Matching Items (26)
Description
Political and economic competition, so goes the broad argument, reduce corruption because competition increases the cost of actors to engage in corrupt practices. It increases the risk of exposure, provides non-corrupt alternatives for consumers, and introduces non-corrupt practices into the political and economic domains. Why then, has corruption persisted in the Central Eastern European countries decades after the introduction of political and economic competition in the early 1990s?
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing.
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary.
The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor.
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing.
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary.
The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor.
ContributorsKartner, Jennifer Joan (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Thies, Cameron (Committee member) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Berliner, Daniel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This work explores the underlying dynamics of democracies in the context of underdevelopment, arguing that when society has not attained a substantial degree of economic independence from the state, it undermines democratic quality and stability. Economic underdevelopment and political oppression are mutually reinforcing, and both are rooted in the structure of the agriculture sector, the distribution of land, and the rural societies that emerge around this order. These systems produce persistent power imbalances that militate toward their continuance, encourage dependency, and foster the development of neopatrimonialism and corruption in the government, thereby weakening key pillars of democracy such as accountability and representativeness. Through historical analysis of a single case study, this dissertation demonstrates that while this is partly a result of actor choices at key points in time, it is highly influenced by structural constraints embedded in earlier time periods. I find that Ghana’s historical development from the colonial era to present day closely follows this trajectory.
ContributorsEllis, Alicia N (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.
ContributorsZerba, Shaio Hui (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Nuclear weapons possess enormous potential to inflict damage on our world. The majority of countries in the world denounce the proliferation of these weapons, but a minority of countries have a desire to proliferate. This essay analyzes the impact of regime type and alliance strength to a nuclear state on protégé proliferation decisions. Prior research focuses on single factors in proliferation decisions and fails to take in to account the multi-faceted factors that influence the international system that states operate in. The analysis finds that regime type gives an indication about a state’s likelihood to proliferate, but does not explain proliferation choices comprehensively. Alliance strength plays a large role in a state’s security calculations and must be analyzed in conjunction to regime type to understand proliferation decisions.
ContributorsHsu, Kai Nalu (Author) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis director) / Thies, Cameron (Committee member) / W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
Genocide studies have traditionally focused on the perpetrator’s intent to eradicate a particular identity-based group, using the Holocaust as their model and point of comparison. Although some aspects of the Holocaust were undoubtedly unique, recent scholars have sought to challenge the notion that it was a singular phenomenon. Instead, they draw attention to a recurring pattern of genocidal events throughout history by shifting the focus from intent to structure. One particular branch of scholars seeks to connect the ideology and tactics of imperialism with certain genocidal events. These anti-imperialist genocide scholars concede that their model cannot account for all genocides, but still claim that it creates meaningful connections between genocides committed by Western colonialist powers and those that have occurred in a neoimperialist world order shaped according to Western interests. The latter includes genocides in postcolonial states, which these scholars believe were shaped by the scars of their colonial past, as well as genocides in which imperial hegemons assisted local perpetrators. Imperialist and former colonial powers have contributed meaningfully to all of these kinds of genocides, yet their contributions have largely been ignored due to their own influence on the creation of the current international order. Incorporating the anti-imperialist perspective into the core doctrine of genocide studies may lead to breakthroughs in areas of related policy and practice, such as prevention and accountability.
ContributorsParker, Ashleigh Mae (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis director) / Sivak, Henry (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
Alexis de Tocqueville, French political theorist and scientist, theorized in the 19th century that “France cannot reform except through revolution” (Heisbourg, 2016). As France continues to face a strained economy with high unemployment and stalled growth, the OECD recommends that France should implement labor reform “to promote job growth” (OECD, 2015). Labor reform refers to removing labor protections for French employees, resulting in an increase in firing and hiring flexibility for employers.
Recent governments in France have failed to bring about meaningful labor reform, faced with opposition in the streets or within their own political party. The election of Emanuel Macron, viewed as a political outsider who had never held elected office created his own political party, En Marche, seemed like the catalyst to lasting economic reform. However, if high unemployment and slow economic growth to comparable economies have been concerns for France since the beginning of the 21st century, why were past governments unsuccessful in implementing legislative actions to address labor reform?
This paper will argue that the election of Macron and the establishment of En Marche was caused by a shift in power that allowed Macron enough support to sway the political landscape of France and implement labor market reform. This largely has to do with the power struggle between France’s Outsiders, “those without secure employment, Insiders, “those with secure employment” and the Upscale group, “employers, the upper middle class, and the business and financial community” (Rudea, 2007). However, the degree and preservation of Macron’s reform plans are threatened by Insiders who have been stripped of employee protections.
Recent governments in France have failed to bring about meaningful labor reform, faced with opposition in the streets or within their own political party. The election of Emanuel Macron, viewed as a political outsider who had never held elected office created his own political party, En Marche, seemed like the catalyst to lasting economic reform. However, if high unemployment and slow economic growth to comparable economies have been concerns for France since the beginning of the 21st century, why were past governments unsuccessful in implementing legislative actions to address labor reform?
This paper will argue that the election of Macron and the establishment of En Marche was caused by a shift in power that allowed Macron enough support to sway the political landscape of France and implement labor market reform. This largely has to do with the power struggle between France’s Outsiders, “those without secure employment, Insiders, “those with secure employment” and the Upscale group, “employers, the upper middle class, and the business and financial community” (Rudea, 2007). However, the degree and preservation of Macron’s reform plans are threatened by Insiders who have been stripped of employee protections.
ContributorsLoonam, Daniel Francis (Author) / Thomson, Henry (Thesis director) / Kirsch, Robert (Committee member) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
Political scientists have long recognized the importance of representation as being critical to the American form of government. This paper begins by establishing the theoretical basis for representational studies in political science. It then turns to the empirical question of measuring the degree to which legislators represent their constituents. While there have been comprehensive studies of representation among members of Congress, several practical difficulties have prevented similar studies at the state legislature level. Underlying measures of representation are the preferences of constituents and the representational behavior of legislators. This paper proposes two metrics, a modified Partisan Voting Index and the American Conservative Union State Legislative Ratings, to compare the district-level preferences with roll call voting behavior (a form of substantive representation) of the corresponding legislators. This methodology is then tested against data collected from the Arizona legislature, specifically incorporating election returns from 2012, 2014, and 2016, and votes taken during the 2017 and 2018 sessions of the legislature. The findings suggest a strong relationship between the partisan and ideological leaning of a state legislative district and how conservative or liberal a legislator’s voting record is, even when controlling for political party. Two special cases are also examined in the context of this data. First, the three legislative districts with a split delegation are analyzed and determined to have a moderating effect on representative behavior. Second, five mid-term vacancies are examined along with the process for filling a vacancy. The paper concludes with a discussion of how this line of research can better inform legislators and help constituents hold their elected officials to account.
ContributorsFairbanks, Austin Kyle (Author) / Herrera, Richard (Thesis director) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
Within sixty years, the People’s Republic of China has risen from a struggling post-civil war state to the second largest economy in the world, comprising of 16.71 percent of the global economy as of 2015. While China has grown, its presence internationally has grown as well—China has utilized its capital to foment important relationships and foster soft power dynamics, making billions available in development aid and investment projects across the globe, most notably in Africa and Latin America, where Chinese goods have begun to dominate the markets there as they have in American counterparts. However, within Latin America China has been investing in countries that are traditionally seen as “risky” financial investments. This paper hypothesizes that the returns on Chinese investments in Latin America are not financial, but political—that China is investing in expansion of its soft-power and legitimizing its beginnings of global hegemony. The paper also explores the success of these initiatives by comparing the level of Chinese investment to changes in Latin American foreign policy alignment, discourse, and agreements through utilizing case studies of Venezuela and Bolivia.
ContributorsHochhaus, Natalie (Co-author) / Yan, Jaylia (Co-author) / Thomson, Henry (Thesis director) / Ripley, Charles (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
While the negative humanitarian effects of sanctions are widely known, scholars and policymakers often assume these costs are geographically localized. This research questions these assertions by examining the relationship between economic sanctions and refugee flight. I argue that the imposition of sanctions produces refugees for two reasons. First, in the face of rising prices and stagnant wages, people are forced to leave in order to survive. Second, sanctions increase the level of state-sponsored repression, forcing refugees to flee political violence. The empirical results offer initial support for this theory and suggest that sanctions may promote a contagion effect that could have negative consequences for regional economic and political stability.
ContributorsTruax, Timothy Christian (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis director) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Levels of civic engagement among young adults has been an increasing concern for social scientists. Young adults are showing lower amounts of civic engagement than in the past, and this has translated into a concern for the democratic process in the United States. This thesis looks to analyze the national downward trend of civic engagement at the collegiate level, specifically at Arizona State University. To make this 71,000-student community more manageable, this analysis will specifically look at one community within Arizona State: Fraternity and Sorority Life. The different groups within Fraternity and Sorority Life at Arizona State University provide an all-encompassing view of civic engagement through participation in various activities and events. An annual report published by the office of Fraternity and Sorority Life will show the effect of the number of educational programs, number of charitable donations, and amount of outside campus involvement has on civic engagement. Looking at pieces of work like Putnam’s Bowling Alone and Hero’s Racial Diversity and Social Capital, this thesis analyzes the associations of these organizations and how that translates into civic engagement and social capital. In addition, we subsequently question Putnam’s analysis, and attempt to apply these critiques to Arizona State University’s collegiate community. This thesis looks at the impact of historically cultural vs historically social groups. The results of this study show that the historically cultural groups are demonstrating higher levels of civic engagement based on their horizontal associations. This information can be used to better understand young adult’s impact on their surrounding community, as well as how the makeup and functioning of groups can influence levels of social capital and civic engagement.
ContributorsHertle, Sydnee Avery (Author) / Thomson, Henry (Thesis director) / Hero, Rodney (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05