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This study compared mock jurors' verdict decisions regarding three different insanity defenses that are used across jurisdictions in the United States' Criminal Justice System. Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI), Guilty Except Insane (GEI) and Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) all have different effects on the defendant and on

This study compared mock jurors' verdict decisions regarding three different insanity defenses that are used across jurisdictions in the United States' Criminal Justice System. Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI), Guilty Except Insane (GEI) and Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) all have different effects on the defendant and on the system, but little is known about how jurors' will use these different verdicts. This study used a vignette and online survey delivered through MTurk to see which of the three verdicts, if rendered, would be more preferable by the mock jurors. It was predicted that GEI (a "compromise" verdict with elements from both NGRI and GBMI) would be more favorable than NGRI (the most lenient) but less favorable that GBMI (the strictest). However, the findings indicated that lay people cannot tell the difference between the three insanity verdicts: an equal proportion of mock jurors in each condition chose the relevant insanity verdict. Limitations, implications, and future directions are discussed.
ContributorsSiso, Cassidy Brooke (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis director) / Schweitzer, Nick (Committee member) / School of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Contributor) / Hugh Downs School of Human Communication (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
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Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness

Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness of a novel way to phrase jury instructions to debias jurors inspired by moral foundations theory. In two experimental studies, participants read a transcript of a sexual assault (Study 1: n = 544) or an assault and battery criminal case (Study 2: n = 509). In each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read either a case with or without prejudicial evidence. Participants exposed to prejudicial evidence were either given standard jury instructions to disregard the evidence, no instructions, or novel jury instructions inspired by moral foundations theory. Individual differences in moral foundations affected how susceptible people were to prejudicial evidence and case facts in general. This pattern emerged regardless of the type of jury instructions in most cases, suggesting that the moral foundation inspired instructions failed to help jurors disregard prejudicial evidence. The impact of people’s moral foundation endorsement has direct implications for how attorneys may phrase evidence to cater towards these moral biases and select ideal jurors during the voir dire process. To further advance people’s understanding of the effects of prejudicial evidence and jury instructions in legal settings, a third study looked at how attorneys (n = 138) perceived the prevalence and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases and the effectiveness of jury instructions. Over three quarters of the sample (77.54%) reported having experienced prejudicial evidence in their cases and expressed concern that prejudicial evidence is influential to jurors with jury instructions being ineffective. Taken altogether, the results of this project show the potential impact moral foundation endorsement can have on case judgments and how jurors are differently influenced by prejudicial evidence. In addition, data from attorneys showing the perceived prevalent and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases further justifies the need to continue researching safeguards against prejudicial evidence.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen Marie (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Stolzenberg, Stacia N (Committee member) / Fox, Kate A (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
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Description
For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional

For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless of whether the jury actually disregards the inadmissible evidence. This study tested four interventions derived from psychological research to identify the combination that most effectively helped jurors disregard inadmissible evidence (operationalized by lower conviction rates). It was hypothesized that the most effective interventions identified in Study 1 would yield significantly lower conviction rates when compared to traditional instructions to disregard in Study 2. The interventions were tested in Study 1 using Multiphase Optimization Strategy (MOST) methodology to identify the optimized intervention package through regression analysis. Study 2 served as a randomized controlled trial in which treatment as usual (a judge’s instructions to disregard) was compared to the optimized intervention package. Participants were randomly assigned to either (1) be exposed to no inadmissible evidence, (2) receive inadmissible evidence and treatment as usual, (3) receive inadmissible evidence, treatment as usual and the optimized intervention package, or (4) receive the inadmissible evidence without objection. Logistic regression revealed that jurors who were given an instruction to disregard produced lower conviction rates when they also received the optimized intervention package. Interpretation, limitations, and calls to action are discussed.
ContributorsSandberg, Pamela Nicole (Author) / O'Hara, Karey L. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
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Description
This dissertation examines dog training in the United States to see how it is implemented and practiced and the potential ramifications for our pet dogs. In Chapter 2, word-based analysis compared the words practicing dog trainers use to describe their work and examined how gender and experience differ between methodologies.

This dissertation examines dog training in the United States to see how it is implemented and practiced and the potential ramifications for our pet dogs. In Chapter 2, word-based analysis compared the words practicing dog trainers use to describe their work and examined how gender and experience differ between methodologies. Given both the vast history of dog training and the variety of training information available to dog owners, in Chapter 3, I surveyed undergraduate students to determine where dog guardians obtain their information and how they might tackle dog problem behavior. Of 100 practicing dog trainers, only 20%, mostly female trainers using non-aversive methods, were certified. When asked who they asked for dog training advice, most dog guardians reached out to friends, family, or online sources and only about 20% ever attended a formal dog training class. In Chapter 4, dogs were walked on four different types of leash walking equipment which were attached to a strain gauge to assess if these equipment were any better or worse at reducing a dog’s pulling force; dogs pulled most on a martingale collar and there were no statistically significant differences among the other equipment types to each other. Through behavior analysis, none of the dogs in our study showed impaired welfare. In Chapter 5, I compared e-collar training to non-aversive methods in the ability to stop chasing of a lure. Dogs experiencing e-collar stimulation were successful in stopping chase of the lure both during training sessions and in testing. None of the dogs in either non-aversive group was successful in the tests. The findings did not indicate that dogs in the e-collar group, or the non-aversive groups, differed in welfare. As in Chapter 4, despite the lack of immediate negative welfare effects for the dogs experiencing aversive methods like the e-collar, given the demonstrated evidence for Chapters 2 and 3 that individuals who use these aversive tools, either practicing trainers or the general public, may lack the foundation to properly implement them, I recommend caution in their public sale and do not advocate for their use.
ContributorsJohnson, Anamarie Clare (Author) / Wynne, Clive D. L. (Thesis advisor) / Sanabria, Federico (Committee member) / Udell, Monique A. R. (Committee member) / Stenhoff, Donald (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2024
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When questions about a person’s mental state arise in court, psychologists are often called in to help. Psychological assessment tools are routinely included in these evaluations to inform legal decision making. In accordance with the Daubert standard, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, courts are obligated to exclude evidence

When questions about a person’s mental state arise in court, psychologists are often called in to help. Psychological assessment tools are routinely included in these evaluations to inform legal decision making. In accordance with the Daubert standard, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, courts are obligated to exclude evidence that relies on poor scientific practice, including assessment tools. However, prior research demonstrates that psychological assessment tools with weak psychometric properties are routinely admitted in court, rarely challenged on the basis of their reliability, and if a challenge is indeed raised, often still admitted (Neal et al., 2019). Is neuropsychological assessment evidence in particular vulnerable to the same pitfalls? The present research aimed to 1) quantify the quality of neuropsychological assessment evidence used in court, 2) evaluate whether courts are calibrated to the quality of these tools through the rate and success of legal admissibility challenges raised, and 3) compare forensic mental health evaluators’ experiences and practices with regard to the quality of neuropsychological versus non-neuropsychological assessment tools. Neuropsychological tools appeared to perform worse than non-neuropsychological tools in terms of psychometric quality. However, in a case law analysis, significantly fewer challenges were observed to the legal admissibility of neuropsychological tools than to non-neuropsychological tools. To protect the legitimacy of the legal system and prevent wrongful decisions, it is critical that the evidence on which psychologists’ expert opinions are formed is scientifically valid, and that judges and attorneys adequately scrutinize the quality of evidence introduced in court.
ContributorsMathers, Elizabeth (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Burleson, Mary (Committee member) / Roberts, Nicole (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
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This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to

This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.
ContributorsJones, Ashley C. T. (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
Juror impartiality is necessary for a fair and just legal system, but is true juror impartiality

realistic? The current study investigated the role of implicit and explicit social-cognitive biases in jurors’ conceptualizations of insanity, and the influence of those biases in juror verdict decisions. It was hypothesized that by analyzing the

Juror impartiality is necessary for a fair and just legal system, but is true juror impartiality

realistic? The current study investigated the role of implicit and explicit social-cognitive biases in jurors’ conceptualizations of insanity, and the influence of those biases in juror verdict decisions. It was hypothesized that by analyzing the role of implicit and explicit biases in insanity defense cases, jurors’ attitudes towards those with mental illnesses and attitudes towards the insanity defense would influence jurors’ final verdict decisions. Two hundred and two participants completed an online survey which included a trial vignette incorporating an insanity defense (adapted from Maeder et al., 2016), the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), Community Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill Scale (Taylor & Dear, 1981), and an Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). While implicit associations concerning mental illness and dangerousness were significantly related to mock jurors’ verdicts, they no longer were when explicit insanity defense attitudes were added to a more complex model including all measured attitudes and biases. Insanity defense attitudes were significantly related to jurors’ verdicts over and above attitudes about the mentally ill and implicit biases concerning the mentally ill. The potentially biasing impact of jurors’ insanity defense attitudes and the impact of implicit associations about the mentally ill in legal judgments are discussed.
ContributorsHamza, Cassandra (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Each year, nearly three million dogs will enter one of over 13,000 animal shelters in the United States. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how breed identity and dog welfare in the shelter, in addition to post-adoption and fostering interventions out of the shelter, can contribute to

Each year, nearly three million dogs will enter one of over 13,000 animal shelters in the United States. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how breed identity and dog welfare in the shelter, in addition to post-adoption and fostering interventions out of the shelter, can contribute to the betterment of dog lives. In Chapter 2, I conducted the largest sampling of shelter dogs’ breed identities to-date to determine their breed heritage and compare shelter breed assignment by staff as determined by visual appearance to that of genetic testing. In Chapter 4, I examined the efficacy of a post-adoption intervention intended to reduce returns by encouraging physical activity between adopters and their dogs. In Chapter 6, I examined the effects of brief stays in a foster home on the urinary cortisol: creatinine ratios of dogs awaiting adoption compared to ratios collected before or after their stays; and in Chapter 7, I characterized the relationships between multiple physiological, health, and cognitive measures and the in-kennel behavior of shelter dogs.

Four suggestions from the findings of this dissertation that will likely better the lives of dogs living in animal shelters are: 1) Shelter dog breed heritage is complex and visually identifying multiple breeds in a mixed breed dog is difficult at best. Shelters should instead focus on communicating the morphology and behavior of the dogs in their care to best support adopters. 2) While encouraging walking did not influence owner behavior, adopters who reported higher obligation and self-efficacy in dog walking were more active with their dogs. Thus, post-adoption interventions that can effectively target owner perceptions of obligation and self-efficacy may be more successful in changing behavior. 3) Temporary fostering is an impactful intervention that reduces stress for dogs awaiting adoption; however addressing stressors present at shelters that are likely contributing to higher stress responding is also needed. 4) It is possible to predict the internal stress responding of shelter dogs by observing their overt, in-kennel behavior, and this study is a first step in assessing and improving the welfare of dogs living in animal shelters.
ContributorsGunter, Lisa (Author) / Wynne, Clive D. L. (Thesis advisor) / Luecken, Linda J. (Committee member) / Barber, Rebecca T. (Committee member) / Casey, Rachel A. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Biases have been studied in many legal contexts, including sexual assault cases. Sexual assault cases are complex because there are many stages that biases can come into play and have lasting effects on the rest of the case proceedings. One aspect that has not been widely explored is how people

Biases have been studied in many legal contexts, including sexual assault cases. Sexual assault cases are complex because there are many stages that biases can come into play and have lasting effects on the rest of the case proceedings. One aspect that has not been widely explored is how people perceive institutions’ liability in sexual assault cases based on an obligation to create non-discriminating environments for members and employees according to laws like Title VII and Title IX. The current project focused on how and why cognitive biases affect laypeople’s judgment. Specifically, laypeople’s ability to discern the strength of evidence in civil sexual assault cases against institutions. This was addressed in a series of two studies, with samples collected from Prolific Academic (n = 90) and Arizona State University students (n = 188) for Study 1 (N = 278), and Prolific Academic in Study 2 (N = 449). Both studies used Latin-square design methods, with within and between subject elements, looking at how confirmation bias influenced decisions about whether an institution demonstrated negligence, and thus liability, in the way they responded to sexual assault allegations within their institution. Results from these studies suggest that jurors are overall accurately able to differentiate between weak and strong cases. However, consistent with previous literature, jurors may be susceptible to confirmation bias from outside information (e.g., news stories) and negatively influenced by their personal attitudes (e.g., rape myth acceptance). Given the increased attention of the Me Too movement, these results provide an initial insight into how individuals may be judging these types of cases against institutions.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica M (Committee member) / Davis, Kelly C (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case established criteria for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. It holds that scientific evidence must be valid, reliable, and relevant, and judges are required to be “gatekeepers” of evidence by screening out evidence that has not been empirically

The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case established criteria for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. It holds that scientific evidence must be valid, reliable, and relevant, and judges are required to be “gatekeepers” of evidence by screening out evidence that has not been empirically tested or vetted through the academic community. Yet, little is known about whether psychological assessment tools are subjected to scrutiny through the standards courts are supposed to apply. In three different studies, from the perspectives of judges, attorneys, and forensic mental health experts, the authors investigate whether psychological assessment evidence is being challenged. Information was collected on participants’ experiences with challenges to psychological assessments. Judges and lawyers completed a series of experimental case vignettes to assess their decision-making about legal admissibility of different qualities of psychological assessments. It was hypothesized they would not distinguish between low- and high-quality psychological assessments in admissibility. Bayesian model selection methods did not support the null hypothesis, however. It was found attorneys differentiate between the conditions. The rates in which legal professionals and forensic mental health evaluators experienced challenges were also higher than was expected. These positive findings show there is some degree of gatekeeping psychological assessment evidence in the courts.
ContributorsNeu Line, Emily C (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Horne, Zachary (Committee member) / Saks, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020