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Description
Over the past decades, Colombian society has endured the impact of a longstanding political conflict among different actors and outrageous expressions of violence, especially among left wing guerrillas, right wing paramilitary groups and the state government. Drawing on socio-legal studies in transitional justice and human rights, this research attempts to analyze the recent experience of transitional justice in Colombia. The main purpose of this research is to understand how political, institutional and social actors, especially the government, the courts, the human rights and transitional justice NGOs, and victims associations, frame the mechanisms of transitional justice and use legal instruments to transform the conflict and reach what they consider "justice." It also attempts to understand the relations between politics and law in the context of a hegemonic discourse of security and give account of the expressions of resistance of human rights networks. In doing so, this research advances theory on literature about law and society and transitional justice by means of applying and expanding the theoretical framework of socio-legal research via the process of transitional justice in Colombia. The dissertation presents information gathered in the field in Colombia between July 2009 and July 2010 through a qualitative research design based on document analysis and in-depth interviews with members of different international and domestic human rights organizations, victims' organizations and national institutions. The research explains how these organizations combined political and legal actions in order to contest a project of security, and more specifically a project of impunity that came from negotiations with the paramilitary groups. The research also explains how the human rights networks not only mobilized internationally to gain political support from the international community, but also how these organizations contributed to transform the political debate about victims' rights. The research also explains how the human rights organizations and victims' groups articulated the global discourse on human rights and the local and domestic meanings constructed by the emerging movements of victims. Finally, the research analyses the relevance of legal practices consisting on strategic use of law in order to protect the victims of human rights violations.
ContributorsGomez Sanchez, Gabriel (Author) / Lauderdale, Pat (Thesis advisor) / Vanna, Gonzales (Committee member) / Ladawn, Haglund (Committee member) / Jeffrey, Juris (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Recognizing that CEOs are less capable of diversifying their employment risks than shareholders who could diversify their investment risks through portfolio investments, agency theory assumes that CEOs tend to be risk averse compared with shareholders. Based on this assumption, agency theory scholars suggest that to align the risk preference of CEOs with that of shareholders, CEOs need to be closely monitored and have less power. SEC regulators have been adopting the suggestion and accordingly CEO power has been reduced in the past decades. However, the empirical results are mixed and cannot provide solid support for the suggestion that reducing CEO power could lead the CEO to take more risks.
Considering that managerial risk taking is an important issue in strategic management research and agency theory has been widely adopted in academia and business worlds, it is imperative to clarify the mechanism behind the relationship between CEO power and risk taking. My study aims to fill this research gap. In this study I follow agency theory to take an employment security perspective and fully consider how CEOs’ concern about employment security is affected by their power and ownership structure to enrich the understanding of the effects of CEO power and ownership structure on risk taking. I fine-tune the key concept CEO power into the CEO power over board and introduce a key aspect of ownership structure - nontransient investor ownership. I further suggest that CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership affect CEOs’ employment security and the resulting CEO risk taking. In addition, I consider a set of industry and firm characteristics as the boundary conditions for the effects of CEO power and nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk-taking. This set of industry and firm characteristics include industry complexity, industry dynamism, industry munificence and firm slack.
I test my theory using a large-scale, multi-year sample of U.S. publicly listed S&P 1500 firms between 2001 and 2017. My main hypotheses about the effects of CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk taking receive strong support.
Considering that managerial risk taking is an important issue in strategic management research and agency theory has been widely adopted in academia and business worlds, it is imperative to clarify the mechanism behind the relationship between CEO power and risk taking. My study aims to fill this research gap. In this study I follow agency theory to take an employment security perspective and fully consider how CEOs’ concern about employment security is affected by their power and ownership structure to enrich the understanding of the effects of CEO power and ownership structure on risk taking. I fine-tune the key concept CEO power into the CEO power over board and introduce a key aspect of ownership structure - nontransient investor ownership. I further suggest that CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership affect CEOs’ employment security and the resulting CEO risk taking. In addition, I consider a set of industry and firm characteristics as the boundary conditions for the effects of CEO power and nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk-taking. This set of industry and firm characteristics include industry complexity, industry dynamism, industry munificence and firm slack.
I test my theory using a large-scale, multi-year sample of U.S. publicly listed S&P 1500 firms between 2001 and 2017. My main hypotheses about the effects of CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk taking receive strong support.
ContributorsZhu, Qi (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, David (Thesis advisor) / Certo, Trevis (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019