Matching Items (2)
Filtering by
- All Subjects: lucid
- Creators: Neal, Tess
Description
Lucid dreaming occurs in those who become aware they are dreaming, while still in the dreaming state. Although lucid dreaming has been studied with respect to personality characteristics and as a learned cognitive skill to enhance well-being via processes such as mindfulness, less research has been conducted on relationships between lucid dreaming and emotion. I collected self-reports from a college sample of 262 participants to examine the relationships between lucidity experienced in dreams and emotion regulation, dispositional positive emotions, interoceptive awareness, and mindfulness. Pearson correlations revealed that greater lucidity experienced within dreams was significantly related to more positive emotions, greater interoceptive awareness, and greater mindfulness; however, lucidity was not related to emotion regulation. Furthermore, regression analyses revealed that greater lucidity experienced within dreams predicted more dispositional positive emotions above and beyond emotion regulation and interoceptive awareness. It is important to note that these relationships were tested across people who self-identified as lucid dreamers as well as those who identified as non-lucid dreamers. Overall, lucidity may be beneficial for anyone who recalls his or her dreams, in that higher lucidity was associated with more positive affect during waking. Positive emotions experienced during waking also may translate into greater awareness during dreaming.
ContributorsRosenbusch, Kaylee Michael Ann (Author) / Roberts, Nicole A. (Thesis advisor) / Burleson, Mary H (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought.
ContributorsHafdahl, Riquel J (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016