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- Creators: Poulenc, Francis, 1899-1963
Description
This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a method of gathering evidence if it has established some agreed-upon standards regarding how to evaluate uses of this method. Existing meta-philosophical disputes take the nature of intuitions to be their starting point. This is a mistake. My concern is not the epistemic status of intuitions, but rather how metaphysicians appeal to intuitions as a form of evidence. In order for intuitions to play a viable role in research they must be subject to certain constraints, regardless of whether they allow individual researchers to know that their theories are true. Metaphysicians are not permitted to use intuitions as arbitrarily having different evidential status in different circumstances, nor should they continue to use intuitions as evidence in certain disputes when there is disagreement amongst disputants about whether intuitions should have this evidential status.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
ContributorsMusgrave, Shea (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Nestor A. (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
ContributorsPoulenc, Francis, 1899-1963 (Composer)
ContributorsPoulenc, Francis, 1899-1963 (Composer)
ContributorsPoulenc, Francis, 1899-1963 (Composer)
ContributorsPoulenc, Francis, 1899-1963 (Composer)
Description
In this thesis, I discuss the philosophical problem of evil and, as a response, John Hick's soul making theodicy. First, I discuss the transformation of the problem. I examine how the problem has shifted from logical to evidential in recent history. Next, I offer a faithful rendition of Hick's position - one which states the existence of evil does not provide evidence against the existence of God. After reconstructing his argument, I go on to exposes its logical faults. I present four main contentions to Hick's theodicy. First, I analyze the psychology of dehumanization to question whether we have any evidence that soul making is happening in response to the suffering in the world. Second, I argue that Hick's theodicy is self-defeating if accepted because it undermines the central point on which his argument depends. Third, I claim that Hick's theodicy is self-defeating given his eschatological views. Finally, I discuss how Hick's theodicy does not account for the animal suffering that widely exists in the world now, and that exists in our evolutionary history. My hope is to show that Hick's theodicy fails to solve the problem of evil. I claim that the amount of gratuitous suffering in the world does provide evidence against the existence of God.
ContributorsScarpa, Frank Vincent (Author) / Manninen, Bertha (Thesis advisor) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Committee member) / Pinillos, Angel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Russellian monism is a promising theory of consciousness that attempts to capture the strengths of both physicalism and dualism while avoiding their weaknesses. I begin by showing that the Russellian monist’s chief anti-physicalist rival, emergentism, is unable to give an adequate solution to the exclusion problem. Specifically, they fall prey to what I call “the opacity problem.” That is, because the emergentist is committed to there being both a sufficient physical cause and a sufficient mental cause for our actions, it is unclear what difference the mental cause is making in bringing about the effect. This is because, for the physical cause to truly be a sufficient cause, it must be sufficient to bring about the effect as it occurred. This distinguishes mental overdetermination from non-problematic kinds of overdetermination (like double rock throwing cases). I then show how the constitutive Russellian monist is able to avoid the exclusion problem, while the emergent Russellian monist faces similar opacity problems to emergentism. Finally, I give an account of how the constitutive Russellian monist can give a response to the strongest objection against—the subject-summing problem. I argue that we only have translucent access to our conscious states—that is, only part of the essential nature of the state is revealed to us through introspection. I then argue that we have reason to think that part of the essential nature of the conscious state not revealed to us is involved in subject-summing.
ContributorsSchreick, Forrest J (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Thesis advisor) / Reynolds, Steven L. (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, N. Angel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Criminal Justice is a complex subject matter, and not everyone agrees on the way a criminal justice system ought to function. But one feature that is common to virtually all forms of proposed justice systems is that a true justice system treats people ethically. The question, then, is how a justice system can achieve this. This investigation analyzed two ethical theories, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, to determine which one would be better suited for guiding a criminal justice system on how to treat the people involved ethically. This investigation focused on applying the two theories to the U.S. Criminal Justice System in particular.
Kantianism is a duty-based moral theory in which actions have an intrinsic moral worth. This means certain actions are morally right and other are morally wrong, regardless of the intended or realized consequences. The theory relies on the categorical imperative to judge the morality of certain actions. It states that an action is moral if its maxim can be willed universal law and if it avoids treating people as merely a means. In contrast, Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which focuses on the consequences of an action in judging moral worth. In Utilitarianism, the morally correct action is the one which will maximize utility; that is to say, the morally right action is the one which will produce the greatest amount of happiness and minimize the amount of pain for the greatest number of people.
After applying these two theories to moral dilemmas facing the U.S. Criminal Justice System, including the appropriate collection of DNA evidence, the use of police deception, and the use of criminal punishments such as solitary confinement or the death penalty, it was clear that Kantianism was the ethical theory best suited for guiding the system in treating people ethically. This is because Kantianism’s focus on the intrinsic moral worth of an action rather than its consequences leaves less room for ambiguity than does Utilitarianism.
Kantianism is a duty-based moral theory in which actions have an intrinsic moral worth. This means certain actions are morally right and other are morally wrong, regardless of the intended or realized consequences. The theory relies on the categorical imperative to judge the morality of certain actions. It states that an action is moral if its maxim can be willed universal law and if it avoids treating people as merely a means. In contrast, Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which focuses on the consequences of an action in judging moral worth. In Utilitarianism, the morally correct action is the one which will maximize utility; that is to say, the morally right action is the one which will produce the greatest amount of happiness and minimize the amount of pain for the greatest number of people.
After applying these two theories to moral dilemmas facing the U.S. Criminal Justice System, including the appropriate collection of DNA evidence, the use of police deception, and the use of criminal punishments such as solitary confinement or the death penalty, it was clear that Kantianism was the ethical theory best suited for guiding the system in treating people ethically. This is because Kantianism’s focus on the intrinsic moral worth of an action rather than its consequences leaves less room for ambiguity than does Utilitarianism.
ContributorsMorett, Xavier Laakea (Author) / Manninen, Bertha (Thesis director) / Kimberly, Kobojek (Committee member) / School of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Natural Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
Universal healthcare has become a regular feature of most developed nations around the world. This characteristic, however, does not extend to the United States, where some 28.2 million Americans remain uninsured or underinsured. In the past few years, the US has been on the precipice of major healthcare overhaul which has brought the debate on government-sponsored coverage to the forefront of political discourse. This thesis explores what it may mean to establish affordable access to healthcare as a right for all Americans. In doing so, it utilizes rule-utilitarian principles to define and assess the moral obligation of the United States' federal and state governments to provide sufficient coverage to all qualifying individuals within the country. This paper focuses on evaluating the current healthcare system in the United States while concentrating particularly on how its fragmented approach limits its success and longevity. It then offers a cross-comparison with the universal healthcare systems of Canada, France, and Japan, nations that outperform the United States in most healthcare measures such as life expectancy, infant and under-5 mortality, medical costs per capita, and disease prevalence. The free-market criticisms of government-provided coverage and its alternative private-insurance-based approach to healthcare in the US are also deliberated. In light of these considerations, this thesis concludes with a commentary on what healthcare reform could look like for the nation as well as examines how a utilitarian appeal to rights likely makes the best case for adopting universal government-sponsored healthcare coverage in the United States.
ContributorsKhan, Sameera (Author) / Manninen, Bertha (Thesis director) / Marshall, Pamela (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Natural Sciences (Contributor) / School of Humanities, Arts, and Cultural Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
Through this thesis, I intend to explore what sociologist Arthur Frank means when he describes illness as "a dangerous opportunity" (Frank, 1991, p. 1). It is my objective to more fully understand the lived experience of illness and how narrative can aid in transforming illness from tragic to transcendent. In doing so, it is first necessary to understand how illness differs from disease and how the medicalization of human health has displaced narrative from medical practice. Since illness is best understood as a lived experience, I will discuss how narrative is an exemplary means of communicating these experiences and restoring identity that is threatened by illness. Lastly, I will address how narrative might be more effectively utilized in the context of medicine, in respect to both patients and physicians. In this work, I propose that the opportunities posed by illness might be seized by actively exploring it by means of narrative expression. It is my hope that this thesis might contribute to extending the notion that narrative is a means of attributing greater meaning to illness and constructing a more complete, compassionate approach to medicine.
ContributorsFarley, Savannah Raelynn (Author) / Manninen, Bertha (Thesis director) / Piemonte, Nicole (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Natural Sciences (Contributor) / School of Humanities, Arts, and Cultural Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05