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By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
With many recent events, such as the 2008 Financial Crisis, still under heavy scrutiny from the public, the payment received by executives at some of the major US banking institutions has been at the center of a major debate: are bank executives overpaid? While many people have attempted to answer

With many recent events, such as the 2008 Financial Crisis, still under heavy scrutiny from the public, the payment received by executives at some of the major US banking institutions has been at the center of a major debate: are bank executives overpaid? While many people have attempted to answer this question, it is important to look at historical data and determine whether banks tie executive pay to the performance of the firm. The authors gathered historical 10-K data on firm performance at five major banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo), as well as Proxy Statement data on how top-5 executives were being paid at these banks. Correlations between how the firm performed during a given year and what the executive officers of the bank were paid were calculated, to see whether the two subjects correlated with one another. Results were mixed-certain banks drew large correlations between the pay of executives and firm performance, while other banks did not. Interpretation of such data leads to a belief that some banks rely on overall firm performance when setting pay packages for executives, while other banks do not, perhaps using internal measures of performance unknown to the public. Extensive further research could be conducted on this issue to determine what other measures might play a more prominent role when it comes to deciding pay for executives at big banks.
ContributorsScheven, Tyler (Co-author) / Mayer, Robert (Co-author) / LePine, Marcie (Thesis director) / Budolfson, Arthur (Committee member) / Sampedro, Louie (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Management (Contributor)
Created2013-05
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Description
This study investigates the performance effects of cross-industry mergers and acquisitions (M&A) using a sample of firms listed in China’s Growth Entrepreses Market (GEM). Compared to firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, firms listed in the GEM are much smaller and tend to derive the majority of

This study investigates the performance effects of cross-industry mergers and acquisitions (M&A) using a sample of firms listed in China’s Growth Entrepreses Market (GEM). Compared to firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, firms listed in the GEM are much smaller and tend to derive the majority of their revenues from a single industry. I first analyze the motives for firms listed in the GEM to engage in M&As and propose a set of factors that may influence their likelihood of M&A activities. Using data on 55 cross-industry M&As between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2016, I find that investor generally responded positively in short-term, as indicated by the positive accumulated abonormal returns over the first five trading days following the announcements. Meanwhile, I found no evidence that investors benefited from cross-industry M&As in long-term over three years after the event. Further analysis suggests that the short-term effects of cross-industry M&As by GEM listed firms were influenced by the target firm’s market valuation, whether the M&A was paid by cash, the amount of the payment, and the degree of difference between the acquiring firm’s and the target firm’s industries. These findings have important implications for the investors and senior executives of firms listed in the GEM.
ContributorsZhou, Wei (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Yu, Xiaoyun (Thesis advisor) / Jiang, Zhan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018