disillusion. I argue that his prescription that we shatter moral illusions is congruent with Harry Frankfurt's prescription that we ought to care about some things and not others. From this discussion emerges the explicit distinction between moral disillusion and moral goodness. Moreover, I conclude that the morally disillusioned are morally accountable for more than those still harboring moral illusions. Although moral disillusion does not entail becoming morally good, by acquiring the ability to raise questions about moral principles and to affect the content of one's cares, one acquires the ability to take responsibility for, and potentially minimize, evil. To have and understand these abilities, but not to care about them, increases one's moral accountability.
ContributorsGoldberg, Zachary J. (Author) / French, Peter A. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Matustik, Martin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
This dissertation puts forth an account of moral responsibility. The central claim defended is that an agent's responsibility supervenes on the agent's mental states at the time of the action. I call the mental states that determine responsibility the agent's quality of will (QOW). QOW is taken to concern the agent's action, understood from an internal perspective, along with the agent's motivations, her actual beliefs about the action, and the beliefs she ought to have had about the action. This approach to responsibility has a number of surprising implications. First, blameworthiness can come apart from wrongness, and praiseworthiness from rightness. This is because responsibility is an internal notion and rightness and wrongness are external notions. Furthermore, agents can only be responsible for their QOW. It follows that agents cannot be responsible for the consequences of their actions. I further argue that one's QOW is determined by what one cares about. And the fact that we react to the QOW of others with morally reactive emotions, such as resentment and gratitude, shows that we care about QOW. The reactive attitudes can therefore be understood as ways in which we care about what others care about. Responsibility can be assessed by comparing one's actual QOW to the QOW one ought to have had.
ContributorsKhoury, Andrew (Author) / French, Peter A. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
At present, the ideological bias in the human enhancement debate holds that opponents to human enhancement are primarily techno-conservatives who, lacking any reasonable, systematic account of why we ought to be so opposed, simply resort to a sort of fear-mongering and anti-meliorism. This dissertation means to counteract said bias by offering just such an account. Offered herein is a heuristic explanation of how, given a thorough understanding of enhancement both as a technology and as an attitude, we can predict a likely future of rampant commodification and dehumanization of man, and a veritable assault on human flourishing.
ContributorsMilleson, Valerye Michelle (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / French, Peter (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Gays identity is usually cast in generics--statements about an indeterminate number of members in a given category. Sometimes these generic statements often get built up into folk definitions, vague and imprecise ways to talk about objects. Other times generics get co-opted into authentic definitions, definitions that pick out a few traits and assert that real members of the class have these traits and members that do not are simply members by a technicality. I assess how we adopt these generic traits into our language and what are the ramifications of using generic traits as a social identity. I analyze the use of authentic definitions in Queer Theory, particularly Michael Warner's use of authentic traits to define a normative Queer identity. I do not just simply focus on what are the effects, but how these folk or authentic definitions gain currency and, furthermore, how can they be changed. I conclude with an analytic account of what it means to be gay and argue that such an account will undercut many of the problems associated with folk or authentic definitions about being gay.
ContributorsBlankschaen, Kurt (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Angel (Committee member) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012