Understanding the political landscape is crucial to formulating a reasonable prediction as to the future of the London market. Aside from research reports and articles, our main insights into the political direction of Brexit come from our recordings from meetings in March of 2017 with two high-ranking members of Parliament and one member of the House of Lords—all of whom are members of the Tory Party (the meetings being held under the condition of anonymity). The below analysis will be followed by a discussion of the economics of Brexit, primarily focusing on the economic risks and uncertainties which have emerged after the vote, and which currently exist today. Such risks include the UK losing its financial passporting rights, weakening GDP and currency value, the potential for a reduction in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the potential loss of the service sector in the city of London due to not being able to access the European Single Market.
The report will shift focus to analyzing three competing viewpoints of the direction of the London market based on recordings from interviews of stakeholders in the London real estate market. One being an executive of one of the largest REITs in the UK, another being the Global Head of Real Estate at a top asset management firm, and another being a director at a large property consulting firm. The report includes these differing “sub-theses” in order to try to make sense of the vast market uncertainties post-Brexit as well as to contrast their viewpoints with where the market is currently and with the report’s investment recommendation.
The remainder of the report will consist of the methods used for analyzing market trends including how the data was modeled in order to make the investment recommendation. The report will analyze real estate and market metrics pre-Brexit, immediately after the vote, post-Brexit, and will conclude with future projections encapsulating the investment recommendation.
Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, financial institutions faced regulatory changes due to inherent weaknesses that were exposed by the recession. Within the United States, regulation came via the passing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, which was heavily influenced by the internationally focused Basel III accord. A key component to both of these sets of regulations focused on raising the capital requirements for financial institutions, as well as creating capital buffers to help protect solvency during economic downturns in the future. The goal of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of these changes to capital requirements, and to hypothesize as to what would happen if the modern banking system experienced the COVID-19 pandemic recession with the capital and leverage levels of the banking institutions circa 2007. To accomplish this, data from the Federal Reserve describing the capital and leverage ratios of the banking industry will be evaluated during both the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, as well as during the COVID-19 Recession. Specifically, we will look at by how much capital was improved due to Dodd-Frank/Basel III, the resiliency of the capital and leverage ratios during the modern COVID-19 recession, and we will look at the average drop in capital levels caused by the COVID-19 recession and apply these percentage changes to the leverage/capital levels seen in 2007. Given the results, it is clear to see that the change in capital requirements along with the counter-cyclical buffers described in Dodd-Frank and Basel III allowed the banking system to function throughout the COVID recession without approaching insolvency in the slightest, something that ailed many large banks and firms during the Global Financial Crisis. As an answer to our hypothetical, we found that the drop seen affecting the measures of bank capital experienced during the COVID pandemic when applied to values seen at the beginning of the 2007 recession still led to a well-capitalized banking industry as a whole, highlighting the resiliency seen during the COVID recession thanks to the capital buffers put in place, as well as the direct assistance provided by the federal government (via PPP loans and stimulus checks) and the Federal Reserve in keeping the hit on capital to minimal values throughout the pandemic.
The goal of this study is to test the assumption that an AP score of 3 is equivalent to a C and gain an understanding of how AP-3 students are performing academically at ASU and how to interpret a 3 when evaluating ASU AP credit acceptance policy. Of primary interest is comparing the performance of AP-3 students to those non-AP students that got a C or higher in the corresponding course. To accomplish this, a tabular analysis of academic performance by AP score is conducted using aggregate student data from the ASU 2012-2014 cohorts. Among the performances considered are GPA, time to graduation, performance in the corresponding and following course at ASU, and more. Following this, a model is estimated for the impact that a 3 has on a student’s time to graduation when compared to non-AP students that got a C in the corresponding course.