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- All Subjects: philosophy
- Creators: Watson, Jeffrey
Description
Emergentism offers a promising compromise in the philosophy of mind between Cartesian substance dualism and reductivistic physicalism. The ontological emergentist holds that conscious mental phenomena supervene on physical phenomena, but that they have a nature over and above the physical. However, emergentist views have been subjected to a variety of powerful objections: they are alleged to be self-contradictory, incompatible with mental causation, justified by unreliable intuitions, and in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I defend the emergentist position against these objections. I clarify the concepts of supervenience and of ontological novelty in a way that ensures the emergentist position is coherent, while remaining distinct from physicalism and traditional dualism. Making note of the equivocal way in which the concept of sufficiency is used in Jaegwon Kim's arguments against emergent mental causation, I argue that downward causation does not entail widespread overdetermination. I argue that considerations of ideal a priori deducibility from some physical base, or "Cosmic Hermeneutics", will not themselves provide answers to where the cuts in the structure of nature lie. Instead, I propose reconsidering the question of Cosmic Hermeneutics in terms of which cognitive resources would be required for the ideal reasoner to perform the deduction. Lastly, I respond to the objection that emergence in the philosophy of mind is in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I suggest that a kind of weak ontological emergence is a viable form of explanation in many fields, and discuss current applications of emergence in biology, sociology, and the study of complex systems.
ContributorsWatson, Jeffrey (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Nestor (Committee member) / Horgan, Terence (Committee member) / Reynolds, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
I argue that a morally heavy, poorly researched, emotionally powerful piece of non-fiction media with complex subject matter shown to an ill-equipped audience is unethical. I then evaluate methods of avoiding unethical situations from the perspective of media creators. I conclude by calling for a strictly diligence based ratings board anchored in the professional guilds of the entertainment industry.
ContributorsBroderick, Nathan Andrew (Author) / Maday, Gregg (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Film, Dance and Theatre (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
The Mu’tazila were a group of early Islamic rationalists whose primary philosophical project was to reconcile God’s perfectly just nature, as well as the existence of a judgment day, with human free will. Drawing on Greek logical precepts, the Mu’tazila rejected the idea that human actions were caused solely by God, thereby affirming that humans have at least some degree of originative power. In this thesis, I will present a logical analysis of the Mu’tazila’s rejection of determinism, as well as their position on human-originated action, primarily using Qadi Abd al-Jabbar’s Book of the Five Principles as my source text. I will then present some of the primary views in contemporary free will discourse and compare these views to those of the Mu’tazila. The aim of my thesis is to present a logically rigorous picture of free will under Mu’tazilism, as well as to highlight the relevance of Mu’tazilism within contemporary discussions of free will.
ContributorsGeorge, Allison (Author) / Botham, Thad (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
In the past several years, the long-standing debate over freedom and responsibility has been applied to artificial intelligence (AI). Some such as Raul Hakli and Pekka Makela argue that no matter how complex robotics becomes, it is impossible for any robot to become a morally responsible agent. Hakli and Makela assert that even if robots become complex enough that they possess all the capacities required for moral responsibility, their history of being programmed undermines the robot’s autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. In this paper, I argue that a robot’s history of being programmed does not undermine that robot’s autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. I begin the paper with an introduction to Raul and Hakli’s argument, as well as an introduction to several case studies that will be utilized to explain my argument throughout the paper. I then display why Hakli and Makela’s argument is a compelling case against robots being able to be morally responsible agents. Next, I extract Hakli and Makela’s argument and explain it thoroughly. I then present my counterargument and explain why it is a counterexample to that of Hakli and Makela’s.
ContributorsAnderson, Troy David (Author) / Khoury, Andrew (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / College of Integrative Sciences and Arts (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
This thesis proposes an extension of David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, providing a method to calculate the `degrees of causal influence.' By providing a quantitative approach to causal influence, I find that that the influence approach can assess statements that involve causal redundancies, allowing the assessor to attribute primary causal responsibility to the contending cause with a higher net influence value. The causal influence calculation also addresses criticisms towards Lewis's influence account, namely those involving `inert zones' of influence, the use of the term `might,' trumping versus symmetric overdetermination, and Lewis's clause requiring stepwise influence. This thesis also compares the results of causal influence in multiple toy cases including Two Rocks, both the asymmetric and symmetric variants, demonstrating that causal influence overcomes many of the core issues in Lewis's initial counterfactual account of causation. Using the asymmetric Two Rocks variant, this thesis also provides a detailed example of how to use the calculation and a discussion of the calculation's limitations. The main drawbacks of the quantitative method for causal influence seems to be the effort that it requires and issues in finding measurable qualities to compare the similarity/difference between possible worlds. Using the Two Rocks case, however, the causal influence calculation reaches the same conclusions as what Lewis suggests. A primary remaining issue is applying the calculation to instances of causation by omission, however this seems to only be a problem in using the equations rather than a problem within the idea of causal influence itself. Also, there may still be issues in justifying comparative overall similarity. However, this is an issue that both the counterfactual and influence accounts face.
ContributorsKha, Rachael Thuy-Trang (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / McElhoes, David (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Chemical Engineering Program (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
Philippa Foot's theory of Natural Goodness provides a theoretical ethical framework that encompasses Aristotelian notions of flourishing and practical rationality. Foot's text provides a clear path to self-fulfillment, and her argument suggests that for a human being to flourish, they must experience happiness, actively enjoy good things, encompass human goodness, and exercise practical rationality. This thesis aims to evolve Foot's project of Natural Goodness from a theoretical model into a configuration that may be applied to everyday practical living. This project begins by detailing Philippa Foot's theory, walking through each step of the argument Foot provides in support for her ethical framework. Following, the merits of the theory are compared to other renowned ethical theories, and the intuitive nature of Natural Goodness is highlighted. It is argued that although Foot's ethical framework is praiseworthy, the theory is too open-ended in its discussion of happiness for individuals lacking human goodness to confidently apply the account in a practical setting. Due to this, I explore Foot's notion of happiness, defined as the enjoyment of good things, and I focus on the subjective aspect of enjoyment. By applying research from the field of positive psychology, the definition becomes guided into a more practical form, allowing for Foot's framework of Natural Goodness to become an applicable theory within contemporary society. Once this is achieved, and interrogatories are answered, I delve into ramifications of this new framework, and ways that individuals may increase the quality of their own lives.
ContributorsWoods, Tyler (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Klein, Shawn (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
Description
Personal identity stands at the heart of many practical practices such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman argues that the only accounts of personal identity that can capture this practical importance are those that address the characterization question \u2014 the question of what makes some feature attributable to a person. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels answers the characterization question and is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this paper, I argue that her account ultimately does not serve her purposes as it only focuses on attribution of features and does not, in fact, account for personal identity. Given that her view is exclusively about attribution, I explain, it is not relevant to the conversation on personal identity. Upon making this argument, I describe how the narrative self constitution view may nevertheless be useful as a tool for understanding the phenomenological notion of a sense of self or a self conception. Here I argue against Galen Strawson who holds that a narrative self conception is oftentimes problematic and unnecessary for several practical human functions. I argue that having a narrative sense of self is useful for personal growth insofar as it involves placing emphasis on certain life events, placing those events in context, and seeing one's life as having direction. Ultimately, I argue that a narrative self conception is not as problematic as Strawson thinks and may often be a useful tool for self-improvement.
ContributorsMoga, Radu (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Khoury, Andrew (Committee member) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12