ETDs

This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.

In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.

Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.

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Ownership Structure And Executive Compensation Design – An Empirical Study

Description
In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may…

In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may result in differential incentives in governance through the selection of senior management and in the design of senior management compensation system. This thesis investigates four firms with four different types of ownership structures: a public listed firm with the controlling interest by the state, a public listed firm with a non-state-owned controlling interest, a public listed firm a family-owned controlling interest, and a Sino-foreign joint venture firm. By using a case study approach, I focus on two dimensions of ownership structure characteristics – ownership diversification and differences in property rights so as to document whether there are systematic differences in governance participation and executive compensation design. Specifically, I focused on whether such differences are reflected in management selection (which is linked to adverse selection and moral hazard problems) and in compensation design (the choices of performance measurements, performance pay, and in stock option or restricted stock). The results are consistent with my expectation – the nature of ownership structure does affect senior management compensation design. Policy implications are discussed accordingly.
ContributorsGao, Shenghua (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Financing Choices of Chinese Households: Formal vs. Informal Channels

Description
Informal finance in this paper refers to the financing activities of individuals or households to borrow money through channels other than formal financial institutions such as commercial banks. Using data from China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) conducted by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) and the People's Bank of…

Informal finance in this paper refers to the financing activities of individuals or households to borrow money through channels other than formal financial institutions such as commercial banks. Using data from China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) conducted by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) and the People's Bank of China, this paper employs Probit model to analyze the factors that may influence the financing needs of Chinese households and factors that influence their likelihood of obtaining loans from formal financial institutions versus from informal channels. Results show that household wealth, family structure, and household head’s characteristics are the major factors that influence their financing needs. Moreover, the results suggest that (a) richer families are more likely to obtain loans from formal financial channels while poorer families are more likely to do so from informal channels; (b) families with stronger social ties are more likely to obtain loans from formal financial channels, but this relationship is weaker in regions where the financial market is more competitive;and (c) the increase of formal financial services is positively related to the probability of households obtaining formal finance, but has no relationship with the probability of households obtaining informal finance. These findings have important implications for finance policy making.
ContributorsZhang, Linchao (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Xiaoping (Thesis advisor) / Liu, Jun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016