Matching Items (244)
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- All Subjects: Business Administration
- Genre: Doctoral Dissertation
- Creators: Arizona State University
- Status: Published
Description
As securities companies occupy an increasingly important position in the national economy, and the most valuable competitive advantage for whom is human resources; therefore, Security Industry practitioners pay close attention to the influences of securities companies' incentive mechanisms regarding to various business types.
This paper finds that asymmetry of information in business models is the motivation of the gaming for all participants, through analyzing the differences of various business models of securities brokerage services. Further, various incentive mechanisms under different circumstances result in diverse strategies of gaming. It varies development paths of securities companies. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to theoretically deduce the most reasonable and optimal securities companies’ incentive mechanism.
This paper intends to identify the principle component factors influencing securities brokerage services via questionnaire investigations towards 75 branches under the same securities company and 13 different securities companies, respectively. In addition, based on historical data, the paper aim to explain rationales between adjustments of incentive mechanisms and market shares of securities brokerage services.Lastly, combining author’s personal experience of various incentive mechanisms and development tracks in four securities companies that hopefully presents valuable information and clues for deducing the optimal securities company incentive mechanism.
There are two critical agency relationships in securities brokerage services. One is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are directors of branches. The other is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are securities marketers or brokers. Because of such operational setup, information is highly asymmetrical between all parties. It brought prominent problems regarding agency relationship and motivation aspects.
Under the certain circumstances, implementation of Incomplete Contracting Theory with franchising models in securities companies is quite useful. Specifically, for the former relationship between securities companies and marketers, the motivation effects of sub-license franchising are better than bonus compensation structure. Fixed salaries without bonus have the worst stimulating effects in such business model. For the latter relationship between securities companies and directors of branches, the agents focus on long term residual value claim rights, since it coincides with agents’ appraisals, focusing on incremental market shares and profit drawings.
This paper finds that asymmetry of information in business models is the motivation of the gaming for all participants, through analyzing the differences of various business models of securities brokerage services. Further, various incentive mechanisms under different circumstances result in diverse strategies of gaming. It varies development paths of securities companies. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to theoretically deduce the most reasonable and optimal securities companies’ incentive mechanism.
This paper intends to identify the principle component factors influencing securities brokerage services via questionnaire investigations towards 75 branches under the same securities company and 13 different securities companies, respectively. In addition, based on historical data, the paper aim to explain rationales between adjustments of incentive mechanisms and market shares of securities brokerage services.Lastly, combining author’s personal experience of various incentive mechanisms and development tracks in four securities companies that hopefully presents valuable information and clues for deducing the optimal securities company incentive mechanism.
There are two critical agency relationships in securities brokerage services. One is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are directors of branches. The other is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are securities marketers or brokers. Because of such operational setup, information is highly asymmetrical between all parties. It brought prominent problems regarding agency relationship and motivation aspects.
Under the certain circumstances, implementation of Incomplete Contracting Theory with franchising models in securities companies is quite useful. Specifically, for the former relationship between securities companies and marketers, the motivation effects of sub-license franchising are better than bonus compensation structure. Fixed salaries without bonus have the worst stimulating effects in such business model. For the latter relationship between securities companies and directors of branches, the agents focus on long term residual value claim rights, since it coincides with agents’ appraisals, focusing on incremental market shares and profit drawings.
ContributorsZhang, Xiangdong (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This study investigates the impact of a specific organizational form – partnership – on employees’ awareness of risk control and job engagement in securities companies. Given that their organizational performance relies heavily on the performance of individual employees, it is critical for securities companies in China to adopt appropriate organizational forms so that they can better captalize on their employees’ human capital to cope with the increasingly intense market competition. Partnership, as one of the few organizational forms, has been widely adopted in industries that rely on the performance of individuals, such as law, auditing, consulting, and investment banking, around the world. In the context of China’s emerging economy, it has also been adopted as an incentive system by market leaders across several industries, including Alibaba in online shopping, Vanke in real estate, and Fosun in investments. In contrast, partnership has not been adopted or implemented by securities companies in China as most of them are still state-owned enterprises.
Based on my review of the corporate governance literature and qualitative analysis of partnership adoption in China, I propose that partnership can help better alighn the interests of employees with owners in securities companies as well. Specifically, the prospect of becoming a partner in the future can improve employees’ awareness of risk control and increase their job engagement. Taking advantage of partnership adoption at a Chinese securities company as a natural field experienment, I surveyed its employees about their awareness of risk contrl and job dedication before and after the adoption. The results from 505 matched surveys showed an increase in the average scores of both awareness of risk control and job dedication after the company adopted partnership as a new organizational form. Findings of this study have important implications for organizational and incentive design for securities companies in China.
Based on my review of the corporate governance literature and qualitative analysis of partnership adoption in China, I propose that partnership can help better alighn the interests of employees with owners in securities companies as well. Specifically, the prospect of becoming a partner in the future can improve employees’ awareness of risk control and increase their job engagement. Taking advantage of partnership adoption at a Chinese securities company as a natural field experienment, I surveyed its employees about their awareness of risk contrl and job dedication before and after the adoption. The results from 505 matched surveys showed an increase in the average scores of both awareness of risk control and job dedication after the company adopted partnership as a new organizational form. Findings of this study have important implications for organizational and incentive design for securities companies in China.
ContributorsSha, Changming (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Valuation adjustment mechanism has been widely applied in acquisitions of listed companies in China today, and is usually agreed upon future financial performance indicators of acquired companies (mostly net income). This paper examines how changes of key contents of VAM agreement affect firms’ ability to meet performance commitments from the perspective of incentive effects. Empirical results show that as the performance goals set in VAM agreement becomes higher, the incentive for management to meet performance commitments will initially increase and then decrease, so that the ratio of actual profits to promised profits for target firms will reach peak at some reasonable performance goal and then decrease. Second, as the level of the information asymmetry between buyer and seller turns higher, the incentive effect of performance goals becomes lower. Third, compared with cash-based compensation, stock-based compensation shows significantly higher incentive effects on promisors thus increasing the ability for target firms to achieve performance commitments.
ContributorsWang, Yixin (Author) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Yu, Xiaoyun (Thesis advisor) / Jiang, Zhan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
China's city commercial banks were reorganized by the urban credit cooperatives in the same city in the 1990s. Although they are allowed to open branches outside the registered city, the location and the number of their branches have been strictly restricted. It is fatal to them to increase the competitiveness of their branches. Based on the diversity theory and its mechanism, in this study I examined the impact of source diversity of the senior management in the branches of the city commercial bank on the branches’ productivity and their asset yield. Invoking the resource-based theory and the social capital framework, the source diversity lead to the organization resources diversity and the organization knowledge diversity. The results demonstrate that the source diversity contribute to the branches’ competitiveness advantage. Both internal trained personnel and external introduction personnel are important for the branches’ top management team. But one of the two kinds of personnel is more suitable to their middle management team.
ContributorsZhang, Xiande (Author) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Wang, Tan (Thesis advisor) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017