Matching Items (3)
Filtering by
- Creators: Barrett, The Honors College
- Creators: Brake, Elizabeth
Description
It is no secret that humans at some point in their lives will endure some sort of immense pain or suffering that continues, making life difficult to live in such a way. The question then becomes how a sufferer goes about dealing with their distress and whether or not they choose to deal with it or continue to live a life that is detrimental to them. This is a topic in which I will discuss in the terms of modern day psychology and how people who suffer from psychological disorders can embrace a new path to recovery through words and being able to rewrite their stories. Throughout this thesis, I shall argue, with the assistance of various philosophic works, that everyone is born into a story and responsibility lies within a person either to continue with a story to which they have become accustomed or choose to embark on a new journey all together. When the decision is rendered to rewrite the path one has taken, it is essential to look at what is driving the story or the goals one has been pursuing. The person suffering can then go to treatment based upon the exchange of words between them and their psychoanalyst in hopes of regaining a sense of responsibility in their lives.
ContributorsWilson, Bailey Rachelle (Author) / Ramsey, Ramsey Eric (Thesis director) / Piemonte, Nicole (Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
Description
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fascinating and complex topic. There is consensus that companies both make a large impact on the world and have a responsibility beyond profits. The challenge with this responsibility is that determining businesses' responsibility and measuring the impact remains unclear. Scholars most often point to the early to mid 1900s as its starting point and the increased economic growth and workers' unions occurring in the 1950s as one of the reasons for scholars paying more attention to the topic. This thesis project analyzes current examples of CSR from Starbucks and IBM. These companies have reputations for their positive CSR practices. Both companies' availability of information, the vast number of their CSR practices, and efforts to measure the impact set them apart. IBM and Starbucks stand out because of the sheer volume of CSR activities they have, and when examined closely, the mixed, primarily good, impact of these activities is revealed. Having a high number of CSR practices alone does not equate to doing CSR well. Instead, companies' CSR should be examined based on both the number of practices and their impact. Considering both of these metrics will help consumers, as well as other stakeholders, better evaluate the success or failure of CSR in a business.
ContributorsSullivan, Victoria Mary (Author) / Brian, Jennifer (Thesis director) / York, Abigail (Committee member) / School of Human Evolution and Social Change (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
Description
This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
ContributorsGurney, David (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016