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- All Subjects: Electric power systems--State estimation.
- Creators: Haughton, Daniel Andrew
- Creators: Liang, Jingwen
Description
The electric power system is one of the largest, most complicated, and most important cyber-physical systems in the world. The link between the cyber and physical level is the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Energy Management Systems (EMS). Their functions include monitoring the real-time system operation through state estimation (SE), controlling the system to operate reliably, and optimizing the system operation efficiency. The SCADA acquires the noisy measurements, such as voltage angle and magnitude, line power flows, and line current magnitude, from the remote terminal units (RTUs). These raw data are firstly sent to the SE, which filters all the noisy data and derives the best estimate of the system state. Then the estimated states are used for other EMS functions, such as contingency analysis, optimal power flow, etc.
In the existing state estimation process, there is no defense mechanism for any malicious attacks. Once the communication channel between the SCADA and RTUs is hijacked by the attacker, the attacker can perform a man-in-middle attack and send data of its choice. The only step that can possibly detect the attack during the state estimation process is the bad data detector. Unfortunately, even the bad data detector is unable to detect a certain type of attack, known as the false data injection (FDI) attacks.
Diagnosing the physical consequences of such attacks, therefore, is very important to understand system stability. In this thesis, theoretical general attack models for AC and DC attacks are given and an optimization problem for the worst-case overload attack is formulated. Furthermore, physical consequences of FDI attacks, based on both DC and AC model, are addressed. Various scenarios with different attack targets and system configurations are simulated. The details of the research, results obtained and conclusions drawn are presented in this document.
In the existing state estimation process, there is no defense mechanism for any malicious attacks. Once the communication channel between the SCADA and RTUs is hijacked by the attacker, the attacker can perform a man-in-middle attack and send data of its choice. The only step that can possibly detect the attack during the state estimation process is the bad data detector. Unfortunately, even the bad data detector is unable to detect a certain type of attack, known as the false data injection (FDI) attacks.
Diagnosing the physical consequences of such attacks, therefore, is very important to understand system stability. In this thesis, theoretical general attack models for AC and DC attacks are given and an optimization problem for the worst-case overload attack is formulated. Furthermore, physical consequences of FDI attacks, based on both DC and AC model, are addressed. Various scenarios with different attack targets and system configurations are simulated. The details of the research, results obtained and conclusions drawn are presented in this document.
ContributorsLiang, Jingwen (Author) / Sankar, Lalitha (Thesis advisor) / Kosut, Oliver (Thesis advisor) / Hedman, Kory (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
The Smart Grid initiative describes the collaborative effort to modernize the U.S. electric power infrastructure. Modernization efforts incorporate digital data and information technology to effectuate control, enhance reliability, encourage small customer sited distributed generation (DG), and better utilize assets. The Smart Grid environment is envisioned to include distributed generation, flexible and controllable loads, bidirectional communications using smart meters and other technologies. Sensory technology may be utilized as a tool that enhances operation including operation of the distribution system. Addressing this point, a distribution system state estimation algorithm is developed in this thesis. The state estimation algorithm developed here utilizes distribution system modeling techniques to calculate a vector of state variables for a given set of measurements. Measurements include active and reactive power flows, voltage and current magnitudes, phasor voltages with magnitude and angle information. The state estimator is envisioned as a tool embedded in distribution substation computers as part of distribution management systems (DMS); the estimator acts as a supervisory layer for a number of applications including automation (DA), energy management, control and switching. The distribution system state estimator is developed in full three-phase detail, and the effect of mutual coupling and single-phase laterals and loads on the solution is calculated. The network model comprises a full three-phase admittance matrix and a subset of equations that relates measurements to system states. Network equations and variables are represented in rectangular form. Thus a linear calculation procedure may be employed. When initialized to the vector of measured quantities and approximated non-metered load values, the calculation procedure is non-iterative. This dissertation presents background information used to develop the state estimation algorithm, considerations for distribution system modeling, and the formulation of the state estimator. Estimator performance for various power system test beds is investigated. Sample applications of the estimator to Smart Grid systems are presented. Applications include monitoring, enabling demand response (DR), voltage unbalance mitigation, and enhancing voltage control. Illustrations of these applications are shown. Also, examples of enhanced reliability and restoration using a sensory based automation infrastructure are shown.
ContributorsHaughton, Daniel Andrew (Author) / Heydt, Gerald T (Thesis advisor) / Vittal, Vijay (Committee member) / Ayyanar, Raja (Committee member) / Hedman, Kory W (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012