In this formative research project, we seek to better understand the general barriers to refugee access to higher education. Using mixed methods research--which included surveys, interviews, and course data--we evaluate the benefits and challenges experienced by refugee students in Israel who are enrolled in Arizona State University's Education for Humanity programs. In the end, this case study resulted in 24 recommend programmatic changes designed to eliminate the barriers that prevent refugee students from accessing and succeeding in higher education.

The potential empowerment of the UN System as a result of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine requires an examination of what it could mean for both state sovereignty and the authority of the UN Security Council. I argue that the Security Council is already a sovereign body within the international system that would be greatly empowered by the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and the veto reform efforts of the Accountability, Transparency and Coherence (ACT) Group. I rely on Carl Schmitt’s influential definition of sovereignty and his key takeaways regarding the 1919 German constitution to illustrate the existence of two distinct levels of Schmittian-like sovereigns in the international system: state sovereigns and representative sovereigns. I will then describe the authority and structure of the Security Council followed by a brief case study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Kosovo as an example of how real-life situations challenge the Security Council’s ability to exercise its role as a representative sovereign, including a discussion about how it can either fail to act or choose not to act and the difference between them. Afterwards, I will discuss the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and how it expands the relative power of representative sovereignty at the cost of reducing the relative power of state sovereignty, culminating in a discussion of what attempts to reform the veto power on the Security Council may do to the Council’s sovereignty. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the key takeaways of this paper and some further considerations.

Previous studies about the effects of regulatory institutions on the outcomes of regulation have resulted in a lack of consensus on the nature of these impacts. This paper seeks to resolve some of this ambiguity by analyzing two dimension of electric utility regulatory outcomes, prices and reliability, with a broader panel of explanatory variables and with a Hausman-Taylor regression technique. The results suggest that elected regulators and deregulated electricity markets result in worse reliability outcomes for consumers without strong evidence that either institution secures lower electricity prices. Incorporating these insights into a theoretical model of regulation could give more detailed insight into how to create regulatory institutions that can optimize the outcomes of governance.