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Description
This thesis addresses the ever increasing threat of botnets in the smartphone domain and focuses on the Android platform and the botnets using Online Social Networks (OSNs) as Command and Control (C&C;) medium. With any botnet, C&C; is one of the components on which the survival of botnet depends. Individual

This thesis addresses the ever increasing threat of botnets in the smartphone domain and focuses on the Android platform and the botnets using Online Social Networks (OSNs) as Command and Control (C&C;) medium. With any botnet, C&C; is one of the components on which the survival of botnet depends. Individual bots use the C&C; channel to receive commands and send the data. This thesis develops active host based approach for identifying the presence of bot based on the anomalies in the usage patterns of the user before and after the bot is installed on the user smartphone and alerting the user to the presence of the bot. A profile is constructed for each user based on the regular web usage patterns (achieved by intercepting the http(s) traffic) and implementing machine learning techniques to continuously learn the user's behavior and changes in the behavior and all the while looking for any anomalies in the user behavior above a threshold which will cause the user to be notified of the anomalous traffic. A prototype bot which uses OSN s as C&C; channel is constructed and used for testing. Users are given smartphones(Nexus 4 and Galaxy Nexus) running Application proxy which intercepts http(s) traffic and relay it to a server which uses the traffic and constructs the model for a particular user and look for any signs of anomalies. This approach lays the groundwork for the future host-based counter measures for smartphone botnets using OSN s as C&C; channel.
ContributorsKilari, Vishnu Teja (Author) / Xue, Guoliang (Thesis advisor) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Dasgupta, Partha (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
Need-based transfers (NBTs) are a form of risk-pooling in which binary welfare exchanges

occur to preserve the viable participation of individuals in an economy, e.g. reciprocal gifting

of cattle among East African herders or food sharing among vampire bats. With the

broad goal of better understanding the mathematics of such binary welfare and

Need-based transfers (NBTs) are a form of risk-pooling in which binary welfare exchanges

occur to preserve the viable participation of individuals in an economy, e.g. reciprocal gifting

of cattle among East African herders or food sharing among vampire bats. With the

broad goal of better understanding the mathematics of such binary welfare and risk pooling,

agent-based simulations are conducted to explore socially optimal transfer policies

and sharing network structures, kinetic exchange models that utilize tools from the kinetic

theory of gas dynamics are utilized to characterize the wealth distribution of an NBT economy,

and a variant of repeated prisoner’s dilemma is analyzed to determine whether and

why individuals would participate in such a system of reciprocal altruism.

From agent-based simulation and kinetic exchange models, it is found that regressive

NBT wealth redistribution acts as a cutting stock optimization heuristic that most efficiently

matches deficits to surpluses to improve short-term survival; however, progressive

redistribution leads to a wealth distribution that is more stable in volatile environments and

therefore is optimal for long-term survival. Homogeneous sharing networks with low variance

in degree are found to be ideal for maintaining community viability as the burden and

benefit of NBTs is equally shared. Also, phrasing NBTs as a survivor’s dilemma reveals

parameter regions where the repeated game becomes equivalent to a stag hunt or harmony

game, and thus where cooperation is evolutionarily stable.
ContributorsKayser, Kirk (Author) / Armbruster, Dieter (Thesis advisor) / Lampert, Adam (Committee member) / Ringhofer, Christian (Committee member) / Motsch, Sebastien (Committee member) / Gardner, Carl (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only

One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only by drastic, government-mandated social reforms, while Ostrom's empirical work demonstrates that community-scale collaboration can circumvent tragedy without any elaborate outside intervention. Though more optimistic, Ostrom's work provides scant insight into larger-scale dilemmas such as climate change. Consequently, it remains unclear if the sustainable management of global resources is possible without significant government mediation. To investigate, we conducted two game theoretic experiments that challenged students in different countries to collaborate digitally and manage a hypothetical common resource. One experiment involved students attending Arizona State University and the Rochester Institute of Technology in the US and Mountains of the Moon University in Uganda, while the other included students at Arizona State and the Management Development Institute in India. In both experiments, students were randomly assigned to one of three production roles: Luxury, Intermediate, and Subsistence. Students then made individual decisions about how many units of goods they wished to produce up to a set maximum per production class. Luxury players gain the most profit (i.e. grade points) per unit produced, but they also emit the most externalities, or social costs, which directly subtract from the profit of everybody else in the game; Intermediate players produce a medium amount of profit and externalities per unit, and Subsistence players produce a low amount of profit and externalities per unit. Variables influencing and/or inhibiting collaboration were studied using pre- and post-game surveys. This research sought to answer three questions: 1) Are international groups capable of self-organizing in a way that promotes sustainable resource management?, 2) What are the key factors that inhibit or foster collective action among international groups?, and 3) How well do Hardin's theories and Ostrom's empirical models predict the observed behavior of students in the game? The results of gameplay suggest that international cooperation is possible, though likely sub-optimal. Statistical analysis of survey data revealed that heterogeneity and levels of trust significantly influenced game behavior. Specific traits of heterogeneity among students found to be significant were income, education, assigned production role, number of people in one's household, college class, college major, and military service. Additionally, it was found that Ostrom's collective action framework was a better predictor of game outcome than Hardin's theories. Overall, this research lends credence to the plausibility of international cooperation in tragedy of the commons scenarios such as climate change, though much work remains to be done.
ContributorsStanton, Albert Grayson (Author) / Clark, Susan Spierre (Thesis director) / Seager, Thomas (Committee member) / Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
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Description
With the rise of social media, user-generated content has become available at an unprecedented scale. On Twitter, 1 billion tweets are posted every 5 days and on Facebook, 20 million links are shared every 20 minutes. These massive collections of user-generated content have introduced the human behavior's big-data.

This big data

With the rise of social media, user-generated content has become available at an unprecedented scale. On Twitter, 1 billion tweets are posted every 5 days and on Facebook, 20 million links are shared every 20 minutes. These massive collections of user-generated content have introduced the human behavior's big-data.

This big data has brought about countless opportunities for analyzing human behavior at scale. However, is this data enough? Unfortunately, the data available at the individual-level is limited for most users. This limited individual-level data is often referred to as thin data. Hence, researchers face a big-data paradox, where this big-data is a large collection of mostly limited individual-level information. Researchers are often constrained to derive meaningful insights regarding online user behavior with this limited information. Simply put, they have to make thin data thick.

In this dissertation, how human behavior's thin data can be made thick is investigated. The chief objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate how traces of human behavior can be efficiently gleaned from the, often limited, individual-level information; hence, introducing an all-inclusive user behavior analysis methodology that considers social media users with different levels of information availability. To that end, the absolute minimum information in terms of both link or content data that is available for any social media user is determined. Utilizing only minimum information in different applications on social media such as prediction or recommendation tasks allows for solutions that are (1) generalizable to all social media users and that are (2) easy to implement. However, are applications that employ only minimum information as effective or comparable to applications that use more information?

In this dissertation, it is shown that common research challenges such as detecting malicious users or friend recommendation (i.e., link prediction) can be effectively performed using only minimum information. More importantly, it is demonstrated that unique user identification can be achieved using minimum information. Theoretical boundaries of unique user identification are obtained by introducing social signatures. Social signatures allow for user identification in any large-scale network on social media. The results on single-site user identification are generalized to multiple sites and it is shown how the same user can be uniquely identified across multiple sites using only minimum link or content information.

The findings in this dissertation allows finding the same user across multiple sites, which in turn has multiple implications. In particular, by identifying the same users across sites, (1) patterns that users exhibit across sites are identified, (2) how user behavior varies across sites is determined, and (3) activities that are observed only across sites are identified and studied.
ContributorsZafarani, Reza, 1983- (Author) / Liu, Huan (Thesis advisor) / Kambhampati, Subbarao (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Leskovec, Jure (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
This dissertation investigates the dynamics of evolutionary games based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which individuals are discrete, space is explicit, and dynamics are stochastic. Its focus is on 2-strategy games played on a d-dimensional integer lattice with a range of interaction M. An overview of

This dissertation investigates the dynamics of evolutionary games based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which individuals are discrete, space is explicit, and dynamics are stochastic. Its focus is on 2-strategy games played on a d-dimensional integer lattice with a range of interaction M. An overview of related past work is given along with a summary of the dynamics in the mean-field model, which is described by the replicator equation. Then the dynamics of the interacting particle system is considered, first when individuals are updated according to the best-response update process and then the death-birth update process. Several interesting results are derived, and the differences between the interacting particle system model and the replicator dynamics are emphasized. The terms selfish and altruistic are defined according to a certain ordering of payoff parameters. In these terms, the replicator dynamics are simple: coexistence occurs if both strategies are altruistic; the selfish strategy wins if one strategy is selfish and the other is altruistic; and there is bistability if both strategies are selfish. Under the best-response update process, it is shown that there is no bistability region. Instead, in the presence of at least one selfish strategy, the most selfish strategy wins, while there is still coexistence if both strategies are altruistic. Under the death-birth update process, it is shown that regardless of the range of interactions and the dimension, regions of coexistence and bistability are both reduced. Additionally, coexistence occurs in some parameter region for large enough interaction ranges. Finally, in contrast with the replicator equation and the best-response update process, cooperators can win in the prisoner's dilemma for the death-birth process in one-dimensional nearest-neighbor interactions.
ContributorsEvilsizor, Stephen (Author) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Thesis advisor) / Kang, Yun (Committee member) / Motsch, Sebastien (Committee member) / Smith, Hal (Committee member) / Thieme, Horst (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
We live in a networked world with a multitude of networks, such as communication networks, electric power grid, transportation networks and water distribution networks, all around us. In addition to such physical (infrastructure) networks, recent years have seen tremendous proliferation of social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Google+

We live in a networked world with a multitude of networks, such as communication networks, electric power grid, transportation networks and water distribution networks, all around us. In addition to such physical (infrastructure) networks, recent years have seen tremendous proliferation of social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Google+ and others. These powerful social networks are not only used for harnessing revenue from the infrastructure networks, but are also increasingly being used as “non-conventional sensors” for monitoring the infrastructure networks. Accordingly, nowadays, analyses of social and infrastructure networks go hand-in-hand. This dissertation studies resource allocation problems encountered in this set of diverse, heterogeneous, and interdependent networks. Three problems studied in this dissertation are encountered in the physical network domain while the three other problems studied are encountered in the social network domain.

The first problem from the infrastructure network domain relates to distributed files storage scheme with a goal of enhancing robustness of data storage by making it tolerant against large scale geographically-correlated failures. The second problem relates to placement of relay nodes in a deployment area with multiple sensor nodes with a goal of augmenting connectivity of the resulting network, while staying within the budget specifying the maximum number of relay nodes that can be deployed. The third problem studied in this dissertation relates to complex interdependencies that exist between infrastructure networks, such as power grid and communication network. The progressive recovery problem in an interdependent network is studied whose goal is to maximize system utility over the time when recovery process of failed entities takes place in a sequential manner.

The three problems studied from the social network domain relate to influence propagation in adversarial environment and political sentiment assessment in various states in a country with a goal of creation of a “political heat map” of the country. In the first problem of the influence propagation domain, the goal of the second player is to restrict the influence of the first player, while in the second problem the goal of the second player is to have a larger market share with least amount of initial investment.
ContributorsMazumder, Anisha (Author) / Sen, Arunabha (Thesis advisor) / Richa, Andrea (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Reisslein, Martin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
While network problems have been addressed using a central administrative domain with a single objective, the devices in most networks are actually not owned by a single entity but by many individual entities. These entities make their decisions independently and selfishly, and maybe cooperate with a small group of other

While network problems have been addressed using a central administrative domain with a single objective, the devices in most networks are actually not owned by a single entity but by many individual entities. These entities make their decisions independently and selfishly, and maybe cooperate with a small group of other entities only when this form of coalition yields a better return. The interaction among multiple independent decision-makers necessitates the use of game theory, including economic notions related to markets and incentives. In this dissertation, we are interested in modeling, analyzing, addressing network problems caused by the selfish behavior of network entities. First, we study how the selfish behavior of network entities affects the system performance while users are competing for limited resource. For this resource allocation domain, we aim to study the selfish routing problem in networks with fair queuing on links, the relay assignment problem in cooperative networks, and the channel allocation problem in wireless networks. Another important aspect of this dissertation is the study of designing efficient mechanisms to incentivize network entities to achieve certain system objective. For this incentive mechanism domain, we aim to motivate wireless devices to serve as relays for cooperative communication, and to recruit smartphones for crowdsourcing. In addition, we apply different game theoretic approaches to problems in security and privacy domain. For this domain, we aim to analyze how a user could defend against a smart jammer, who can quickly learn about the user's transmission power. We also design mechanisms to encourage mobile phone users to participate in location privacy protection, in order to achieve k-anonymity.
ContributorsYang, Dejun (Author) / Xue, Guoliang (Thesis advisor) / Richa, Andrea (Committee member) / Sen, Arunabha (Committee member) / Zhang, Junshan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
The recent years have witnessed a rapid development of mobile devices and smart devices. As more and more people are getting involved in the online environment, privacy issues are becoming increasingly important. People’s privacy in the digital world is much easier to leak than in the real world, because every

The recent years have witnessed a rapid development of mobile devices and smart devices. As more and more people are getting involved in the online environment, privacy issues are becoming increasingly important. People’s privacy in the digital world is much easier to leak than in the real world, because every action people take online would leave a trail of information which could be recorded, collected and used by malicious attackers. Besides, service providers might collect users’ information and analyze them, which also leads to a privacy breach. Therefore, preserving people’s privacy is very important in the online environment.

In this dissertation, I study the problems of preserving people’s identity privacy and loca- tion privacy in the online environment. Specifically, I study four topics: identity privacy in online social networks (OSNs), identity privacy in anonymous message submission, lo- cation privacy in location based social networks (LBSNs), and location privacy in location based reminders. In the first topic, I propose a system which can hide users’ identity and data from untrusted storage site where the OSN provider puts users’ data. I also design a fine grained access control mechanism which prevents unauthorized users from accessing the data. Based on the secret sharing scheme, I construct a shuffle protocol that disconnects the relationship between members’ identities and their submitted messages in the topic of identity privacy in anonymous message submission. The message is encrypted on the mem- ber side and decrypted on the message collector side. The collector eventually gets all of the messages but does not know who submitted which message. In the third topic, I pro- pose a framework that hides users’ check-in information from the LBSN. Considering the limited computation resources on smart devices, I propose a delegatable pseudo random function to outsource computations to the much more powerful server while preserving privacy. I also implement efficient revocations. In the topic of location privacy in location based reminders, I propose a system to hide users’ reminder locations from an untrusted cloud server. I propose a cross based approach and an improved bar based approach, re- spectively, to represent a reminder area. The reminder location and reminder message are encrypted before uploading to the cloud server, which then can determine whether the dis- tance between the user’s current location and the reminder location is within the reminder distance without knowing anything about the user’s location information and the content of the reminder message.
ContributorsZhao, Xinxin (Author) / Xue, Guoliang (Thesis advisor) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Huang, Dijiang (Committee member) / Zhang, Yanchao (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
The field of cyber-defenses has played catch-up in the cat-and-mouse game of finding vulnerabilities followed by the invention of patches to defend against them. With the complexity and scale of modern-day software, it is difficult to ensure that all known vulnerabilities are patched; moreover, the attacker, with reconnaissance on their

The field of cyber-defenses has played catch-up in the cat-and-mouse game of finding vulnerabilities followed by the invention of patches to defend against them. With the complexity and scale of modern-day software, it is difficult to ensure that all known vulnerabilities are patched; moreover, the attacker, with reconnaissance on their side, will eventually discover and leverage them. To take away the attacker's inherent advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed the notion of proactive defenses such as Moving Target Defense (MTD) in cyber-security. In this thesis, I make three key contributions that help to improve the effectiveness of MTD.

First, I argue that naive movement strategies for MTD systems, designed based on intuition, are detrimental to both security and performance. To answer the question of how to move, I (1) model MTD as a leader-follower game and formally characterize the notion of optimal movement strategies, (2) leverage expert-curated public data and formal representation methods used in cyber-security to obtain parameters of the game, and (3) propose optimization methods to infer strategies at Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium, addressing issues pertaining to scalability and switching costs. Second, when one cannot readily obtain the parameters of the game-theoretic model but can interact with a system, I propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning approach that finds the optimal movement strategy. Third, I investigate the novel use of MTD in three domains-- cyber-deception, machine learning, and critical infrastructure networks. I show that the question of what to move poses non-trivial challenges in these domains. To address them, I propose methods for patch-set selection in the deployment of honey-patches, characterize the notion of differential immunity in deep neural networks, and develop optimization problems that guarantee differential immunity for dynamic sensor placement in power-networks.
ContributorsSengupta, Sailik (Author) / Kambhampati, Subbarao (Thesis advisor) / Bao, Tiffany (Youzhi) (Committee member) / Huang, Dijiang (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020