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- All Subjects: Electric power systems
- Creators: Heydt, Gerald T
- Creators: Kosut, Oliver
- Member of: Theses and Dissertations
- Member of: Barrett, The Honors College Thesis/Creative Project Collection
- Resource Type: Text
Lossy compression is a form of compression that slightly degrades a signal in ways that are ideally not detectable to the human ear. This is opposite to lossless compression, in which the sample is not degraded at all. While lossless compression may seem like the best option, lossy compression, which is used in most audio and video, reduces transmission time and results in much smaller file sizes. However, this compression can affect quality if it goes too far. The more compression there is on a waveform, the more degradation there is, and once a file is lossy compressed, this process is not reversible. This project will observe the degradation of an audio signal after the application of Singular Value Decomposition compression, a lossy compression that eliminates singular values from a signal’s matrix.
power, gas , communication networks. Ensuring the security of these
infrastructures is of utmost importance. This task becomes ever more challenging as
the inter-dependence among these infrastructures grows and a security breach in one
infrastructure can spill over to the others. The implication is that the security practices/
analysis recommended for these infrastructures should be done in coordination.
This thesis, focusing on the power grid, explores strategies to secure the system that
look into the coupling of the power grid to the cyber infrastructure, used to manage
and control it, and to the gas grid, that supplies an increasing amount of reserves to
overcome contingencies.
The first part (Part I) of the thesis, including chapters 2 through 4, focuses on
the coupling of the power and the cyber infrastructure that is used for its control and
operations. The goal is to detect malicious attacks gaining information about the
operation of the power grid to later attack the system. In chapter 2, we propose a
hierarchical architecture that correlates the analysis of high resolution Micro-Phasor
Measurement Unit (microPMU) data and traffic analysis on the Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) packets, to infer the security status of the grid and
detect the presence of possible intruders. An essential part of this architecture is
tied to the analysis on the microPMU data. In chapter 3 we establish a set of anomaly
detection rules on microPMU data that
flag "abnormal behavior". A placement strategy
of microPMU sensors is also proposed to maximize the sensitivity in detecting anomalies.
In chapter 4, we focus on developing rules that can localize the source of an events
using microPMU to further check whether a cyber attack is causing the anomaly, by
correlating SCADA traffic with the microPMU data analysis results. The thread that
unies the data analysis in this chapter is the fact that decision are made without fully estimating the state of the system; on the contrary, decisions are made using
a set of physical measurements that falls short by orders of magnitude to meet the
needs for observability. More specifically, in the first part of this chapter (sections 4.1-
4.2), using microPMU data in the substation, methodologies for online identification of
the source Thevenin parameters are presented. This methodology is used to identify
reconnaissance activity on the normally-open switches in the substation, initiated
by attackers to gauge its controllability over the cyber network. The applications
of this methodology in monitoring the voltage stability of the grid is also discussed.
In the second part of this chapter (sections 4.3-4.5), we investigate the localization
of faults. Since the number of PMU sensors available to carry out the inference
is insufficient to ensure observability, the problem can be viewed as that of under-sampling
a "graph signal"; the analysis leads to a PMU placement strategy that can
achieve the highest resolution in localizing the fault, for a given number of sensors.
In both cases, the results of the analysis are leveraged in the detection of cyber-physical
attacks, where microPMU data and relevant SCADA network traffic information
are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system
information and/or operations.
In second part of this thesis (Part II), the security analysis considers the adequacy
and reliability of schedules for the gas and power network. The motivation for
scheduling jointly supply in gas and power networks is motivated by the increasing
reliance of power grids on natural gas generators (and, indirectly, on gas pipelines)
as providing critical reserves. Chapter 5 focuses on unveiling the challenges and
providing solution to this problem.
The impact of the failure of transmission assets operated by a major utility company in the Southwest United States on its power system network is studied. A methodology is used to quantify the impact and subsequently rank transmission assets in decreasing order of their criticality. The analysis is carried out on the power system network using a node breaker model and steady state analysis. The light load case of spring 2019, peak load case of summer 2023 and two intermediate load cases have been considered for the ranking. The contingency simulations and power flow studies have been carried out using a commercial power flow study software package, Positive Sequence Load Flow (PSLF). The results obtained from PSLF are analyzed using Matlab to obtain the desired ranking. The ranked list of transmission assets will enable asset managers to identify the assets that have the most significant impact on the overall power system network performance. Therefore, investment and maintenance decisions can be made effectively. A conclusion along with a recommendation for future work is also provided in the thesis.
transportation of power from the sources of power generation via an intermediate
densely connected transmission network to a large distribution network of end-users
at the lowest level of the hierarchy. At each level of the hierarchy (generation/ trans-
mission/ distribution), the system is managed and monitored with a combination of
(a) supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA); and (b) energy management
systems (EMSs) that process the collected data and make control and actuation de-
cisions using the collected data. However, at all levels of the hierarchy, both SCADA
and EMSs are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Furthermore, given the criticality of the
electric power infrastructure, cyber attacks can have severe economic and social con-
sequences.
This thesis focuses on cyber attacks on SCADA and EMS at the transmission
level of the electric power system. The goal is to study the consequences of three
classes of cyber attacks that can change topology data. These classes include: (i)
unobservable state-preserving cyber attacks that only change the topology data; (ii)
unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks that change both states and
topology data to enable a coordinated physical and cyber attack; and (iii) topology-
targeted man-in-the-middle (MitM) communication attacks that alter topology data
shared during inter-EMS communication. Specically, attack class (i) and (ii) focus on
the unobservable attacks on single regional EMS while class (iii) focuses on the MitM
attacks on communication links between regional EMSs. For each class of attacks,
the theoretical attack model and the implementation of attacks are provided, and the
worst-case attack and its consequences are exhaustively studied. In particularly, for
class (ii), a two-stage optimization problem is introduced to study worst-case attacks
that can cause a physical line over
ow that is unobservable in the cyber layer. The long-term implication and the system anomalies are demonstrated via simulation.
For attack classes (i) and (ii), both mathematical and experimental analyses sug-
gest that these unobservable attacks can be limited or even detected with resiliency
mechanisms including load monitoring, anomalous re-dispatches checking, and his-
torical data comparison. For attack class (iii), countermeasures including anomalous
tie-line interchange verication, anomalous re-dispatch alarms, and external contin-
gency lists sharing are needed to thwart such attacks.
It is shown that the proposed communication scheme results in approximate channel models with amplitude-limited inputs and signal-dependent additive noise. Motivated by this observation, I study capacity of amplitude-limited channels under different transmission scenarios. Specifically, I consider fading channels, signal-dependent additive Gaussian noise channels, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems and parallel Gaussian channels under peak power constraints.
I also consider practical channel coding problems for channels with signal-dependent noise. I consider two specific models; signal-dependent additive Gaussian noise channels and Z-channels which serve as binary-input binary-output approximations to the Gaussian case. I propose a new upper bound on the probability of error, and utilize it for design of codes. I illustrate the tightness of the derived bounds and the performance of the designed codes via examples.
Proposed market solutions are often infeasible because constraint relaxation practices and approximations that are incorporated into market models. Therefore, the dispatch solution must be corrected to ensure its feasibility. The practice of correcting the proposed dispatch solution after the market is solved is known as out-of-market corrections (OMCs), defined as any action an operator takes that modifies a proposed day-ahead dispatch solution to ensure operating and reliability requirements. The way in which OMCs affect market outcomes is illustrated through the use of different corrective procedures. The objective of the work presented is to demonstrate the implications of these industry practices and assess the impact these practices have on market outcomes.
1. Analysis of load model parameter uncertainty and sensitivity based pa-rameter estimation for power system studies
2. A systematic approach to n-1-1 analysis for power system security as-sessment
To assess the effect of load model parameter uncertainty, a trajectory sensitivity based approach is proposed in this work. Trajectory sensitivity analysis provides a sys-tematic approach to study the impact of parameter uncertainty on power system re-sponse to disturbances. Furthermore, the non-smooth nature of the composite load model presents some additional challenges to sensitivity analysis in a realistic power system. Accordingly, the impact of the non-smooth nature of load models on the sensitivity analysis is addressed in this work. The study was performed using the Western Electrici-ty Coordinating Council (WECC) system model. To address the issue of load model pa-rameter estimation, a sensitivity based load model parameter estimation technique is presented in this work. A detailed discussion on utilizing sensitivities to improve the ac-curacy and efficiency of the parameter estimation process is also presented in this work.
Cascading outages can have a catastrophic impact on power systems. As such, the NERC transmission planning (TPL) standards requires utilities to plan for n¬-1-1 out-ages. However, such analyses can be computationally burdensome for any realistic pow-er system owing to the staggering number of possible n-1-1 contingencies. To address this problem, the report proposes a systematic approach to analyze n-1-1 contingencies in a computationally tractable manner for power system security assessment. The pro-posed approach addresses both static and dynamic security assessment. The proposed methods have been tested on the WECC system.
For this study, the MATLab software platform is used, a mathematical based modeling language, optimization solvers (specifically Gurobi), and a power flow solver (PowerWorld) are used to simulate an economic dispatch problem that includes energy storage and transmission losses. A program is created which utilizes quadratic programming to analyze various cases using a 2010 summer peak load from the Arizona portion of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) system. Actual data from industry are used in this test bed. In this thesis, the full capabilities of Gurobi are not utilized (e.g., integer variables, binary variables). However, the formulation shown here does create a platform such that future, more sophisticated modeling may readily be incorporated.
The developed software is used to assess the Arizona test bed with a low level of energy storage to study how the storage power limit effects several optimization outputs such as the system wide operating costs. Large levels of energy storage are then added to see how high level energy storage affects peak shaving, load factor, and other system applications. Finally, various constraint relaxations are made to analyze why the applications tested eventually approach a constant value. This research illustrates the use of energy storage which helps minimize the system wide generator operating cost by "shaving" energy off of the peak demand.
The thesis builds on the work of another recent researcher with the objectives of strengthening the assumptions used, checking the solutions obtained, utilizing higher level simulation languages to affirm results, and expanding the results and conclusions.
One important point not fully discussed in the present thesis is the impact of efficiency in the pumped hydro cycle. The efficiency of the cycle for modern units is estimated at higher than 90%. Inclusion of pumped hydro losses is relegated to future work.
In the existing state estimation process, there is no defense mechanism for any malicious attacks. Once the communication channel between the SCADA and RTUs is hijacked by the attacker, the attacker can perform a man-in-middle attack and send data of its choice. The only step that can possibly detect the attack during the state estimation process is the bad data detector. Unfortunately, even the bad data detector is unable to detect a certain type of attack, known as the false data injection (FDI) attacks.
Diagnosing the physical consequences of such attacks, therefore, is very important to understand system stability. In this thesis, theoretical general attack models for AC and DC attacks are given and an optimization problem for the worst-case overload attack is formulated. Furthermore, physical consequences of FDI attacks, based on both DC and AC model, are addressed. Various scenarios with different attack targets and system configurations are simulated. The details of the research, results obtained and conclusions drawn are presented in this document.