ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2
Filtering by
- All Subjects: identity property of controlling shareholder
- All Subjects: incentive design
- Creators: Shen, Wei
Description
In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may result in differential incentives in governance through the selection of senior management and in the design of senior management compensation system. This thesis investigates four firms with four different types of ownership structures: a public listed firm with the controlling interest by the state, a public listed firm with a non-state-owned controlling interest, a public listed firm a family-owned controlling interest, and a Sino-foreign joint venture firm. By using a case study approach, I focus on two dimensions of ownership structure characteristics – ownership diversification and differences in property rights so as to document whether there are systematic differences in governance participation and executive compensation design. Specifically, I focused on whether such differences are reflected in management selection (which is linked to adverse selection and moral hazard problems) and in compensation design (the choices of performance measurements, performance pay, and in stock option or restricted stock). The results are consistent with my expectation – the nature of ownership structure does affect senior management compensation design. Policy implications are discussed accordingly.
ContributorsGao, Shenghua (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
This study investigates the impact of a specific organizational form – partnership – on employees’ awareness of risk control and job engagement in securities companies. Given that their organizational performance relies heavily on the performance of individual employees, it is critical for securities companies in China to adopt appropriate organizational forms so that they can better captalize on their employees’ human capital to cope with the increasingly intense market competition. Partnership, as one of the few organizational forms, has been widely adopted in industries that rely on the performance of individuals, such as law, auditing, consulting, and investment banking, around the world. In the context of China’s emerging economy, it has also been adopted as an incentive system by market leaders across several industries, including Alibaba in online shopping, Vanke in real estate, and Fosun in investments. In contrast, partnership has not been adopted or implemented by securities companies in China as most of them are still state-owned enterprises.
Based on my review of the corporate governance literature and qualitative analysis of partnership adoption in China, I propose that partnership can help better alighn the interests of employees with owners in securities companies as well. Specifically, the prospect of becoming a partner in the future can improve employees’ awareness of risk control and increase their job engagement. Taking advantage of partnership adoption at a Chinese securities company as a natural field experienment, I surveyed its employees about their awareness of risk contrl and job dedication before and after the adoption. The results from 505 matched surveys showed an increase in the average scores of both awareness of risk control and job dedication after the company adopted partnership as a new organizational form. Findings of this study have important implications for organizational and incentive design for securities companies in China.
Based on my review of the corporate governance literature and qualitative analysis of partnership adoption in China, I propose that partnership can help better alighn the interests of employees with owners in securities companies as well. Specifically, the prospect of becoming a partner in the future can improve employees’ awareness of risk control and increase their job engagement. Taking advantage of partnership adoption at a Chinese securities company as a natural field experienment, I surveyed its employees about their awareness of risk contrl and job dedication before and after the adoption. The results from 505 matched surveys showed an increase in the average scores of both awareness of risk control and job dedication after the company adopted partnership as a new organizational form. Findings of this study have important implications for organizational and incentive design for securities companies in China.
ContributorsSha, Changming (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018