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Research on the psychology of social power has shown how experiences of power tend to promote goal-oriented behavior and sexual perception in individuals. These experiences need not be generated through real-life power dynamics, but can be primed experimentally in the lab. A recent study has explored how power affects even

Research on the psychology of social power has shown how experiences of power tend to promote goal-oriented behavior and sexual perception in individuals. These experiences need not be generated through real-life power dynamics, but can be primed experimentally in the lab. A recent study has explored how power affects even lower level goal-oriented motor movement, showing how increased power facilitates the initiation of goal-oriented motor actions (Maner et al., 2010). However, this research did not explore how these goal-oriented motor movements promoted by power dynamically evolve over time, or can be influenced by sexual perceptual processes. Using an experimental paradigm known as computer mouse-tracking, we designed an experimental task to asses how participants’ – primed with either a High or Low sense of power – motor movements and sexual perceptual processes co-evolved and influenced one another during decision-making. We analyzed four distinct mouse-tracking variables, including traditional reaction time measures and novel measures indexing real-time decision-making processes. Several hypotheses are proposed and discussed. No significant findings emerged, however general trends showed promising signs for future iterations of the study. The study limitations and proposed future directions for studying these phenomena are discussed.
ContributorsGonzales, James Paul (Author) / Duran, Nicholas D (Thesis advisor) / Hall, Deborah L. (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the

There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought.
ContributorsHafdahl, Riquel J (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
Loss aversion manifests as a decision bias in which avoiding losses is preferred over acquiring rewards and can drastically alter an individual’s decision-making by overweighting potential losses relative to gains of equal magnitude. Consequently, individuals may require greater positive compensation to offset potential losses, exhibit contradictory choice preferences, or even

Loss aversion manifests as a decision bias in which avoiding losses is preferred over acquiring rewards and can drastically alter an individual’s decision-making by overweighting potential losses relative to gains of equal magnitude. Consequently, individuals may require greater positive compensation to offset potential losses, exhibit contradictory choice preferences, or even avoid the decision entirely; and this behavior may be ascribed to an over-reliance on automatic, unconscious (intuitive) judgments rather than initiating analytic reasoning more capable of objectively evaluating outcomes.

Religion (specifically Christianity) is the topic of focus, as preliminary evidence suggests an individual’s intuitive inclinations positively correlate with and predict religious beliefs. Moreover, self-reported religious beliefs significantly differed as a function of inducing either intuitive or reflective mindsets. Therefore, the purpose of this experiment was to test the hypothesis that religious participants will display significantly greater levels of loss aversion than nonreligious participants.

This hypothesis extends from a previous study relating large-scale cultural and religious differences with loss aversion. While their results revealed religious orthodoxy strongly influenced loss aversion, the parameters elicited may be less stable as only two lottery questions were asked and religion was determined by cultural demographics. This study used the same design, but with a total of ten lotteries and a more detailed investigation into individual religious factors.

While loss aversion coefficients replicated the overall behavioral effect (Median θ = 2.6), independent sample, Mann-Whitney U tests did not yield any significant differences between Christian and Nonreligious participants (p > 0.05); nor did any of the religious factors examined account for a significant amount of variability.

This study attempted to add to current knowledge by further conflating the relationship between religiosity and adaptive decision strategies susceptible to errant and inconsistent behavior. While the hypotheses were unsupported, a null finding is still important, and future research re-testing this association or introducing causational designs may prove more fruitful in understanding these complex relationships.
ContributorsHowatt, Brian (Author) / Robles-Sotelo, Elias (Thesis advisor) / Vargas, Perla (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017