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Participation in employee stock option exchange programs and future stock returns

Description

In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's…

In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's information environment: high institutional ownership and high financial statement informativeness weaken the negative relation between participation and abnormal returns. Controlling for transparency of the firms' information environment, the association between participation and future returns arises primarily from firms that allow the CEO to participate.

ContributorsMakridis, Vanessa Radick (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven E (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)

Created2013

Relative performance evaluation and the use of discretionary bonuses in executive compensation

Description

In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I…

In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I find that RPE is most pronounced for firms that allow little or no scope for ex post subjective adjustments to annual bonuses. Conversely, firms that rely mainly on subjectivity in determining bonus exhibit little use of RPE. These findings suggest that information about peer performance is not used at the end of the year. Instead, peer performance seems to be incorporated in performance targets at the beginning of the year, at least among firms primarily using objective performance measurements. In addition, I provide new evidence on the determinants of the use of subjectivity.

ContributorsTsui, Stephanie (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)

Created2013

Dual-class firms' choice of performance measures in CEO stock compensation contracts

Description

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I…

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.

ContributorsLi, Ji (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Reckers, Philip (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)

Created2014

Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position

Description

A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more…

A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company’s oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE’s direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.

ContributorsZhang, Wei (Author) / Lamoreaux, Phillip (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)

Created2019

Does Credit Supply Competition Affect Accounting Conservatism?

Description

This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, introducing a positive shock to…

This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, introducing a positive shock to credit supply competition in the banking industry. The increase in credit supply competition weakens banks’ bargaining power in the negotiation process, which in turn may weaken their ability to demand conservative financial reporting from borrowers. Consistent with this prediction, results show that firms report less conservatively after the IBBEA is passed in their headquartered states. The effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is particularly stronger for firms in states with a greater increase in competition among banks, firms whose operations are more concentrated in their headquarter states, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms subject to less external monitoring. Robustness tests confirm that the observed decline in conditional conservatism is causally related to the passage of IBBEA. Overall, this study highlights the impact of credit supply competition on financial reporting practices.

ContributorsHuang, Wei (Author) / Li, Yinghua (Thesis advisor) / Huang, Xiaochuan (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)

Created2018

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