Matching Items (54)
Description
Psychology of justice research has demonstrated that individuals are concerned with both the process and the outcomes of a decision-making event. While the literature has demonstrated the importance of formal and informal aspects of procedural justice and the relevancy of moral values, the present study focuses on introducing a new form of justice: Substantive justice. Substantive justice focuses on how the legal system uses laws to constrain and direct human behavior, specifically focusing on the function and the structure of a law. The psychology of justice literature is missing the vital distinction between laws whose function is to create social opportunities versus threats and between laws structured concretely versus abstractly. In the present experiment, we found that participant evaluations of the fairness of the law, the outcome, and the decision-maker all varied depending on the function and structure of the law used as well as the outcome produced. Specifically, when considering adverse outcomes, individuals perceived laws whose function is to create liability (threats) as being fairer when structured as standards (abstract guidelines) rather than rules (concrete guidelines); however, the opposite is true when considering laws whose function is to create eligibility (opportunities). In juxtaposition, when receiving a favorable outcome, individuals perceived laws whose function is to create liability (threats) as being fairer when defined as rules (concrete guidelines) rather than standards (abstract guidelines).
ContributorsLovis-McMahon, David (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Saks, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Kwan, Sau (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Individuals engaged in perceptual tasks often use their bodies to lighten the cognitive load, that is, they replace internal (mental) processing with external (body-based) processing. The present investigation explores how the body is used in the task of reading rotated text. The experimental design allowed the participants to exhibit spontaneous behavior and choose what strategies to use in order to efficiently complete the task. The results demonstrate that the use of external strategies can benefit performance by offloading internal processing.
ContributorsMedimorec, Srdan (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Risko, Evan F. (Committee member) / Newman, Matt L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
This study compared mock jurors' verdict decisions regarding three different insanity defenses that are used across jurisdictions in the United States' Criminal Justice System. Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI), Guilty Except Insane (GEI) and Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) all have different effects on the defendant and on the system, but little is known about how jurors' will use these different verdicts. This study used a vignette and online survey delivered through MTurk to see which of the three verdicts, if rendered, would be more preferable by the mock jurors. It was predicted that GEI (a "compromise" verdict with elements from both NGRI and GBMI) would be more favorable than NGRI (the most lenient) but less favorable that GBMI (the strictest). However, the findings indicated that lay people cannot tell the difference between the three insanity verdicts: an equal proportion of mock jurors in each condition chose the relevant insanity verdict. Limitations, implications, and future directions are discussed.
ContributorsSiso, Cassidy Brooke (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis director) / Schweitzer, Nick (Committee member) / School of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Contributor) / Hugh Downs School of Human Communication (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness of a novel way to phrase jury instructions to debias jurors inspired by moral foundations theory. In two experimental studies, participants read a transcript of a sexual assault (Study 1: n = 544) or an assault and battery criminal case (Study 2: n = 509). In each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read either a case with or without prejudicial evidence. Participants exposed to prejudicial evidence were either given standard jury instructions to disregard the evidence, no instructions, or novel jury instructions inspired by moral foundations theory. Individual differences in moral foundations affected how susceptible people were to prejudicial evidence and case facts in general. This pattern emerged regardless of the type of jury instructions in most cases, suggesting that the moral foundation inspired instructions failed to help jurors disregard prejudicial evidence. The impact of people’s moral foundation endorsement has direct implications for how attorneys may phrase evidence to cater towards these moral biases and select ideal jurors during the voir dire process. To further advance people’s understanding of the effects of prejudicial evidence and jury instructions in legal settings, a third study looked at how attorneys (n = 138) perceived the prevalence and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases and the effectiveness of jury instructions. Over three quarters of the sample (77.54%) reported having experienced prejudicial evidence in their cases and expressed concern that prejudicial evidence is influential to jurors with jury instructions being ineffective. Taken altogether, the results of this project show the potential impact moral foundation endorsement can have on case judgments and how jurors are differently influenced by prejudicial evidence. In addition, data from attorneys showing the perceived prevalent and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases further
justifies the need to continue researching safeguards against prejudicial evidence.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen Marie (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Stolzenberg, Stacia N (Committee member) / Fox, Kate A (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless of whether the jury actually disregards the inadmissible evidence. This study tested four interventions derived from psychological research to identify the combination that most effectively helped jurors disregard inadmissible evidence (operationalized by lower conviction rates). It was hypothesized that the most effective interventions identified in Study 1 would yield significantly lower conviction rates when compared to traditional instructions to disregard in Study 2. The interventions were tested in Study 1 using Multiphase Optimization Strategy (MOST) methodology to identify the optimized intervention package through regression analysis. Study 2 served as a randomized controlled trial in which treatment as usual (a judge’s instructions to disregard) was compared to the optimized intervention package. Participants were randomly assigned to either (1) be exposed to no inadmissible evidence, (2) receive inadmissible evidence and treatment as usual, (3) receive inadmissible evidence, treatment as usual and the optimized intervention package, or (4) receive the inadmissible evidence without objection. Logistic regression revealed that jurors who were given an instruction to disregard produced lower conviction rates when they also received the optimized intervention package. Interpretation, limitations, and calls to action are discussed.
ContributorsSandberg, Pamela Nicole (Author) / O'Hara, Karey L. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
When questions about a person’s mental state arise in court, psychologists are often called in to help. Psychological assessment tools are routinely included in these evaluations to inform legal decision making. In accordance with the Daubert standard, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, courts are obligated to exclude evidence that relies on poor scientific practice, including assessment tools. However, prior research demonstrates that psychological assessment tools with weak psychometric properties are routinely admitted in court, rarely challenged on the basis of their reliability, and if a challenge is indeed raised, often still admitted (Neal et al., 2019). Is neuropsychological assessment evidence in particular vulnerable to the same pitfalls? The present research aimed to 1) quantify the quality of neuropsychological assessment evidence used in court, 2) evaluate whether courts are calibrated to the quality of these tools through the rate and success of legal admissibility challenges raised, and 3) compare forensic mental health evaluators’ experiences and practices with regard to the quality of neuropsychological versus non-neuropsychological assessment tools. Neuropsychological tools appeared to perform worse than non-neuropsychological tools in terms of psychometric quality. However, in a case law analysis, significantly fewer challenges were observed to the legal admissibility of neuropsychological tools than to non-neuropsychological tools. To protect the legitimacy of the legal system and prevent wrongful decisions, it is critical that the evidence on which psychologists’ expert opinions are formed is scientifically valid, and that judges and attorneys adequately scrutinize the quality of evidence introduced in court.
ContributorsMathers, Elizabeth (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Burleson, Mary (Committee member) / Roberts, Nicole (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.
ContributorsJones, Ashley C. T. (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Cultivation theory states that consuming television cultivates a social reality in the real world which aligns with the reality present in television. When the television show CSI was released, researchers studied a form of cultivation stemming from the show titled the "CSI Effect." One of the components of the CSI Effect is the tendency of those who watch CSI to be more likely to overestimate the presence of forensic evidence present in a trial and place more trust in such evidence. In recent years, several true crime documentaries that examined controversial cases have been released. In a similar vein of research conducted on CSI, the current study examines true crime documentaries and their possible impacts on viewers’ judgments and beliefs about the criminal justice system. In the current study, participants were provided with a mock case and asked about their perceptions of the case along with their viewership habits. While overall true crime documentary viewership did not influence judgments of evidence manipulation or perceptions of police, findings point to viewership of the targeted documentaries being associated with feelings of mistrust towards the criminal justice system overall, while the lesser-viewed documentaries correlated with judgments of strength and responsibility of the defendant in the case. One possible explanation is that individual characteristics may serve as the driving factor in how individuals choose what to watch when the popularity of the show is not as well-known.
ContributorsDoughty, Kathryn A (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Juror impartiality is necessary for a fair and just legal system, but is true juror impartiality
realistic? The current study investigated the role of implicit and explicit social-cognitive biases in jurors’ conceptualizations of insanity, and the influence of those biases in juror verdict decisions. It was hypothesized that by analyzing the role of implicit and explicit biases in insanity defense cases, jurors’ attitudes towards those with mental illnesses and attitudes towards the insanity defense would influence jurors’ final verdict decisions. Two hundred and two participants completed an online survey which included a trial vignette incorporating an insanity defense (adapted from Maeder et al., 2016), the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), Community Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill Scale (Taylor & Dear, 1981), and an Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). While implicit associations concerning mental illness and dangerousness were significantly related to mock jurors’ verdicts, they no longer were when explicit insanity defense attitudes were added to a more complex model including all measured attitudes and biases. Insanity defense attitudes were significantly related to jurors’ verdicts over and above attitudes about the mentally ill and implicit biases concerning the mentally ill. The potentially biasing impact of jurors’ insanity defense attitudes and the impact of implicit associations about the mentally ill in legal judgments are discussed.
realistic? The current study investigated the role of implicit and explicit social-cognitive biases in jurors’ conceptualizations of insanity, and the influence of those biases in juror verdict decisions. It was hypothesized that by analyzing the role of implicit and explicit biases in insanity defense cases, jurors’ attitudes towards those with mental illnesses and attitudes towards the insanity defense would influence jurors’ final verdict decisions. Two hundred and two participants completed an online survey which included a trial vignette incorporating an insanity defense (adapted from Maeder et al., 2016), the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), Community Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill Scale (Taylor & Dear, 1981), and an Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). While implicit associations concerning mental illness and dangerousness were significantly related to mock jurors’ verdicts, they no longer were when explicit insanity defense attitudes were added to a more complex model including all measured attitudes and biases. Insanity defense attitudes were significantly related to jurors’ verdicts over and above attitudes about the mentally ill and implicit biases concerning the mentally ill. The potentially biasing impact of jurors’ insanity defense attitudes and the impact of implicit associations about the mentally ill in legal judgments are discussed.
ContributorsHamza, Cassandra (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Biases have been studied in many legal contexts, including sexual assault cases. Sexual assault cases are complex because there are many stages that biases can come into play and have lasting effects on the rest of the case proceedings. One aspect that has not been widely explored is how people perceive institutions’ liability in sexual assault cases based on an obligation to create non-discriminating environments for members and employees according to laws like Title VII and Title IX. The current project focused on how and why cognitive biases affect laypeople’s judgment. Specifically, laypeople’s ability to discern the strength of evidence in civil sexual assault cases against institutions. This was addressed in a series of two studies, with samples collected from Prolific Academic (n = 90) and Arizona State University students (n = 188) for Study 1 (N = 278), and Prolific Academic in Study 2 (N = 449). Both studies used Latin-square design methods, with within and between subject elements, looking at how confirmation bias influenced decisions about whether an institution demonstrated negligence, and thus liability, in the way they responded to sexual assault allegations within their institution. Results from these studies suggest that jurors are overall accurately able to differentiate between weak and strong cases. However, consistent with previous literature, jurors may be susceptible to confirmation bias from outside information (e.g., news stories) and negatively influenced by their personal attitudes (e.g., rape myth acceptance). Given the increased attention of the Me Too movement, these results provide an initial insight into how individuals may be judging these types of cases against institutions.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica M (Committee member) / Davis, Kelly C (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020