ETDs

This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.

In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.

Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.

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Epistemic Peers, Disagreement, and Biased Judgment: Why A Good Judge of Peerhood is Hard to Find

Description
ABSTRACT The responses to idealized cases of peer disagreement given in the peer disagreement literature are presented as though those responses ought to be applied to real-world cases of disagreement. In order to apply the advice given in the literature to actual disagreement situations, one must first confidently identify one’s…

ABSTRACT The responses to idealized cases of peer disagreement given in the peer disagreement literature are presented as though those responses ought to be applied to real-world cases of disagreement. In order to apply the advice given in the literature to actual disagreement situations, one must first confidently identify one’s epistemic peers. Previous work in the literature, especially by Nathan King, suggests that one cannot confidently identify one’s epistemic peers in real-world cases of disagreement because it is unlikely that any two people will ever meet the idealized conditions of peerhood in real-world disagreements. I argue that due to the unconscious judgment-altering effects of certain cognitive biases, even if one could consciously meet the idealized conditions for epistemic peerhood as they are outlined in the peer disagreement literature, one should still not be confident that one has correctly identified others as one’s epistemic peers. I give examples of how cognitive biases can affect one’s judgments of one’s own epistemic abilities and the epistemic abilities of others, and I conclude that the peer disagreement literature’s prescriptions may not be suitable for, and are perhaps deleterious to, rational real-world disagreement resolution.
ContributorsBetts, Adam (Author) / Ballantyne, Nathan (Thesis advisor) / King, Nathan (Committee member) / Kung, Peter (Committee member) / Phillips, Ben (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023