Matching Items (60)
Description
Courthouse dogs (sometimes referred to as facility animals) are expertly trained canines which may be used to assist individuals with psychological, emotional, or physical difficulties in a myriad of courtroom situations. While these animals are increasingly used to assist young witness to court, the jury is still out on whether or not they are prejudicial to the defendant. No known research exists in this area, although research is necessary to determine the possibly prejudicial nature of these animals. Using a mock trial paradigm involving a child sexual abuse case, the current study employed a 2 (Witness type: victim vs. bystander) x 3 (Innovation type: courthouse dog vs. teddy bear vs. none) fully-crossed factorial design. It was hypothesized that witness type and innovation type would interact to differentially impact jurors' judgments about the trial, defendant, and child witness. In addition, it was posited that emotions, such as anger and disgust, would also affect judgments and decision-making. Results indicate that courthouse dogs and comfort toys did impact jurors' decision making in some ways. In addition, emotions and witness credibility predicted sentencing, verdict, and other trial judgments.
ContributorsBurd, Kayla (Author) / Mcquiston, Dawn E (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica M (Committee member) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
This study compared mock jurors' verdict decisions regarding three different insanity defenses that are used across jurisdictions in the United States' Criminal Justice System. Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI), Guilty Except Insane (GEI) and Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) all have different effects on the defendant and on the system, but little is known about how jurors' will use these different verdicts. This study used a vignette and online survey delivered through MTurk to see which of the three verdicts, if rendered, would be more preferable by the mock jurors. It was predicted that GEI (a "compromise" verdict with elements from both NGRI and GBMI) would be more favorable than NGRI (the most lenient) but less favorable that GBMI (the strictest). However, the findings indicated that lay people cannot tell the difference between the three insanity verdicts: an equal proportion of mock jurors in each condition chose the relevant insanity verdict. Limitations, implications, and future directions are discussed.
ContributorsSiso, Cassidy Brooke (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis director) / Schweitzer, Nick (Committee member) / School of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Contributor) / Hugh Downs School of Human Communication (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness of a novel way to phrase jury instructions to debias jurors inspired by moral foundations theory. In two experimental studies, participants read a transcript of a sexual assault (Study 1: n = 544) or an assault and battery criminal case (Study 2: n = 509). In each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read either a case with or without prejudicial evidence. Participants exposed to prejudicial evidence were either given standard jury instructions to disregard the evidence, no instructions, or novel jury instructions inspired by moral foundations theory. Individual differences in moral foundations affected how susceptible people were to prejudicial evidence and case facts in general. This pattern emerged regardless of the type of jury instructions in most cases, suggesting that the moral foundation inspired instructions failed to help jurors disregard prejudicial evidence. The impact of people’s moral foundation endorsement has direct implications for how attorneys may phrase evidence to cater towards these moral biases and select ideal jurors during the voir dire process. To further advance people’s understanding of the effects of prejudicial evidence and jury instructions in legal settings, a third study looked at how attorneys (n = 138) perceived the prevalence and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases and the effectiveness of jury instructions. Over three quarters of the sample (77.54%) reported having experienced prejudicial evidence in their cases and expressed concern that prejudicial evidence is influential to jurors with jury instructions being ineffective. Taken altogether, the results of this project show the potential impact moral foundation endorsement can have on case judgments and how jurors are differently influenced by prejudicial evidence. In addition, data from attorneys showing the perceived prevalent and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases further
justifies the need to continue researching safeguards against prejudicial evidence.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen Marie (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Stolzenberg, Stacia N (Committee member) / Fox, Kate A (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless of whether the jury actually disregards the inadmissible evidence. This study tested four interventions derived from psychological research to identify the combination that most effectively helped jurors disregard inadmissible evidence (operationalized by lower conviction rates). It was hypothesized that the most effective interventions identified in Study 1 would yield significantly lower conviction rates when compared to traditional instructions to disregard in Study 2. The interventions were tested in Study 1 using Multiphase Optimization Strategy (MOST) methodology to identify the optimized intervention package through regression analysis. Study 2 served as a randomized controlled trial in which treatment as usual (a judge’s instructions to disregard) was compared to the optimized intervention package. Participants were randomly assigned to either (1) be exposed to no inadmissible evidence, (2) receive inadmissible evidence and treatment as usual, (3) receive inadmissible evidence, treatment as usual and the optimized intervention package, or (4) receive the inadmissible evidence without objection. Logistic regression revealed that jurors who were given an instruction to disregard produced lower conviction rates when they also received the optimized intervention package. Interpretation, limitations, and calls to action are discussed.
ContributorsSandberg, Pamela Nicole (Author) / O'Hara, Karey L. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
Prosecutors’ use of dehumanizing language to describe defendants in their opening and closing statements can often go unchecked. This research aims to assess the effect of dehumanizing language on judgments about Black versus White defendants.Past research has demonstrated the effects of dehumanizing language on lay people's perceptions of out-groups, and how those perceptions can lead to consequential behaviors, prejudice, and even retributive violence and conflict. My first aim is to extend this research to the legal context, more specifically, to address a gap in prior research by randomly assigning participants to read the same closing statement in a murder case with
(a) no dehumanizing language, (b) animalistic dehumanizing language, or (c) mechanistic dehumanizing language to describe either (a) White defendants (Studies 1-2) or (b) Black defendants (Study 2). There has been ample investigation into subtle dehumanization and how it interacts with racial groups, but research has yet to investigate how dehumanized descriptions (both animalistic and mechanistic) of a defendant may influence implicit and explicit perceptions of a defendant and legal outcomes with the inclusion of a race manipulation. I tested the impact of dehumanizing language on participants’ impressions of the defendant, their levels of explicit dehumanization of the defendant specifically and implicit dehumanization of Black versus White targets generally, as well as their ultimate sentencing decisions. I predicted that closing statements including dehumanizing language would lead to greater dehumanization of the defendant and greater likelihood of choosing a death sentence—and that this effect would be greater for Black versus White defendants. I also conducted exploratory tests of the relative impact of animalistic versus mechanistic dehumanization. Investigation into the effects of dehumanization of racial and ethnic groups can help identify underlying psychological causes of racial bias and help to facilitate potential preventative measures in the courtroom.
In this paper, I will report the results from a preliminary study testing the impact of dehumanizing language about a White defendant. I will then report the results from a follow-up study testing the impact of dehumanizing language about a White and a Black defendant.
ContributorsBettis, Taylor (Author) / Salerno, Jessica M (Thesis advisor) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Koop, Greg (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
When questions about a person’s mental state arise in court, psychologists are often called in to help. Psychological assessment tools are routinely included in these evaluations to inform legal decision making. In accordance with the Daubert standard, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, courts are obligated to exclude evidence that relies on poor scientific practice, including assessment tools. However, prior research demonstrates that psychological assessment tools with weak psychometric properties are routinely admitted in court, rarely challenged on the basis of their reliability, and if a challenge is indeed raised, often still admitted (Neal et al., 2019). Is neuropsychological assessment evidence in particular vulnerable to the same pitfalls? The present research aimed to 1) quantify the quality of neuropsychological assessment evidence used in court, 2) evaluate whether courts are calibrated to the quality of these tools through the rate and success of legal admissibility challenges raised, and 3) compare forensic mental health evaluators’ experiences and practices with regard to the quality of neuropsychological versus non-neuropsychological assessment tools. Neuropsychological tools appeared to perform worse than non-neuropsychological tools in terms of psychometric quality. However, in a case law analysis, significantly fewer challenges were observed to the legal admissibility of neuropsychological tools than to non-neuropsychological tools. To protect the legitimacy of the legal system and prevent wrongful decisions, it is critical that the evidence on which psychologists’ expert opinions are formed is scientifically valid, and that judges and attorneys adequately scrutinize the quality of evidence introduced in court.
ContributorsMathers, Elizabeth (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Burleson, Mary (Committee member) / Roberts, Nicole (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
The legal system relies heavily on the contribution of forensic psychologists. These psychologists give opinions on a defendant’s ability to stand trial, their legal sanity at the time of the crime, their future dangerousness, and their competency to be executed. However, we know little about what extrinsic factors bias these experts. I assessed the influence of gruesome photographs on forensic psychologists’ evaluations of competency and legal sanity. Previous research has demonstrated that these photographs influence lay judgments of guilt. I predicted that gruesome color photographs (versus the same photographs in black-and-white or a textual description of the photographs) would influence forensic psychologists to judge the defendant competent and sane (decisions that might ultimately lead to punishment). I also predicted that this effect would be greater for sanity judgments than for competency judgments. I asked laypeople to make the same decisions in order to compare expert and lay judgments. I predicted that impact of photograph type seen in experts would be greater in the lay sample. No differences in judgments of competence, sanity, or mental illness emerged as a function of the type of visual information, for either expert or lay participants. Experts relied on competency evidence to make competency judgments and insanity evidence to make insanity judgments. In contrast, lay people relied on various types of evidence to make their ultimate judgments. This research suggests that people making competency and sanity judgments might not be biased by gruesome photographs.
ContributorsPhalen, Hannah (Author) / Salerno, Jessica M (Thesis advisor) / Saks, Michael J. (Committee member) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.
ContributorsJones, Ashley C. T. (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Differential perceptions of LGBT individuals: the intersectionality of sexual orientation and gender
Description
Current research on anti-gay attitudes has focused heavily on heterosexuals versus
non-heterosexuals, with very little research delving into the differences within these “non-heterosexual” groups. The author conducted an exploratory analysis of how the intersectional effect of gender and sexual orientation affect perceptions of target groups’ gender and sexuality, which in turn might explain different levels of prejudice toward LGBT subgroups. Based on previous studies, the author hypothesized that participants would believe that a gay male has a more fixed sexuality than a lesbian, leading in turn to higher levels of moral outrage. This study further aims to extend the literature to perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals by testing competing hypotheses. Participants might feel less moral outrage toward these groups than other LGBT subgroups because they believe their sexuality is even less fixed than lesbians’. Alternatively, participants might feel more moral outrage toward bisexual and transgender targets (versus other LGBT groups) because of the uncomfortable feeling of uncertainty about these groups’ sexuality and/or gender. Overall, participants demonstrated an interactive effect of gender and sexuality on factors including perceived sexual orientation, perceived biological sex, perceived gender identity, perceived sexual fixedness, and moral outrage rather than gender having a main effect on perceptions of gender and sexual orientation having a main effect on perceptions of sexuality. Furthermore, perceptions of sexual fixedness mediated the effect of gender on moral outrage for heterosexual target groups, but not gay targets. Gender certainty mediated the effect of gender on moral outrage for pre-op transgender target groups, but not heterosexuals. This work is important to inform future research on the topics of the intersection of sexuality and gender, especially to extend the limited literature on perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals.
non-heterosexuals, with very little research delving into the differences within these “non-heterosexual” groups. The author conducted an exploratory analysis of how the intersectional effect of gender and sexual orientation affect perceptions of target groups’ gender and sexuality, which in turn might explain different levels of prejudice toward LGBT subgroups. Based on previous studies, the author hypothesized that participants would believe that a gay male has a more fixed sexuality than a lesbian, leading in turn to higher levels of moral outrage. This study further aims to extend the literature to perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals by testing competing hypotheses. Participants might feel less moral outrage toward these groups than other LGBT subgroups because they believe their sexuality is even less fixed than lesbians’. Alternatively, participants might feel more moral outrage toward bisexual and transgender targets (versus other LGBT groups) because of the uncomfortable feeling of uncertainty about these groups’ sexuality and/or gender. Overall, participants demonstrated an interactive effect of gender and sexuality on factors including perceived sexual orientation, perceived biological sex, perceived gender identity, perceived sexual fixedness, and moral outrage rather than gender having a main effect on perceptions of gender and sexual orientation having a main effect on perceptions of sexuality. Furthermore, perceptions of sexual fixedness mediated the effect of gender on moral outrage for heterosexual target groups, but not gay targets. Gender certainty mediated the effect of gender on moral outrage for pre-op transgender target groups, but not heterosexuals. This work is important to inform future research on the topics of the intersection of sexuality and gender, especially to extend the limited literature on perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals.
ContributorsMalik, Sarah Elizabeth (Author) / Salerno, Jessica M (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Protectors who do harm are often punished more severely because their crime is perceived as a betrayal of trust. Two experiments test whether this will generalize to protectors who incur harm while serving in their protective role, and if not, whether collective guilt for the harm they suffered provides an explanation. Study 1 tested competing hypotheses that a veteran (versus civilian) with PTSD would be punished either more harshly because of the trust betrayal, or more leniently because of increased guilt about the harm the veteran suffered during war. Men and women were both more lenient toward a veteran (versus civilian) but this effect was mediated by collective guilt only among men. In Study 2, guilt inductions increased leniency among participants less likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (women, low national identifiers), but not in those who are more likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (men, high national identifiers), who were lenient without any guilt inductions.
ContributorsJay, Alexander Charles (Author) / Salerno, Jessica M (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015