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- Member of: ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Description
Understanding sources of knowledge (e.g., seeing leads to knowing) is an important ability in young children’s theory of mind development. The research presented here measured if children were better at reporting their own versus another person’s knowledge states, which would indicate the presence of introspection. Children had to report when the person (self or other) had knowledge or ignorance after looking into one box and not looking into another box. In Study 1 (N = 66), 3- and 4-year-olds found the other-version of the task harder than the self-version whereas 5-year-olds performed near ceiling on both versions. This effect replicated in Study 2 (N = 43), which included familiarization trials to make sure children understood the question format. This finding is in support of the presence of introspection in preschool-aged children. In the same studies, children also showed evidence for theorizing about their own and others knowledge states in a guessing task (Study 1) and in true and false belief tasks (Study 2). These findings together indicate both introspection and theorizing are present during young children's theory of mind development.
ContributorsGonzales, Christopher (Author) / Fabricius, William (Thesis advisor) / Spinrad, Tracy (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Do emotions help explain our behaviors? Can they condemn us, excuse us, orr mitigate our moral responsibility orr blameworthiness? Can they explain our rationality and irrationality, orr warrant such attributions? Can they be justified orr warranted? Are they constitutive aspects of our consciousness, identity, characters, virtues, orr epistemic status? The answer to these questions, at least to a significant extent, depends on what emotions are. This illustrates the importance of what emotions are to academics across multiple disciplines, as well as to members of governing bodies, organizations, communities, and groups. Given the great importance of emotions to various aspects of our lives, this dissertation is about the relevance of the topic of emotion as an area of study for the discipline of philosophy. This dissertation is also broadly about the need to bridge the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between various distinct disciplines, thereby contributing to the process of unifying knowledge across the various disciplines within the realm of academia.
The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC).
The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC).
ContributorsMun, Cecilea (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Shiota, Michelle (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
After surveying the literature on the normativity of logic, the paper answers that logic is normative for reasoning and rationality. The paper then goes on to discuss whether this constitutes a new problem in issues in normativity, and the paper affirms that it does. Finally, the paper concludes by explaining that the logic as model view can address this new problem.
ContributorsCadenas, Haggeo (Author) / Pinillos, Angel (Thesis advisor) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / nair, shyam (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
My job in this thesis is to explore a supposedly dragon-filled area of philosophy, tropology. By 'tropology,' I only mean the study of figurative speech, or, more particularly, metaphors. It seems clear to most people that metaphors have meaning. But this fact flies in the face of several different theories of meaning. Such as, the meaning of a metaphor can't be properly conveyed by Possible Worlds Semantics or Truth-Conditional Semantics. Tropology is also an area of philosophy with very few commonly accepted theories. It is not like the study of reference, where there are two theories, each having a large following. The the various theories in tropology are so radically different, with each having relatively few followers, that the it is widely unexplored in philosophy. Some theories claim that metaphors is the exact same as another use of speech (namely, similes). Another claims that metaphors lack “meaning.” And a third claims that metaphors do 'mean' but getting at that meaning requires some special mental operations. By the end of this thesis, you will not only have my map of tropology, my theory of metaphors, but also some experimental philosophy about them to help put to rest some theories.
ContributorsSmith, Davis Alexander (Author) / Pinillos, Angel (Thesis advisor) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Reynolds, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
There is ample evidence from psychology and cognitive science that a person's beliefs, memories, expectations, concepts, and desires can influence how that person perceives the world. In other words, the way an object looks (the color, size, shape, etc.) to a person can vary according to his or her beliefs, memories, desires, and so on. But a person is principally justified in his or her beliefs about the world by how things look to that person. So, if how things look to a person justifies that person's beliefs about the world, and that person's prior beliefs, memories, and desires influence how things look, then his or her prior beliefs, memories, and desires influence the justification for his or her beliefs about the world. This influence creates several significant philosophical problems. In this dissertation, I introduce and attempt to solve these problems by constructing a theory of justification in which a person's beliefs about the world are justified if and only if his or her prior beliefs, memories, and desires constitute a coherent worldview.
ContributorsCrutchfield, Parker (Author) / Reynolds, Steven (Thesis advisor) / Cohen, Stewart (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Kriegel, Uriah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011