Matching Items (31)
Description
In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's information environment: high institutional ownership and high financial statement informativeness weaken the negative relation between participation and abnormal returns. Controlling for transparency of the firms' information environment, the association between participation and future returns arises primarily from firms that allow the CEO to participate.
ContributorsMakridis, Vanessa Radick (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven E (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I find that RPE is most pronounced for firms that allow little or no scope for ex post subjective adjustments to annual bonuses. Conversely, firms that rely mainly on subjectivity in determining bonus exhibit little use of RPE. These findings suggest that information about peer performance is not used at the end of the year. Instead, peer performance seems to be incorporated in performance targets at the beginning of the year, at least among firms primarily using objective performance measurements. In addition, I provide new evidence on the determinants of the use of subjectivity.
ContributorsTsui, Stephanie (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.
ContributorsLi, Ji (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Reckers, Philip (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company’s oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE’s direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.
ContributorsZhang, Wei (Author) / Lamoreaux, Phillip (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, introducing a positive shock to credit supply competition in the banking industry. The increase in credit supply competition weakens banks’ bargaining power in the negotiation process, which in turn may weaken their ability to demand conservative financial reporting from borrowers. Consistent with this prediction, results show that firms report less conservatively after the IBBEA is passed in their headquartered states. The effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is particularly stronger for firms in states with a greater increase in competition among banks, firms whose operations are more concentrated in their headquarter states, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms subject to less external monitoring. Robustness tests confirm that the observed decline in conditional conservatism is causally related to the passage of IBBEA. Overall, this study highlights the impact of credit supply competition on financial reporting practices.
ContributorsHuang, Wei (Author) / Li, Yinghua (Thesis advisor) / Huang, Xiaochuan (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
An ethical dilemma is not a matter of “right” versus “wrong,” but rather it is a situation of conflicting values. A common ethical dilemma is that of honesty versus loyalty—is it better to tell the truth, or remain loyal to the company? In the Japanese culture, truth is circumstantial and can vary with different situations. In a way, the Japanese idea of honesty reflects how highly they value loyalty. This overlap of values results in the lack of an ethical dilemma for the Japanese, which creates a new risk for fraud. Without this struggle, a Japanese employee does not have strong justification against committing fraud if it aligns with his values of honesty and loyalty.
This paper looks at the Japanese values relating to honesty and loyalty to show how much these ideas overlap. The lack of a conflict of values creates a risk for fraud, which will be shown through an analysis of the scandals of two Japanese companies, Toshiba and Olympus. These scandals shine light on the complexity of the ethical dilemma for the Japanese employees; since their sense of circumstantial honesty encourages them to lie if it maintains the harmony of the group, there is little stopping them from committing the fraud that their superiors asked them to commit.
In a global economy, understanding the ways that values impact business and decisions is important for both interacting with others and anticipating potential conflicts, including those that may result in or indicate potential red flags for fraud.
This paper looks at the Japanese values relating to honesty and loyalty to show how much these ideas overlap. The lack of a conflict of values creates a risk for fraud, which will be shown through an analysis of the scandals of two Japanese companies, Toshiba and Olympus. These scandals shine light on the complexity of the ethical dilemma for the Japanese employees; since their sense of circumstantial honesty encourages them to lie if it maintains the harmony of the group, there is little stopping them from committing the fraud that their superiors asked them to commit.
In a global economy, understanding the ways that values impact business and decisions is important for both interacting with others and anticipating potential conflicts, including those that may result in or indicate potential red flags for fraud.
ContributorsTabar, Kelly Ann (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Goldman, Alan (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
Financial statements are one of the most important, if not the most important, documents for investors. These statements are prepared quarterly and yearly by the company accounting department, and are then audited in detail by a large external accounting firm. Investors use these documents to determine the value of the company, and trust that the company was truthful in its statements, and the auditing firm correctly audited the company's financial statements for any mistakes in their books and balances. Mistakes on a company's financial statements can be costly. However, financial fraud on the statements can be outright disastrous. Penalties for accounting fraud can include individual lifetime prison sentences, as well as company fines for billions of dollars. As students in the accounting major, it is our responsibility to ensure that financial statements are accurate and truthful to protect ourselves, other stakeholders, and the companies we work for. This ethics game takes the stories of Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers and uses them to help students identify financial fraud and how it can be prevented, as well as the consequences behind unethical decisions in financial reporting. The Enron scandal involved CEO Kenneth Lay and his predecessor Jeffery Skilling hiding losses in their financial statements with the help of their auditing firm, Arthur Andersen. Enron collapsed in 2002, and Lay was sentenced to 45 years in prison with his conspirator Skilling sentenced to 24 years in prison. In the WorldCom scandal, CEO Bernard "Bernie" Ebbers booked line costs as capital expenses (overstating WorldCom's assets), and created fraudulent accounts to inflate revenue and WorldCom's profit. Ebbers was sentenced to 25 years in prison and lost his title as WorldCom's Chief Executive Officer. Lehman Brothers took advantage of a loophole in accounting procedure Repo 105, that let the firm hide $50 billion in profits. No one at Lehman Brothers was sentenced to jail since the transaction was technically considered legal, but Lehman was the largest investment bank to fail and the only large financial institution that was not bailed out by the U.S. government.
ContributorsPanikkar, Manoj Madhuraj (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Ahmad, Altaf (Committee member) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
The results in this research study shows that experience with corruption affects a person's behavior, although it does not impact their attitude towards corruption. Condemnation to both corruption and bribery is widespread amongst citizens of both countries; however, more Angolan citizens experienced bribe demands and confessed paying more bribes than Brazilians did. This paper studies the effect of corruption towards citizens by analyzing a sample of 200 surveyed Brazilians and Angolans. The surveys questioned participants about their (i.) experience with corruption by looking at the number of bribe demands, (ii.) attitudes by identifying their values or views towards corruption and bribery and finally (iii.) their behavior through their actions.
ContributorsFernandes, Domingas Manuela Da Fonseca (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Blockchain is a sophisticated and complex technology that will have a massive impact on the public accounting industry. Currently there is concern surrounding how blockchain may impact the industry as a whole. Auditors and accountants are worried that this technology has the potential to replace the responsibilities they fulfill. However, blockchain technology will not replace accountants and will enhance their daily activities by eliminating menial tasks, providing increased transparency, and allowing time to be spent in areas that require more consideration. This will change the role of accountants and professionals, requiring them to be more technologically proficient and analytically minded. This paper is organized as follows. There will be an initial explanation of the technology to inform the reader of what blockchain is and how it works. Then there will be a discussion regarding how blockchain technology relates to, and can be utilized by, public accounting firms as well as the implications of blockchain on the public accounting industry. These implications will be discussed followed by why they are extraneous, and how to combat them in both the assurance and advisory practices. In conclusion, recommendations will be provided for public accounting firms on how to effectively utilize the technology to their benefit.
ContributorsLomsdalen, Stephen A (Co-author) / Charen, Stephanie (Co-author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Garverick, Michael (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12