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- Genre: Academic theses
Description
Natural history is, and was, dependent upon the collection of specimens. In the nineteenth century, American naturalists and institutions of natural history cultivated and maintained extensive collection networks comprised of numerous collectors that provided objects of natural history for study. Effective networks were collaborative in nature, with naturalists such as Spencer Baird of the Smithsonian trading their time and expertise for specimens. The incorporation of Darwinian and Neo-Lamarckian evolutionary theory into natural history in the middle of the century led to dramatic changes in the relationship between naturalists and collectors, as naturalists sought to reconcile their observations within the new evolutionary context. This dissertation uses the careers of collectors Robert Kennicott, Frank Stephens, Edward W. Nelson, E.A. Goldman, and Edmund Heller as case studies in order to evaluate how the changes in the theoretical framework of late nineteenth century natural history led to advances in field practice by assessing how naturalists trained their collectors to meet new demands within the field. Research focused on the correspondence between naturalists and collectors, along with the field notes and applicable publications by collectors. I argue that the changes in natural history necessitated naturalists training their collectors in the basics of biogeography - the study of geographic distribution of organisms, and systematics - the study of the diversity of life - leading to a collaborative relationship in which collectors played an active role in the formation of new biological knowledge. The project concludes that the changes in natural history with regard to theory and practice gradually necessitated a more professional cadre of collectors. Collectors became active agents in the formation of biological knowledge, and instrumental in the formation of a truly systematic natural history. As a result, collectors became de facto field naturalists, the forerunners of the field biologists that dominated the practice of natural history in the early and middle twentieth century.
ContributorsLaubacher, Matthew (Author) / Green, Monica (Thesis advisor) / Laubichler, Manfred (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Johnson Kent (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
This is a study of scientific realism, and of the extent to which it is undermined by objections that have been raised by advocates of various forms of antirealism. I seek to develop and present a version of scientific realism that improves on past formulations, and then to show that standard antirealist arguments against it do not succeed. In this paper, I will first present my formulation of scientific realism, which conceives of theories as model-based and as fundamentally non-linguistic. I advocate an epistemic position that accords with indirect realism, and I review and assess the threat posed by theses of underdetermination. Next, I review and discuss three important views: the antirealist constructivist view of Thomas Kuhn, the realist view of Norwood Hanson, and the antirealist constructive empiricist view of Bas van Fraassen. I find merits and flaws in all three views. In the course of those discussions, I develop the theme that antirealists' arguments generally depend on assumptions that are open to question, especially from the perspective of the version of realism I advocate. I further argue that these antirealist views are undermined by their own tacit appeals to realism.
ContributorsNovack, Alexander Dion (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis advisor) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / French, Peter (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
This thesis explores the conceptual span and plausibility of emergence and its applicability to the problem of mental causation. The early parts of the project explicate a distinction between weak and strong emergence as described by Jaegwon Kim. They also consider Kim's objections regarding the conceptual incoherence of strong emergence and the otiose nature of weak emergence. The paper then explores Mark Bedau's in-between conception of emergence and ultimately finds that middle conception to be both coherent and useful. With these three emergence distinctions in hand, the thesis goes on to explore Evan Thompson's recent work - Mind in Life (2010). In that work, Thompson advances a strong emergence approach to mind, whereby he concludes the incipient stages of cognition are found at the most basic levels of life, namely - biologic cells. Along the way, Thompson embraces holism and a nonfundamental
onhierarchical physics in order to counter Jaegwon Kim's objections to the notion of downward causation needed for strong emergence. The thesis presents arguments against Thompson's holism and nonfundamental physics, while supporting his assertion regarding the incipient stages of cognition. It then combines an important distinction between mental causation and the experience of mental causation with Thompson's notion of incipient cognition to arrive at a dual realms approach to understanding mental causation.
onhierarchical physics in order to counter Jaegwon Kim's objections to the notion of downward causation needed for strong emergence. The thesis presents arguments against Thompson's holism and nonfundamental physics, while supporting his assertion regarding the incipient stages of cognition. It then combines an important distinction between mental causation and the experience of mental causation with Thompson's notion of incipient cognition to arrive at a dual realms approach to understanding mental causation.
ContributorsFournier, Thomas (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W (Thesis advisor) / Reynolds, Steven L (Committee member) / Armendt, Brad (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
Once perceived as an unimportant occurrence in living organisms, cell degeneration was reconfigured as an important biological phenomenon in development, aging, health, and diseases in the twentieth century. This dissertation tells a twentieth-century history of scientific investigations on cell degeneration, including cell death and aging. By describing four central developments in cell degeneration research with the four major chapters, I trace the emergence of the degenerating cell as a scientific object, describe the generations of a variety of concepts, interpretations and usages associated with cell death and aging, and analyze the transforming influences of the rising cell degeneration research. Particularly, the four chapters show how the changing scientific practices about cellular life in embryology, cell culture, aging research, and molecular biology of Caenorhabditis elegans shaped the interpretations about cell degeneration in the twentieth-century as life-shaping, limit-setting, complex, yet regulated. These events created and consolidated important concepts in life sciences such as programmed cell death, the Hayflick limit, apoptosis, and death genes. These cases also transformed the material and epistemic practices about the end of cellular life subsequently and led to the formations of new research communities. The four cases together show the ways cell degeneration became a shared subject between molecular cell biology, developmental biology, gerontology, oncology, and pathology of degenerative diseases. These practices and perspectives created a special kind of interconnectivity between different fields and led to a level of interdisciplinarity within cell degeneration research by the early 1990s.
ContributorsJiang, Lijing (Author) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Laubichler, Manfred (Thesis advisor) / Hurlbut, James (Committee member) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / White, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
The present essay addresses the epistemic difficulties involved in achieving consensus with respect to the Hayek-Keynes debate. In particular, it is argued that the debate cannot be settled on the basis of the observable evidence; or, more precisely, that the empirical implications of the theories of Hayek and Keynes are such that, regardless of what is observed, both of the theories can be interpreted as true, or at least, not falsified. Regardless of the evidence, both Hayek and Keynes can be interpreted as right. The underdetermination of theories by evidence is an old and ubiquitous problem in science. The present essay makes explicit the respects in which the empirical evidence underdetermines the choice between the theories of Hayek and Keynes. In particular, it is argued both that there are convenient responses one can offer that protect each theory from what appears to be threatening evidence (i.e., that the choice between the two theories is underdetermined in the holist sense) and that, for particular kinds of evidence, the two theories are empirically equivalent (i.e., with respect to certain kinds of evidence, the choice between the two theories is underdetermined in the contrastive sense).
ContributorsScheall, Scott (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Armendt, Brad (Committee member) / French, Peter (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Gene-centric theories of evolution by natural selection have been popularized and remain generally accepted in both scientific and public paradigms. While gene-centrism is certainly parsimonious, its explanations fall short of describing two patterns of evolutionary and social phenomena: the evolution of sex and the evolution of social altruism. I review and analyze current theories on the evolution of sex. I then introduce the conflict presented to gene-centric evolution by social phenomena such as altruism and caste sterility in eusocial insects. I review gene-centric models of inclusive fitness and kin selection proposed by Hamilton and Maynard Smith. Based their assumptions, that relatedness should be equal between sterile workers and reproductives, I present several empirical examples that conflict with their models. Following that, I introduce a unique system of genetic caste determination (GCD) observed in hybrid populations of two sister-species of seed harvester ants, Pogonomyrmex rugosus and Pogonomyrmex barbatus. I review the evidence for GCD in those species, followed by a critique of the current gene-centric models used to explain it. In chapter two I present my own theoretical model that is both simple and extricable in nature to explain the origin, evolution, and maintenance of GCD in Pogonomyrmex. Furthermore, I use that model to fill in the gaps left behind by the contributing authors of the other GCD models. As both populations in my study system formed from inter-specific hybridization, I review modern discussions of heterosis (also called hybrid vigor) and use those to help explain the ecological competitiveness of GCD. I empirically address the inbreeding depression the lineages of GCD must overcome in order to remain ecologically stable, demonstrating that as a result of their unique system of caste determination, GCD lineages have elevated recombination frequencies. I summarize and conclude with an argument for why GCD evolved under selective mechanisms which cannot be considered gene-centric, providing evidence that natural selection can effectively operate on non-heritable genotypes appearing in groups and other social contexts.
ContributorsJacobson, Neal (Author) / Gadau, Juergen (Thesis advisor) / Laubichler, Manfred (Committee member) / Pratt, Stephen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Professional environmental scientists are increasingly under pressure to inform and even shape policy. Scientists engage policy effectively when they act within the bounds of objectivity, credibility, and authority, yet significant portions of the scientific community condemn such acts as advocacy. They argue that it is nonobjective, that it risks damaging the credibility of science, and that it is an abuse of authority. This means objectivity, credibility, and authority deserve direct attention before the policy advocacy quagmire can be reasonably understood. I investigate the meaning of objectivity in science and that necessarily brings the roles of values in science into question. This thesis is a sociological study of the roles environmental values play in the decisions of environmental scientists working in the institution of academia. I argue that the gridlocked nature of the environmental policy advocacy debates can be traced to what seems to be a deep tension and perhaps confusion among these scientists. I provide empirical evidence of this tension and confusion through the use of in depth semi-structured interviews among a sampling of academic environmental scientists (AES). I show that there is a struggle for these AES to reconcile their support for environmentalist values and goals with their commitment to scientific objectivity and their concerns about being credible scientists in the academy. Additionally, I supplemented my data collection with environmental sociology and history, plus philosophy and sociology of science literatures. With this, I developed a system for understanding values in science (of which environmental values are a subset) with respect to the limits of my sample and study. This examination of respondent behavior provides support that it is possible for AES to act on their environmental values without compromising their objectivity, credibility, and authority. These scientists were not likely to practice this in conversations with colleagues and policy-makers, but were likely to behave this way with students. The legitimate extension of this behavior is a viable route for continuing to integrate the human and social dimensions of environmental science into its practice, its training, and its relationship with policy.
ContributorsAppleton, Caroline (Author) / Minteer, Ben (Thesis advisor) / Chew, Matt (Committee member) / Armendt, Brad (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
This Thesis contends that if the designer of a non-biological machine (android) can establish that the machine exhibits certain specified behaviors or characteristics, then there is no principled reason to deny that the machine can be considered a legal person. The thesis also states that given a related but not necessarily identical set of characteristics, there is no principled reason to deny that the non-biological machine can make a claim to a level of moral personhood. It is the purpose of my analysis to delineate some of the specified behaviors required for each of these conditions so as to provide guidance and understanding to designers seeking to establish criteria for creation of such machines. Implicit in the stated thesis are assumptions concerning what is meant by a non-biological machine. I use analytic functionalism as a mechanism to establish a framework within which to operate. In order to develop this framework it is necessary to provide an analysis of what currently constitutes the attributes of a legal person, and to likewise examine what are the roots of the claim to moral personhood. This analysis consists of a treatment of the concept of legal personhood starting with the Greek and Roman views and tracing the line of development through the modern era. This examination then explores at a more abstract level what it means to be a person. Next, I examine law's role as a normative system, placing it within the context of the previous discussions. Then, criteria such as autonomy and intentionality are discussed in detail and are related to the over all analysis of the thesis. Following this, moral personhood is examined using the animal rights movement of the last thirty years as an argument by analogy to the question posed by the thesis. Finally, all of the above concepts are combined in a way that will provide a basis for analyzing and testing future assertions that a non-biological entity has a plausible claim for legal or moral personhood. If such an entity exhibits the type of intentionality and autonomy which humans view as the foundation of practical reason, in combination with other indicia of sentience described by "folk psychology", analytic functionalism suggests that there is no principled reason to deny the android's claim to rights.
ContributorsCalverley, David J (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis advisor) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / Askland, Andrew (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
How is knowledge created at the intersections between basic science, biotechnology, and industry? Gene drives are an interesting example, as they combine a long-standing interest with a recent technological breakthrough and a new set of commercial applications. Gene drives are genes engineered such that they are preferentially inherited at a frequency greater than the typical Mendelian fifty percent ratio. During the historical and conceptual evolution of gene drives beginning in the 1960s, there have been many innovations and publications. Along with that, gene drive science developed considerable public attention, explosion of new scientists, and variation in the way the topic is discussed. It is now time to look at this new organization of science using a systematic approach to characterize the system that has enabled knowledge to grow in this scientific field. This project breaks new ground in how knowledge advances in genetic engineering science, and how scientists understand what a “gene drive” is through analysis of language, communities, and other social factors. In effect, this research will advance multiple fields and enable a deeper understanding of knowledge and complexity. This project documents patterns of publication, collaborative relationships, linguistic variation, innovation, and knowledge expansion. The results of computational analysis provide an in-depth and complete characterization of the structure, dynamics, and evolution of scientific knowledge found in the gene drive technology. Further, time series analysis of the multiple layers of discourse enabled a diachronic connective mapping of collaborative relationships and tracked linguistic variation and change, highlighting where ambiguous language may appear, improving and creating more cohesive scientific language.
Overall, depicting the structure, dynamics, and evolution of scientific knowledge during a novel eruption of scientific complexity can shed light on the factors that can lead to: (1) improved scientific communication, (2) reduction of scientific progress, (3) new knowledge, and (4) novel collaborative relationships. Therefore, characterizing the current technological, methodological, and social contexts that can influence scientific knowledge.
ContributorsOToole, Cody Lane (Author) / Laubichler, Manfred (Thesis advisor) / Collins, James P (Committee member) / Simeone, Michael (Committee member) / Evans, James (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
Scientific researchers have studied microorganisms since the emergence of the single lens microscope in the 17th century. Since then, researchers designed and published many thousands of images to record and share their observations, including hand-drawn diagrams, photomicrographs, and photographs. Images shaped how researchers conceived of microorganisms, their concepts of microorganisms shaped their images, and their images and concepts were shaped by the contexts in which they were working. Over time, the interplay of images and concepts in various research contexts participated in the development of new concepts related to microorganisms, like the “biofilm” concept, or the idea that bacteria exist in nature as complex aggregates attached to surfaces via extracellular polymeric matrices. Many histories of microbiology locate the origin of the biofilm concept in the 1970s, but that date obscures the rich history of research about attached microbial aggregates that occurred throughout the history of microbiology. I discovered how the interplay of images and concepts related to bacteria participated in the development of the biofilm concept by documenting when and why researchers used different visual features to represent changing concepts related to microorganisms. I specifically examined how and why scientists represented evolving concepts related to bacteria during the 17th century (Chapter 1), from the late 17th century to the early 20th century (Chapter 2), and during the first seventy-four years of the 20th century (Chapter 3). I discovered the biofilm concept developed in at least three unique research contexts during the 20th century, and how images reflected and shaped the concept’s development in each case. The narrative and collection of images generated from this work serve as a visual history of the development of scientists’ ideas about the nature of bacteria over 300 years.
ContributorsGuerrero, Anna Clemencia (Author) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Laubichler, Manfred (Committee member) / Sterner, Beckett (Committee member) / Matlin, Karl (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023