Matching Items (6)
Description
This dissertation integrates research on boards of directors with human and social capital perspectives to examine board appointments. A director's appointment to a board is in part due to the belief that the individual can contribute critical resources and monitoring to the organization. The ability of a director to provide these resources and monitoring depends on his or her level of human and social capital. This dissertation more fully integrates human and social capital perspectives into our understanding of board appointment events. From these theoretical underpinnings, a model is developed proposing that several human and social capital indicators, including educational level, expertise, director experience, and access to network structural holes, affect the likelihood of joining a new board, joining a prestigious board, and exiting a current board. I also consider a number of contextual- and individual-level variables that may potentially moderate the relationship between a director's human and social capital and director mobility. Through this dissertation, I make a number of contributions to the literatures on boards, board appointments, and human and social capital. First, I offer a more comprehensive perspective of the board appointment process by developing an individual-level perspective of board appointments. Second, I contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the market for corporate directors. Third, I focus on several salient dimensions of director mobility. Fourth, I contribute to the growing literature on human and social capital at the board and director levels. Finally, I add to the growing literature on director selection.
ContributorsWithers, Michael C (Author) / Hillman, Amy J. (Thesis advisor) / Certo, S. Trevis (Committee member) / Khanna, Poonam (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
This dissertation explores the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) perquisites, i.e., nonmonetary compensation offered to particular employees and not essential to the accomplishment of a CEO’s duties. While the current CEO perquisite literature has focused on understanding the economic determinants of CEO perquisites, I study the social-psychological determinants of perquisites. Specifically, I propose that organizational status is positively associated with CEO perquisites. The status literature suggests that high-status organizations derive benefits from status and status signals, while agency theory proposes that perquisites are a way for CEOs to extract private rents. Therefore, I posit that for high-status organizations, the benefits derived from certain CEO perquisites may negate the costs associated with those perquisites. I examine a specific CEO perquisite: the mandatory use of corporate aircraft for personal travel. Prior research and the popular press suggest that this perquisite is often seen not only as a status signal but also as an agency cost. Accordingly, I hypothesize that higher status organizations and organizations with higher status directors are more likely than lower status organizations or organizations with lower status directors to mandate their CEOs to use corporate aircraft for personal travel. I also propose that the effect is stronger for low- or high-status organizations than for middle-status organizations. In addition, I hypothesize five contingencies moderating the above relationships. I examine hypothesized relationships using a sample of S&P 500 organizations, and I find support for many of my hypotheses. This dissertation contributes to both status and executive compensation literature.
ContributorsKalm, Matias (Author) / Cannella, Albert (Thesis advisor) / Semadeni, Matthew (Thesis advisor) / Lange, Donald (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Agglomeration research has investigated a key research question, i.e., why do firms in a specific industry co-locate geographically? In the agglomeration literature, it has been assumed that each firm has one business establishment in a cluster such that firms always co-locate with competitors. However, it is often observed that firms operate several business establishments in a cluster, so they co-locate not only with competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration) but also with their own business establishments (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration). While inter-firm agglomeration is a counterpart to the traditional concept of agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration is a new concept in agglomeration research. The separation between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration raises two research questions – 1) how does intra-firm agglomeration differ from inter-firm agglomeration? and 2) do firms decide their locations for intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration differently? These questions actually extend the key question in agglomeration research into a new setting in which firms have several business establishments in a cluster. I proposed that firms can extract more benefits but neutralize more threats from agglomeration through intra-firm agglomeration than through inter-firm agglomeration. I further developed research hypotheses to test this argument in a research context in which multi-unit firms decide their new establishments’ distances to competitors and their other establishments at the same time. The hypotheses received empirical support in an empirical setting in which 10 large multi-unit hotel firms established new hotels in 20 U.S. cities, and several supplementary analyses show that these results are robust.
ContributorsWoo, Hyun-Soo (Author) / Cannella, Albert (Thesis advisor) / Hoetker, Glenn (Committee member) / Mesquita, Luiz (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and theories within competitive dynamics provide competing hypotheses about when and why managers would disclose inside information about their firms. In this study, I highlight how voluntary disclosure theory may help to coalesce these two theoretical perspectives. Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that managers will release inside information when managers perceive that the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. Accordingly, I posit that competitive dynamics introduce the costs associated with disclosing information (i.e., proprietary costs) and that agency theory highlights the benefits associated with disclosing information. Examining the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), I identify three ways managers can use information in SEO prospectuses. I hypothesize that competitive intensity increases proprietary costs that will reduce disclosure of inside information but will increase discussing the organization positively. I then hypothesize that capital market participants (e.g., security analysts and investors) may prefer managers to provide more, clearer, and positive information about the SEO and their firms. I find support for many of my hypotheses.
ContributorsBusenbark, John R (Author) / Certo, S. Trevis (Thesis advisor) / Semadeni, Matthew (Committee member) / Cannella, Albert (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
Entrepreneurship entails a transition from status quo to a founder/leader of a new organization, and the dominant view in the literature focuses on opportunities in a hypothetical situation, namely an entrepreneurial option. This study shifts the attention from an entrepreneurial option to a current situation and proposes that a perception of costliness in status quo as a driver of entrepreneurial decisions and strategies. Specifically, I propose that a perception of inequality due to the local hierarchy of an organization engenders motivation of disadvantaged employees to become a leader of his/her own entrepreneurial organization. Utilizing hierarchy-based power dynamics and attribution biases, I theorize that i) status gap between a leader and a member and ii) status distinctiveness of a leader in the current organization affect an entrepreneurial decision because of inequality perception. Furthermore, I hypothesize that entrepreneurial organizations driven by such status inequality are more likely to replicate the local structure of the previous employer in terms of status hierarchy to compensate for the perceived disadvantages in the previous employer. The empirical analyses of this study investigate entrepreneurial decisions and entrepreneurial team formation of jazz musicians from jazz discographies between 1950 and 2018, and I found supportive results. This study contributes to the entrepreneurship and inequality literature by bridging two research spaces. It first uncovers the roles of a negative perception of the status quo in entrepreneurship, in addition to the established idea of a positive perception of an alternative option. It also suggests a novel explanation of the long-standing question of inequality reproduction by looking at whether and how inequality spreads via entrepreneurship.
ContributorsJeon, Chunhu (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Bundy, Jonathan N (Thesis advisor) / Certo, S. Trevis (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
This dissertation examines the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) numeracy on strategic decisions and outcomes. CEO numeracy refers to the capacity of a CEO to perform one or more mental activities on information and/or concepts that are numerical in nature. Although numeracy is widely studied in disciplines such as health sciences, education, and psychology and is commonly associated with superior and more effective decision making, it is largely missing from organizational scholarship. Numeracy is particularly relevant in the context of top management teams as the conditions in which executives operate compromise the effectiveness of strategic decision making. As such, I examine the effect of CEO numeracy on acquisition decisions and outcomes. Despite global growth in acquisition investments over the years, studies suggest that acquisitions more often erode instead of improve acquiring firm value. Therefore, I propose that CEO numeracy is negatively associated with acquisition decisions such as the number of acquisitions, value of acquisitions, and number of large acquisitions undertaken by a firm. Moreover, among CEOs that engage in acquisitions, I propose that more numerate CEOs will experience better acquisition-related outcomes compared to less numerate CEOs. Specifically, I hypothesize that CEO numeracy is negatively related to acquisition premiums and positively related to post-acquisition performance. I use a longitudinal sample comprised of 250 randomly selected U.S. based firms from the S&P 500 index to empirically test my hypothesized relationships. Furthermore, I use CEO-attributed text from earnings calls transcripts and a closed-language analytical approach to develop a novel and accessible measure of CEO numeracy. My analyses did not yield support for my hypotheses. I discuss potential theoretical and empirical explanations for the null findings in my research and propose directions to mitigate those issues in future research.
ContributorsAlbader, Latifa A H M H (Author) / Certo, S. Trevis (Thesis advisor) / Bundy, Jonathan (Committee member) / Zhu, David (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023