Matching Items (15)
Description
Many of us regularly make decisions with the intention of living longer, healthier lives. We try to eat right, exercise, take vitamins, get checkups, and keep our bodies in general good shape. Some of the enhancements we make that are meant to increase the length or quality of life go even further: organ or joint replacement surgeries, cosmetic surgeries, cancer treatments, etc. These kinds of enhancements and attempts at increasing one's life, or, in some cases, the feeling or look of youth, are not the focus of this essay. These adjustments are too minor. Here I focus on the potential for significant lifespan extension (SLE), with "significant" being the operative word. For the purposes of this article, I shall define SLE as an extension to the human lifespan that is at least 100 years greater than humans 'current lifespan, which now maxes-out at about 120 years. Lifespan extension of merely a few years, say if people could live to 130 or so, would not likely result in vast personal and social differences. However, SLE promises to have more interesting and impactful potential results.
ContributorsWhitney, Shannon (Author) / Calhoun, Chesire (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2012-05
Description
We live in a world of inequality. Some thrive and live luxurious lives while others are deprived of the most basic necessities. With such extreme differences the question is raised, what is our moral obligation to help others? I will examine two theories, Peter Singer's utilitarian theory and Michael Slote's care ethical approach, both of which outline humankind's moral obligation to help others. I will argue that Slote's approach to tackling this complex question is superior to Singer's approach, because it is more palatable and embraces human nature. I will then suggest a strategy to synthesize the two concepts, resulting in global and personal moral elevation.
ContributorsMoore, Ashley Nicole (Author) / Brake, Elizabeth (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
This thesis provides jurors in criminal cases with a body of advice to guide and enrich their understanding of legal proof, knowledge, and justification, in order to ensure that the American legal system is carrying out justice. According to Michael Pardo’s (2010) article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof,’ there are five different possible accounts of the relationship between knowledge and legal proof, which vary based on the way they handle different perspectives on legal proof, epistemic concepts, and the extent to which justification is part of the goal or the goal of legal proof. I will argue that jurors in serious criminal cases should adhere to the knowledge account when evaluating evidence in trial. On this account the aim of a criminal trial is for the jurors to gain knowledge, ensuring that their verdict aims at something beyond a merely justified true belief.
Under the knowledge account the existence of any probatory errors or material errors sufficient to undermine knowledge in a trial are grounds for an acquittal. The definitions that I use for the material perspective and the probatory perspective differ from the standard notions of these terms. The term probatory more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. Evidence and/or propositions that are not probative do not prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. The term material more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that are relevant to a legal case and establish or help establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. Evidence and/or propositions that are immaterial are irrelevant to a legal case and do not establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. I will use the following idiosyncratic definitions of the terms probatory and material as used in Pardo’s article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’. The probatory perspective holds that truth is not essential to the goal of legal proof; instead, a proof standard is formulated that regulates whether the evidence meets the epistemic level set by the proof standard. A probatory error occurs when the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven. The material perspective includes truth as an essential part of the goal of legal proof, and on this perspective when probatory errors or material errors are made, the juror, the legal system, and the verdict have failed to achieve justice. A material error has occurred when either (a) the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven and/or (b) the proposition did not actually occur and a juror concludes that the proposition did occur. The case of Troy Anthony Davis provides an example of a trial that was arguably free from probatory errors, because the conviction of Davis was supported by sufficient evidence for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Davis argued that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice, because material errors occurred in his trial viz., that he’s innocent and so the jury failed to find the truth.
According to Justice Scalia (2009), defendants do not have the constitutional right to challenge their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus multiple times on the federal level when the state court and district court have already ruled that their trial is free of procedural errors. Under Justice Scalia’s perspective, defendants like Davis have exhausted all avenues of post conviction relief, if the state and federal courts have not unreasonably applied federal law, even if the convicted defendants claim that material
errors occurred in his/her trial, i.e., the defendant actually did not commit the crime, yet the jury convicted the defendant. Justice Scalia argues that the district court would be in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it granted Davis the opportunity for a new trial, even if the district court was persuaded by the new evidence Davis provided to demonstrate that material errors occurred during his trial. Justice Stevens disagrees with Justice Scalia’s argument and upholds the constitutional significance of material errors. Justice Stevens argues that federal law, which bars death row inmates, who are actually able to prove their innocence, from receiving habeas corpus relief, may be unconstitutional even if their trials lack procedural errors.
Davis exhausted the maximal amount of recourse the American legal system could provide him. The state court, appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court all denied Davis post conviction relief. Troy Anthony Davis was executed by lethal injection on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m. For all the jury knew, however, Davis may very well have been innocent, even though he had a fair trial from a probatory perspective alone. If Davis were (and, he very well may have been) innocent, then a grave injustice has occurred. For the purposes of my thesis, I will use the Davis case as a case study and assume that Davis was innocent. I contest Justice Scalia’s ruling, arguing that a jury legally (and morally) should acquit a defendant if either probatory or material errors occur during his/her trial. The existence of these errors entails that the legal proof presented for the purposes of issuing a verdict failed to satisfy the knowledge account.
Under the knowledge account the existence of any probatory errors or material errors sufficient to undermine knowledge in a trial are grounds for an acquittal. The definitions that I use for the material perspective and the probatory perspective differ from the standard notions of these terms. The term probatory more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. Evidence and/or propositions that are not probative do not prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. The term material more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that are relevant to a legal case and establish or help establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. Evidence and/or propositions that are immaterial are irrelevant to a legal case and do not establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. I will use the following idiosyncratic definitions of the terms probatory and material as used in Pardo’s article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’. The probatory perspective holds that truth is not essential to the goal of legal proof; instead, a proof standard is formulated that regulates whether the evidence meets the epistemic level set by the proof standard. A probatory error occurs when the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven. The material perspective includes truth as an essential part of the goal of legal proof, and on this perspective when probatory errors or material errors are made, the juror, the legal system, and the verdict have failed to achieve justice. A material error has occurred when either (a) the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven and/or (b) the proposition did not actually occur and a juror concludes that the proposition did occur. The case of Troy Anthony Davis provides an example of a trial that was arguably free from probatory errors, because the conviction of Davis was supported by sufficient evidence for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Davis argued that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice, because material errors occurred in his trial viz., that he’s innocent and so the jury failed to find the truth.
According to Justice Scalia (2009), defendants do not have the constitutional right to challenge their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus multiple times on the federal level when the state court and district court have already ruled that their trial is free of procedural errors. Under Justice Scalia’s perspective, defendants like Davis have exhausted all avenues of post conviction relief, if the state and federal courts have not unreasonably applied federal law, even if the convicted defendants claim that material
errors occurred in his/her trial, i.e., the defendant actually did not commit the crime, yet the jury convicted the defendant. Justice Scalia argues that the district court would be in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it granted Davis the opportunity for a new trial, even if the district court was persuaded by the new evidence Davis provided to demonstrate that material errors occurred during his trial. Justice Stevens disagrees with Justice Scalia’s argument and upholds the constitutional significance of material errors. Justice Stevens argues that federal law, which bars death row inmates, who are actually able to prove their innocence, from receiving habeas corpus relief, may be unconstitutional even if their trials lack procedural errors.
Davis exhausted the maximal amount of recourse the American legal system could provide him. The state court, appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court all denied Davis post conviction relief. Troy Anthony Davis was executed by lethal injection on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m. For all the jury knew, however, Davis may very well have been innocent, even though he had a fair trial from a probatory perspective alone. If Davis were (and, he very well may have been) innocent, then a grave injustice has occurred. For the purposes of my thesis, I will use the Davis case as a case study and assume that Davis was innocent. I contest Justice Scalia’s ruling, arguing that a jury legally (and morally) should acquit a defendant if either probatory or material errors occur during his/her trial. The existence of these errors entails that the legal proof presented for the purposes of issuing a verdict failed to satisfy the knowledge account.
ContributorsSmith, Jenna (Contributor) / Botham, Thad (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Personal identity stands at the heart of many practical practices such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman argues that the only accounts of personal identity that can capture this practical importance are those that address the characterization question \u2014 the question of what makes some feature attributable to a person. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels answers the characterization question and is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this paper, I argue that her account ultimately does not serve her purposes as it only focuses on attribution of features and does not, in fact, account for personal identity. Given that her view is exclusively about attribution, I explain, it is not relevant to the conversation on personal identity. Upon making this argument, I describe how the narrative self constitution view may nevertheless be useful as a tool for understanding the phenomenological notion of a sense of self or a self conception. Here I argue against Galen Strawson who holds that a narrative self conception is oftentimes problematic and unnecessary for several practical human functions. I argue that having a narrative sense of self is useful for personal growth insofar as it involves placing emphasis on certain life events, placing those events in context, and seeing one's life as having direction. Ultimately, I argue that a narrative self conception is not as problematic as Strawson thinks and may often be a useful tool for self-improvement.
ContributorsMoga, Radu (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Khoury, Andrew (Committee member) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Understanding the connection between different forms of oppression is relevant both in the political movement for animal rights and the political movements for social justice and human equality. I argue that sexism, racism, and speciesism intersect in such a way that each form of oppression depends on and mutually reinforces the others. In the struggle for justice, inequalities cannot be compartmentalized and the approach cannot be single issue because leaving groups behind means leaving the oppressive systems intact, perpetuating all forms of oppression, and undermining the efforts of each campaign. By recognizing sexism, racism, and speciesism as inextricably linked, each movement can be made more successful by approaching inequality as a bundled political problem instead of as distinct and independent forms of injustice.
ContributorsKris, Erica Kelly (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
Bad Samaritans are bystanders who omit from preventing some foreseeable harm when doing so could have been accomplished with little risk. Although failing to intervene to prevent a harm often renders Bad Samaritans morally culpable, under current common law in the United States they could not be held criminally liable for any harm that resulted to the victims of that harm. In this paper I argue for the criminalization of individuals who fall under this label; I argue for the adoption of Bad Samaritan laws. To accomplish this, I first argue for the conclusion that omissions can causally contribute to harm. From here I am able to reach three further conclusions relative to Bad Samaritan legislation. These three conclusions are that Bad Samaritan laws are justified, that the punishment for the violation of a Bad Samaritan law should be proportional to the degree culpability for the harm caused, and that if "commission by omission" statutes are justified, then so too are Bad Samaritan laws.
ContributorsCallahan, Ty William (Author) / Sigler, Mary (Thesis director) / Murphy, Jeffrie (Committee member) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Chemical Engineering Program (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
It is not necessarily concerning that it is harder for some to conform to the law until it brings up the issue of insanity. The insanity defense, though controversial, is inherently retributive in that punishing the mentally ill is not blameworthy. As ill-suited subjects for blame, mentally ill persons lack the cognitive reasoning skills necessary to be held legally accountable. Exculpating the mentally ill is not only retributive, but also deeply intuitive, evidenced by how many mentally ill persons seem "odd or crazy" to the average person. Finally, of all the tests used to determined insanity, the Federal Test of 1984 most successfully renders the insanity defense narrow enough to minimize abuse, allows for expert testimony, and calls for a cognitive interpretation of insanity.
ContributorsGilman, Lindsey Erin (Author) / Sigler, Mary (Thesis director) / Murphy, Jeffrie (Committee member) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
Stand-up comedy, as a performance art, has a dearth of serious academic literature and exposition. In this paper, I set out to analyze comedy at the edge, what I refer to as abject comedy. I draw on the major performers in this vein of performance to analyze the effects of their material. Also, I use my more than three years experience in the stand-up world to take a sincere look at the power and effectiveness of this brand of comedy. The abject comedian addresses the personally political narrative of self-discovery, social inequality, and performative boundaries to absolve herself of the existing circumstances she perceives as deplorable and unfounded. I show that abject stand-up exhibits realistic performative change in not only the audience and performer, but in society as a whole. Lastly, I seek out my own motivations for performing stand-up comedy and address my personal relationship with humor and audience interaction, finding that I aim to discover truth, establish uncertainty, and test the limits of social boundaries. At the very least, I aim to make the audience question, to make them think. I do not expect my material to always have my personal intended affect on the audience, but making an affect, sparking a question, challenging the individual's accepted conceptual boundaries, these are my reasons for approaching the stage. Baring my self through a microphone on a well lit stage in a dark room for a group of strangers whose acceptance or denial elevates or remands my spirit; this is my pursuit. This is why I tell jokes
ContributorsRollingher, Daniel (Author) / Fahs, Breanne (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Vicich, Tony (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor)
Created2012-12
Description
This thesis addresses the widespread questions asked of Bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies - decentralized ledgers of peer to peer transactions – have taken the world by storm, with Bitcoin leading the way by means of being the original, most valuable, and most popular. Despite this widespread use, skepticism remains as to what Bitcoin is and whether it counts as money. I first defend the framework that I use for understanding Social Objects, Searle’s X counts as Y in C formula, as money is undoubtedly a social object. I then argue that Smit et al.’s account of money, while useful, mistakenly identifies an essential characteristic of money, the relative ratio scale, as a feature. I therefore present an alternative account of money. I then explain why the most commonly held account of Bitcoin, the chain Definition fails, and why Bitcoin being a fictional substance is not a problem for Bitcoin being money. I then demonstrate Bitcoin’s compatibility with my alternative account, and from this conclude that Bitcoin is Money.
ContributorsRistic, Nikola (Author) / McElhoes, David (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Dean, W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor)
Created2023-05
Description
The thesis looks into the sacrifices of first responders and veterans and how the differences between these people of service are transcended by said sacrifices, allowing them to better empathize and understand what one another had gone through. The thesis also looks at this understanding of sacrifices among people of service, and how such an understanding can be used by the public to better understand issues that affect veterans and first responders after and during their service.
ContributorsGeorge, Ryan (Author) / Perez, Luke (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Civic & Economic Thought and Leadership (Contributor)
Created2023-05