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This survey of 206 forensic psychologists tested the “filtering” effects of preexisting expert attitudes in adversarial proceedings. Results confirmed the hypothesis that evaluator attitudes toward capital punishment influence willingness to accept capital case referrals from particular adversarial parties. Stronger death penalty opposition was associated with higher willingness to conduct evaluations

This survey of 206 forensic psychologists tested the “filtering” effects of preexisting expert attitudes in adversarial proceedings. Results confirmed the hypothesis that evaluator attitudes toward capital punishment influence willingness to accept capital case referrals from particular adversarial parties. Stronger death penalty opposition was associated with higher willingness to conduct evaluations for the defense and higher likelihood of rejecting referrals from all sources. Conversely, stronger support was associated with higher willingness to be involved in capital cases generally, regardless of referral source. The findings raise the specter of skewed evaluator involvement in capital evaluations, where evaluators willing to do capital casework may have stronger capital punishment support than evaluators who opt out, and evaluators with strong opposition may work selectively for the defense. The results may provide a partial explanation for the “allegiance effect” in adversarial legal settings such that preexisting attitudes may contribute to partisan participation through a self-selection process.

Created2016-04-28
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In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time- pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

ContributorsBouwmeester, S. (Author) / Verkoeijen, P.P.J.L. (Author) / Aczel, B. (Author) / Barbosa, F. (Author) / Begue, L. (Author) / Branas-Garza, P. (Author) / Chmura, T.G.H. (Author) / Cornelissen, G. (Author) / Dossing, F.S. (Author) / Espin, A.M. (Author) / Evans, A.M. (Author) / Ferreira-Santos, F. (Author) / Fieldler, S. (Author) / Flegr, J. (Author) / Ghaffari, M. (Author) / Gloeckner, A. (Author) / Goeschl, T. (Author) / Guo, L. (Author) / Hauser, O.P. (Author) / Hernan-Gonzalez, R. (Author) / Herrero, A. (Author) / Horne, Z. (Author) / Houdek, P. (Author) / Johannesson, M. (Author) / Koppel, L. (Author) / Kujal, P. (Author) / Laine, T. (Author) / Lohse, J. (Author) / Martins, E.C. (Author) / Mauro, C. (Author) / Mischkowski, D. (Author) / Mukherjee, S. (Author) / Myrseth, K.O.R. (Author) / Navarro-Martinez, D. (Author) / Neal, T.M.S. (Author) / Novakova, J. (Author) / Paga, R. (Author) / Paiva, T.O. (Author) / Palfi, B. (Author) / Piovesan, M. (Author) / Rahal, R.-M. (Author) / Salomon, E. (Author) / Srinivasan, N. (Author) / Srivastava, A. (Author) / Szaszi, B. (Author) / Szollosi, A. (Author) / Thor, K.O. (Author) / Tinghog, G. (Author) / Trueblood, J.S. (Author) / Van Bavel, J.J. (Author) / van't Veer, A.E. (Author) / Vastfjall, D. (Author) / Warner, M. (Author) / Wengstrom, E. (Author) / Wills, J. (Author) / Wollbrant, C.E. (Author)
Created2017-03-01
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Description

People who testify as expert witnesses in court are often fearful of blundering, feeling inept, and being “caught out” during cross-examinations. There are several reasons for lapses in professional demeanor and responses while testifying. We offer seven baits or temptations that can draw an expert into behaviors that are unbecoming,

People who testify as expert witnesses in court are often fearful of blundering, feeling inept, and being “caught out” during cross-examinations. There are several reasons for lapses in professional demeanor and responses while testifying. We offer seven baits or temptations that can draw an expert into behaviors that are unbecoming, with examples of responses that are inappropriate and harmful. These seven bait and lures are accompanied by descriptions of how to handle them.

ContributorsNeal, Tess (Author) / Brodsky, Stanley (Author) / Dvoskin, Joel (Author)
Created2017-12-01