Evolutionary dynamical models for cyclic competitions of three species (e.g., rock, paper, and scissors, or RPS) provide a paradigm, at the microscopic level of individual interactions, to address many issues in coexistence and biodiversity. Real ecosystems often involve competitions among more than three species. By extending the RPS game model to five (rock-paper-scissors-lizard-Spock, or RPSLS) mobile species, we uncover a fundamental type of mesoscopic interactions among subgroups of species. In particular, competitions at the microscopic level lead to the emergence of various local groups in different regions of the space, each involving three species. It is the interactions among the groups that fundamentally determine how many species can coexist. In fact, as the mobility is increased from zero, two transitions can occur: one from a five- to a three-species coexistence state and another from the latter to a uniform, single-species state. We develop a mean-field theory to show that, in order to understand the first transition, group interactions at the mesoscopic scale must be taken into account. Our findings suggest, more broadly, the importance of mesoscopic interactions in coexistence of great many species.

Dynamical systems based on the minority game (MG) have been a paradigm for gaining significant insights into a variety of social and biological behaviors. Recently, a grouping phenomenon has been unveiled in MG systems of multiple resources (strategies) in which the strategies spontaneously break into an even number of groups, each exhibiting an identical oscillation pattern in the attendance of game players. Here we report our finding of spontaneous breakup of resources into three groups, each exhibiting period-three oscillations. An analysis is developed to understand the emergence of the striking phenomenon of triple grouping and period-three oscillations. In the presence of random disturbances, the triple-group/period-three state becomes transient, and we obtain explicit formula for the average transient lifetime using two methods of approximation. Our finding indicates that, period-three oscillation, regarded as one of the most fundamental behaviors in smooth nonlinear dynamical systems, can also occur in much more complex, evolutionary-game dynamical systems. Our result also provides a plausible insight for the occurrence of triple grouping observed, for example, in the U.S. housing market.

We use an agent-based model to analyze the effects of spatial heterogeneity and agents’ mobility on social-ecological outcomes. Our model is a stylized representation of a dynamic population of agents moving and harvesting a renewable resource. Cooperators (agents who harvest an amount close to the maximum sustainable yield) and selfish agents (those who harvest an amount greater than the sustainable yield) are simulated in the model. Three indicators of the outcomes of the system are analyzed: the number of settlements, the resource level, and the proportion of cooperators in the population. Our paper adds a more realistic approach to previous studies on the evolution of cooperation by considering a social-ecological system in which agents move in a landscape to harvest a renewable resource. Our results conclude that resource dynamics play an important role when studying levels of cooperation and resource use. Our simulations show that the agents’ mobility significantly affects the outcomes of the system. This response is nonlinear and very sensible to the type of spatial distribution of the resource richness. In our simulations, better outcomes of long-term sustainability of the resource are obtained with moderate agent mobility and cooperation is enhanced in harsh environments with low resource level in which cooperative groups have natural boundaries fostered by agents’ low mobility.

Understanding the dynamics of human movements is key to issues of significant current interest such as behavioral prediction, recommendation, and control of epidemic spreading. We collect and analyze big data sets of human movements in both cyberspace (through browsing of websites) and physical space (through mobile towers) and find a superlinear scaling relation between the mean frequency of visit〈f〉and its fluctuation σ : σ ∼〈f⟩^β with β ≈ 1.2. The probability distribution of the visiting frequency is found to be a stretched exponential function. We develop a model incorporating two essential ingredients, preferential return and exploration, and show that these are necessary for generating the scaling relation extracted from real data. A striking finding is that human movements in cyberspace and physical space are strongly correlated, indicating a distinctive behavioral identifying characteristic and implying that the behaviors in one space can be used to predict those in the other.

The insights in Governing the Commons have provided foundational ideas for commons research in the past 23 years. However, the cases that Elinor Ostrom analyzed have been exposed to new social, economic, and ecological disturbances. What has happened to these cases since the 1980s? We reevaluated one of Ostrom’s case studies, the lobster and groundfishery of Port Lameron, Southwest Nova Scotia (SWNS). Ostrom suggested that the self-governance of this fishery was fragile because the government did not recognize the rights of resource users to organize their own rules. In the Maine lobster fishery, however, the government formalized customary rules and decentralized power to fishing ports. We applied the concepts of feedback, governance mismatches, and the robustness of social-ecological systems to understand the pathway of institutional change in Port Lameron. We revisited the case of Port Lameron using marine harvesters’ accounts collected from participant observation, informal interviews and surveys, and literature on fisheries policy and ecology in SWNS and Maine. We found that the government’s failure to recognize the customary rights of harvesters to organize has weakened feedback between the operational level, where resource users interact with the resource, and the collective-choice level, where agents develop rules to influence the behavior of resource users. This has precipitated governance mismatches, which have led harvesters to believe that the decision-making process is detrimental to their livelihoods. Thus, harvesters rarely participate in decision making and resist regulatory change. In Maine, harvesters can influence decisions through participation, but there is a trade-off. With higher influence in decisions, captains have co-opted the decision-making process. Nevertheless, we suggest that the fisheries of SWNS are more vulnerable to social-ecological change because of weaker feedbacks than in Maine. Finally, we have discussed the potential benefits of polycentricity to both fisheries.

During the last 40 years evidence from systematic case study analysis and behavioral experiments have provided a comprehensive perspective on how communities can manage common resources in a sustainable way. The conventional theory based on selfish rational actors cannot explain empirical observations. A more comprehensive theoretical framework of human behavior is emerging that include concepts such as trust, conditional cooperation, other-regarding preferences, social norms, and reputation. The new behavioral perspective also demonstrates that behavioral responses depend on social and biophysical context.

Ecological models are a fundamental tool that archaeologists use to clarify our thinking about the processes that generate the archaeological record. Typically, arguments reasoned from a single model are bolstered by observing the consistency of ethnographic data with the argument. This validation of a model establishes that an argument is reasonable. In this paper, we attempt to move beyond validation by comparing the consistency of two arguments reasoned from different models that might explain corporate territorial ownership in a large ethnographic data set. Our results suggest that social dilemmas are an under appreciated mechanism that can drive the evolution of corporate territorial ownership. When social dilemmas emerge, the costs associated with provisioning the public goods of information on resources or, perhaps, common defence create situations in which human foragers gain more by cooperating to recognize corporate ownership rules than they lose. Our results also indicate that societies who share a common cultural history are more likely to recognize corporate ownership, and there is a spatial dynamic in which societies who live near each other are more likely to recognize corporate ownership as the number of near-by groups who recognize ownership increases. Our results have important implications for investigating the coevolution of territorial ownership and the adoption of food production in the archaeological record.

Recently, there has been an increased interest in using behavioral experiments to study hypotheses on the governance of social-ecological systems. A diversity of software tools are used to implement such experiments. We evaluated various publicly available platforms that could be used in research and education on the governance of social-ecological systems. The aims of the various platforms are distinct, and this is noticeable in the differences in their user-friendliness and their adaptability to novel research questions. The more easily accessible platforms are useful for prototyping experiments and for educational purposes to illustrate theoretical concepts. To advance novel research aims, more elaborate programming experience is required to either implement an experiment from scratch or adjust existing experimental software. There is no ideal platform best suited for all possible use cases, but we have provided a menu of options and their associated trade-offs.

Allowing resource users to communicate in behavioural experiments on commons dilemmas increases the level of cooperation. In actual common pool resource dilemmas in the real world, communication is costly, which is an important detail missing from most typical experiments. We conducted experiments where participants must give up harvesting opportunities to communicate. The constrained communication treatment is compared with the effect of limited information about the state of the resource and the actions of the other participants. We find that despite making communication costly, performance of groups improves in all treatments with communication. We also find that constraining communication has a more significant effect than limiting information on the performance of groups.

Most studies on the response of socioeconomic systems to a sudden shift focus on long-term equilibria or end points. Such narrow focus forgoes many valuable insights. Here we examine the transient dynamics of regime shift on a divided population, exemplified by societies divided ideologically, politically, economically, or technologically. Replicator dynamics is used to investigate the complex transient dynamics of the population response. Though simple, our modeling approach exhibits a surprisingly rich and diverse array of dynamics. Our results highlight the critical roles played by diversity in strategies and the magnitude of the shift. Importantly, it allows for a variety of strategies to arise organically as an integral part of the transient dynamics-as opposed to an independent process-of population response to a regime shift, providing a link between the population's past and future diversity patterns. Several combinations of different populations' strategy distributions and shifts were systematically investigated. Such rich dynamics highlight the challenges of anticipating the response of a divided population to a change. The findings in this paper can potentially improve our understanding of a wide range of socio-ecological and technological transitions.