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In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, banking regulators have been taking a more active role in pursing greater financial stability. One area of focus has been on Wall Street banks' leverage lending practices which include leveraged lending activities to fund leveraged buyouts. In March 2013, the Federal Reserve

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, banking regulators have been taking a more active role in pursing greater financial stability. One area of focus has been on Wall Street banks' leverage lending practices which include leveraged lending activities to fund leveraged buyouts. In March 2013, the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued guidance urging banks to avoid financing leveraged buyouts in most industries that would put total debt on a company of more than six times its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, or Ebitda. Our research, using data on all leveraged buyouts (with EBITDA >$20 million) issued after the guidance, sets out to explain the elements banks consider when exceeding leverage limitations. Initially, we hypothesized that since deals over 6x leverage had higher amounts of debt, they were riskier deals, which would carry over to other risk measures such as yield to maturity on debt and company credit ratings. To analyze this, we obtained a large data set with all LBO deals in the past three years and ran difference-in-means tests on a number of variables such as deal size, credit rating and yield to maturity to determine if deals over 6x leverage had significantly different risk characteristics than deals under 6x leverage. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that deals over 6x leverage had significantly less risk, mainly demonstrated by lower average YTMs, than deals under 6x. One possible explanation of this might be that banks, wanting to ensure they are not fined, will only go through with a deal over 6x leverage if other risk metrics such as yield to maturity are well below average.
ContributorsKing, Adam (Co-author) / Lukemire, Sean (Co-author) / McAleer, Stephen (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Bonadurer, Werner (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
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The main goal of this study was to understand the awareness of small business owners regarding occupational fraud, meaning fraud committed from within an organization. A survey/questionnaire was used to gather insight into the knowledge and perceptions of small business owners, while also obtaining information about the history of fraud

The main goal of this study was to understand the awareness of small business owners regarding occupational fraud, meaning fraud committed from within an organization. A survey/questionnaire was used to gather insight into the knowledge and perceptions of small business owners, while also obtaining information about the history of fraud and the internal controls within their business. Twenty-four owners of businesses with less than 100 employees participated in the study. The results suggest that small business owners overestimate their knowledge regarding internal controls and occupational fraud, while also underestimating the risk of fraud within their own business. In fact, 92% of participants were not at all familiar with the popular Internal Control \u2014 Integrated Framework published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. The results also show that small business owners tend to overestimate the protection provided by their currently implemented controls in regard to their risk of fraud. Overall, through continued knowledge of internal controls and occupational fraud, business owners can better protect their businesses from the risk of occupational fraud by increasing their awareness of fraud.
ContributorsDennis, Lauren Nicole (Author) / Orpurt, Steven (Thesis director) / Munshi, Perseus (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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This thesis provides an in-depth comparison of the attractiveness of leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions under low versus high interest rates. In particular, our analysis focuses on how London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR) affect internal rates of return for hypothetical LBO transactions, assuming financing structure and operational enhancements for the individual

This thesis provides an in-depth comparison of the attractiveness of leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions under low versus high interest rates. In particular, our analysis focuses on how London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR) affect internal rates of return for hypothetical LBO transactions, assuming financing structure and operational enhancements for the individual transactions are held constant. Given that LIBOR rates are currently at historically low levels, we model four hypothetical LBO transactions in the specialty retail space using both historically high and currently low LIBOR rates (for a total of eight model outputs). We quantify the extent to which high rates have the potential to decrease LBO value, while low rates may enhance value. Through this thesis, we have obtained a better understanding of LBO transaction modeling, an understanding that will make us more effective as professionals in investment banking. Finally, this thesis can serve as a step-by-step guide to LBOs for undergraduate finance students, particularly for members of the Investment Banking Industry Scholars (IBIS) program at Arizona State University.
ContributorsGormley, Sean (Co-author) / Hert, James (Co-author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Bhattacharya, Anand (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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Description
This paper examines the qualitative and quantitative effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the current landscape of the investment banking industry. We begin by reviewing what occurred during the financial crisis, including which banks took TARP money, which banks became bank holding companies, and significant mergers and acquisitions. We

This paper examines the qualitative and quantitative effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the current landscape of the investment banking industry. We begin by reviewing what occurred during the financial crisis, including which banks took TARP money, which banks became bank holding companies, and significant mergers and acquisitions. We then examine the new regulations that were created in reaction to the crisis, including the Dodd-Frank Act. In particular, we focus on the Volcker Rule, which is a section of the act that prohibits proprietary trading and other risky activities at banks. Then we shift into a quantitative analysis of the changes that banks made from the years 2005-2016. To do this, we chose four banks to be representative of the industry: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America. We then analyze four metrics for each bank: revenue mix, value at risk, tangible common equity ratio, and debt to equity ratio. These provide methods for analyzing how banks have shifted their revenue centers to accommodate new regulations, as well as how these shifts have affected banks' risk levels and leverage. Our data show that all four banks that we observed shifted their revenue centers to flatter revenue areas, such as investment management, wealth management, and consumer banking operations. This was paired with fairly flat investment banking revenues across the board when controlling for overall market changes in the investment banking sector. Additionally, trading-focused banks significantly shifted their operations away from proprietary trading and higher risk activities. These changes resulted in lower value at risk measures for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley with very minor increases for J.P. Morgan and Bank of America, although these two banks had low levels of absolute value at risk when compared to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. All banks' tangible common equity ratios increased and debt to equity ratios decreased, indicating a safer investment for shareholders and lower leverage. We conclude by offering a forecast of our expectations for the future, particularly in light of a Trump presidency. We expect less regulation going forward and the potential reversal of the Volcker Rule. We believe that these changes would result in more revenue coming from trading and riskier strategies, increasing value at risk, decreasing tangible common equity ratios, and increasing debt to equity ratios. While we do expect less regulation and higher risk, we do not expect these banks to reach pre-crisis levels due to the significant amount of regulations that would be particularly difficult for the Trump administration to reverse.
ContributorsPatel, Aashay (Co-author) / Goulder, Gregory (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
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Description
Financial distress and restructuring is a core component of the corporate finance advisor's arsenal and is needed in nearly all market conditions, whether recessionary or expansionary. Financial distress means that a company is in present or future danger of not being able to pay its financial obligations. There are many

Financial distress and restructuring is a core component of the corporate finance advisor's arsenal and is needed in nearly all market conditions, whether recessionary or expansionary. Financial distress means that a company is in present or future danger of not being able to pay its financial obligations. There are many market indicators of distress which may include: debt trading significantly below face value, stock price trading at or below $1 per share, and implied negative shareholders' equity on the balance sheet. In order to remedy financial distress, the debtor and its creditors seek to hire investment banks specializing in financial restructuring to help fix the debtors's capital structure and possibly navigate through a bankruptcy process. Stephen Moyer describes financial restructuring as "the process of transforming a firm's capital structure to better fit the current and/or future circumstances of the firm" (53). The way that this is accomplished is reducing the debtor's liabilities in order to accurately reflect asset value. Liabilities may be adjusted in out-of-court restructuring agreements or in-court bankruptcy restructurings. The former is often quite difficult considering the hostile nature of the situation and competing interests but is preferred if possible. The latter is most common but also usually both lengthy and expensive. In most cases, the liabilities will be exchanged for new liabilities or equity, providing the creditors with some form of recovery, and leaving the debtor in a healthier position post-emergence. In order to put myself into the shoes of a financial restructuring advisor, I conducted a technical case study on Eastman-Kodak by recreating a financial model depicting possible returns to creditors and emergence from bankruptcy. This model is depicted within the thesis.
ContributorsEghlimi, Sean Cameron (Author) / Licon, Lawrence (Thesis director) / Orpurt, Steven (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12