Matching Items (6)
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- All Subjects: Private Equity
- All Subjects: Dodd-Frank
- All Subjects: SOX
- Creators: Stein, Luke
- Member of: Theses and Dissertations
- Resource Type: Text
Description
Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
The purpose of this paper is to review the effects of the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations on the Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and to analyze if the benefits of the Title VII regulations have outweighed the costs in the OTC derivatives market by reducing systematic(market) risk and protecting market participants or if the Title VII regulations’ costs have made things worse by lessening opportunities in the OTC derivatives market and stifling economics benefits by over regulating the market. This paper strives to examine this issue by explaining how OTC are said to have played a part in the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we give a general overview of financial securities, and what OTC are. Then we will give a general overview of what the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acts are, which are the regulations to come out of the 2008 Financial crisis. Then the paper will dive into Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations and how they regulated OTC derivatives in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we discuss the Clearing House industry. Then the paper explores the major change of central clearing versus the previous bilateral clearing system. The paper will then cover how these rules have affected OTC derivatives market by examining the works of authors, who both support the regulations and others, who oppose the regulations by looking at logical arguments, historical evidence, and empirical evidence. Finally, we conclude that based on all the evidence how the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations effects on the OTC derivatives market are inconclusive at this time.
ContributorsCharette, John (Co-author) / Thacker, Harshit (Co-author) / Aragon, George (Thesis director) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Dean, W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
The following thesis discusses the primary drivers of value creation in a leveraged buyout. Value creation is defined by two broad criteria: enterprise value creation and financial value creation. With enterprise value creation, the company itself may be improved, which in turn may have positive implications on the economy at large. As the analysis of enterprise value creation is outside the scope of publicly available information and data, the core focus of this thesis is financial value creation. Financial value creation is defined as the financial returns to a given private equity firm. Amongst this segment of value creation, there are roughly three primary categories responsible for generating returns: financial engineering, governance improvements, and operational improvements. The attached literature review and subsequent chapters of this thesis discuss the academic drivers of value creation and the outputs of a leveraged buyout model conducted on a public company, Schnitzer Steel, that has been determined to be an ideal candidate for a buyout.
ContributorsAlivarius, Chadwick (Author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Dean, W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact that poison pills have on the value of share prices after the cancellation of a transaction. While various studies have focused on the generic share price impact of poison pills, very few have focused on the impact of poison pills in cancelled transactions. Based on our research and analysis, in cancelled transactions, target firms that have poison pills prior to the transaction and target firms without poison pills generate returns above the announcement date premium and subsequent investment in the S&P 500 when held to the cancellation of the transaction and when held from cancellation to 6 months after the transaction. This analysis can contribute to the argument that holding shares of firms regardless of cancellation risk is preferable to taking profit at announcement date. Additionally, it can contribute to the study of undiscovered pricing impact of poison pills.
ContributorsChotalla, Gurkaran (Co-author) / Amjad, Hamza (Co-author) / Reddy, Samir (Co-author) / Stein, Luke (Thesis director) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Given its impact on the accounting profession and public corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) is a widely researched regulation among accounting scholars. Research typically focuses on the impact it has had on corporations, executives and auditors, however, there is limited research that illustrates the impact SOX may have on average Americans. There were several US criminal code sections that resulted from the passing of SOX. Statute 1519, which is often referred to as the "anti-shredding provision", penalizes anyone who "knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to" obstruct a current or foreseeable federal investigation. This statute, although intended to punish behavior similar to that which occurred in the early 2000s by corporations and auditors, has been used to charge people beyond its original intent. Several issues with the crafting of the statute cause its broad application and some litigation even reached the Supreme Court due to its vague wording. Not only is the statute being applied beyond the intent, there are other issues that legal scholars have critiqued it for. This statute is far from being the only law facing these issues as the same issues and critiques are found in the 14th amendment. Rewriting the statute seems to be the most effective way to address the concerns of judges, lawyers and defendants regarding the statute. In addition, Congress could have passed this statute outside of SOX to avoid being seen as overreaching if obstruction of justice related to documents was actually an issue outside of corporate fraud.
ContributorsGonzalez, Joana (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) are a common practice for private equity firms across the globe and have been on the receiving end of public scrutiny. While the performance of RLBOs has been studied in the past, very few if any works have been published concerning the specific results of reverse leveraged buyout transactions performed by the largest private equity mega-funds specifically. We collected a dataset of 22 transactions and conducted quantitative and qualitative analysis on 18 of the aforementioned transactions in order to determine the magnitude of positive effects that RLBOs had on each company. Less than half of mega-fund RLBOs that had an initial public offerings outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Average on a compound annual growth (CAGR) basis, post-exit. Even less outperformed the S&P 500 index, and substantially less than that outperformed industry averages. It can clearly be seen that while averages dictate that large scale RLBOs do not seem profitable, there is a noticeable disparity between the success and failure of each deal when looking at price performance. This data makes the argument that while RLBOs are difficult to make successful, if the market receives them well then they can be some of the highest returning transactions.
ContributorsKaye, Steven (Co-author) / Chavez, Aaron (Co-author) / Aragon, George (Thesis director) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05