Matching Items (6)
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- All Subjects: Game Theory
- All Subjects: Scheduling
- Creators: Xue, Guoliang
Description
A principal goal of this dissertation is to study stochastic optimization and real-time scheduling in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) ranging from real-time wireless systems to energy systems to distributed control systems. Under this common theme, this dissertation can be broadly organized into three parts based on the system environments. The first part investigates stochastic optimization in real-time wireless systems, with the focus on the deadline-aware scheduling for real-time traffic. The optimal solution to such scheduling problems requires to explicitly taking into account the coupling in the deadline-aware transmissions and stochastic characteristics of the traffic, which involves a dynamic program that is traditionally known to be intractable or computationally expensive to implement. First, real-time scheduling with adaptive network coding over memoryless channels is studied, and a polynomial-time complexity algorithm is developed to characterize the optimal real-time scheduling. Then, real-time scheduling over Markovian channels is investigated, where channel conditions are time-varying and online channel learning is necessary, and the optimal scheduling policies in different traffic regimes are studied. The second part focuses on the stochastic optimization and real-time scheduling involved in energy systems. First, risk-aware scheduling and dispatch for plug-in electric vehicles (EVs) are studied, aiming to jointly optimize the EV charging cost and the risk of the load mismatch between the forecasted and the actual EV loads, due to the random driving activities of EVs. Then, the integration of wind generation at high penetration levels into bulk power grids is considered. Joint optimization of economic dispatch and interruptible load management is investigated using short-term wind farm generation forecast. The third part studies stochastic optimization in distributed control systems under different network environments. First, distributed spectrum access in cognitive radio networks is investigated by using pricing approach, where primary users (PUs) sell the temporarily unused spectrum and secondary users compete via random access for such spectrum opportunities. The optimal pricing strategy for PUs and the corresponding distributed implementation of spectrum access control are developed to maximize the PU's revenue. Then, a systematic study of the nonconvex utility-based power control problem is presented under the physical interference model in ad-hoc networks. Distributed power control schemes are devised to maximize the system utility, by leveraging the extended duality theory and simulated annealing.
ContributorsYang, Lei (Author) / Zhang, Junshan (Thesis advisor) / Tepedelenlioğlu, Cihan (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Ying, Lei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Vehicles powered by electricity and alternative-fuels are becoming a more popular form of transportation since they have less of an environmental impact than standard gasoline vehicles. Unfortunately, their success is currently inhibited by the sparseness of locations where the vehicles can refuel as well as the fact that many of the vehicles have a range that is less than those powered by gasoline. These factors together create a "range anxiety" in drivers, which causes the drivers to worry about the utility of alternative-fuel and electric vehicles and makes them less likely to purchase these vehicles. For the new vehicle technologies to thrive it is critical that range anxiety is minimized and performance is increased as much as possible through proper routing and scheduling. In the case of long distance trips taken by individual vehicles, the routes must be chosen such that the vehicles take the shortest routes while not running out of fuel on the trip. When many vehicles are to be routed during the day, if the refueling stations have limited capacity then care must be taken to avoid having too many vehicles arrive at the stations at any time. If the vehicles that will need to be routed in the future are unknown then this problem is stochastic. For fleets of vehicles serving scheduled operations, switching to alternative-fuels requires ensuring the schedules do not cause the vehicles to run out of fuel. This is especially problematic since the locations where the vehicles may refuel are limited due to the technology being new. This dissertation covers three related optimization problems: routing a single electric or alternative-fuel vehicle on a long distance trip, routing many electric vehicles in a network where the stations have limited capacity and the arrivals into the system are stochastic, and scheduling fleets of electric or alternative-fuel vehicles with limited locations to refuel. Different algorithms are proposed to solve each of the three problems, of which some are exact and some are heuristic. The algorithms are tested on both random data and data relating to the State of Arizona.
ContributorsAdler, Jonathan D (Author) / Mirchandani, Pitu B. (Thesis advisor) / Askin, Ronald (Committee member) / Gel, Esma (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Zhang, Muhong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Semiconductor scaling technology has led to a sharp growth in transistor counts. This has resulted in an exponential increase on both power dissipation and heat flux (or power density) in modern microprocessors. These microprocessors are integrated as the major components in many modern embedded devices, which offer richer features and attain higher performance than ever before. Therefore, power and thermal management have become the significant design considerations for modern embedded devices. Dynamic voltage/frequency scaling (DVFS) and dynamic power management (DPM) are two well-known hardware capabilities offered by modern embedded processors. However, the power or thermal aware performance optimization is not fully explored for the mainstream embedded processors with discrete DVFS and DPM capabilities. Many key problems have not been answered yet. What is the maximum performance that an embedded processor can achieve under power or thermal constraint for a periodic application? Does there exist an efficient algorithm for the power or thermal management problems with guaranteed quality bound? These questions are hard to be answered because the discrete settings of DVFS and DPM enhance the complexity of many power and thermal management problems, which are generally NP-hard. The dissertation presents a comprehensive study on these NP-hard power and thermal management problems for embedded processors with discrete DVFS and DPM capabilities. In the domain of power management, the dissertation addresses the power minimization problem for real-time schedules, the energy-constrained make-span minimization problem on homogeneous and heterogeneous chip multiprocessors (CMP) architectures, and the battery aware energy management problem with nonlinear battery discharging model. In the domain of thermal management, the work addresses several thermal-constrained performance maximization problems for periodic embedded applications. All the addressed problems are proved to be NP-hard or strongly NP-hard in the study. Then the work focuses on the design of the off-line optimal or polynomial time approximation algorithms as solutions in the problem design space. Several addressed NP-hard problems are tackled by dynamic programming with optimal solutions and pseudo-polynomial run time complexity. Because the optimal algorithms are not efficient in worst case, the fully polynomial time approximation algorithms are provided as more efficient solutions. Some efficient heuristic algorithms are also presented as solutions to several addressed problems. The comprehensive study answers the key questions in order to fully explore the power and thermal management potentials on embedded processors with discrete DVFS and DPM capabilities. The provided solutions enable the theoretical analysis of the maximum performance for periodic embedded applications under power or thermal constraints.
ContributorsZhang, Sushu (Author) / Chatha, Karam S (Thesis advisor) / Cao, Yu (Committee member) / Konjevod, Goran (Committee member) / Vrudhula, Sarma (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only by drastic, government-mandated social reforms, while Ostrom's empirical work demonstrates that community-scale collaboration can circumvent tragedy without any elaborate outside intervention. Though more optimistic, Ostrom's work provides scant insight into larger-scale dilemmas such as climate change. Consequently, it remains unclear if the sustainable management of global resources is possible without significant government mediation. To investigate, we conducted two game theoretic experiments that challenged students in different countries to collaborate digitally and manage a hypothetical common resource. One experiment involved students attending Arizona State University and the Rochester Institute of Technology in the US and Mountains of the Moon University in Uganda, while the other included students at Arizona State and the Management Development Institute in India. In both experiments, students were randomly assigned to one of three production roles: Luxury, Intermediate, and Subsistence. Students then made individual decisions about how many units of goods they wished to produce up to a set maximum per production class. Luxury players gain the most profit (i.e. grade points) per unit produced, but they also emit the most externalities, or social costs, which directly subtract from the profit of everybody else in the game; Intermediate players produce a medium amount of profit and externalities per unit, and Subsistence players produce a low amount of profit and externalities per unit. Variables influencing and/or inhibiting collaboration were studied using pre- and post-game surveys. This research sought to answer three questions: 1) Are international groups capable of self-organizing in a way that promotes sustainable resource management?, 2) What are the key factors that inhibit or foster collective action among international groups?, and 3) How well do Hardin's theories and Ostrom's empirical models predict the observed behavior of students in the game? The results of gameplay suggest that international cooperation is possible, though likely sub-optimal. Statistical analysis of survey data revealed that heterogeneity and levels of trust significantly influenced game behavior. Specific traits of heterogeneity among students found to be significant were income, education, assigned production role, number of people in one's household, college class, college major, and military service. Additionally, it was found that Ostrom's collective action framework was a better predictor of game outcome than Hardin's theories. Overall, this research lends credence to the plausibility of international cooperation in tragedy of the commons scenarios such as climate change, though much work remains to be done.
ContributorsStanton, Albert Grayson (Author) / Clark, Susan Spierre (Thesis director) / Seager, Thomas (Committee member) / Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
While network problems have been addressed using a central administrative domain with a single objective, the devices in most networks are actually not owned by a single entity but by many individual entities. These entities make their decisions independently and selfishly, and maybe cooperate with a small group of other entities only when this form of coalition yields a better return. The interaction among multiple independent decision-makers necessitates the use of game theory, including economic notions related to markets and incentives. In this dissertation, we are interested in modeling, analyzing, addressing network problems caused by the selfish behavior of network entities. First, we study how the selfish behavior of network entities affects the system performance while users are competing for limited resource. For this resource allocation domain, we aim to study the selfish routing problem in networks with fair queuing on links, the relay assignment problem in cooperative networks, and the channel allocation problem in wireless networks. Another important aspect of this dissertation is the study of designing efficient mechanisms to incentivize network entities to achieve certain system objective. For this incentive mechanism domain, we aim to motivate wireless devices to serve as relays for cooperative communication, and to recruit smartphones for crowdsourcing. In addition, we apply different game theoretic approaches to problems in security and privacy domain. For this domain, we aim to analyze how a user could defend against a smart jammer, who can quickly learn about the user's transmission power. We also design mechanisms to encourage mobile phone users to participate in location privacy protection, in order to achieve k-anonymity.
ContributorsYang, Dejun (Author) / Xue, Guoliang (Thesis advisor) / Richa, Andrea (Committee member) / Sen, Arunabha (Committee member) / Zhang, Junshan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
The field of cyber-defenses has played catch-up in the cat-and-mouse game of finding vulnerabilities followed by the invention of patches to defend against them. With the complexity and scale of modern-day software, it is difficult to ensure that all known vulnerabilities are patched; moreover, the attacker, with reconnaissance on their side, will eventually discover and leverage them. To take away the attacker's inherent advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed the notion of proactive defenses such as Moving Target Defense (MTD) in cyber-security. In this thesis, I make three key contributions that help to improve the effectiveness of MTD.
First, I argue that naive movement strategies for MTD systems, designed based on intuition, are detrimental to both security and performance. To answer the question of how to move, I (1) model MTD as a leader-follower game and formally characterize the notion of optimal movement strategies, (2) leverage expert-curated public data and formal representation methods used in cyber-security to obtain parameters of the game, and (3) propose optimization methods to infer strategies at Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium, addressing issues pertaining to scalability and switching costs. Second, when one cannot readily obtain the parameters of the game-theoretic model but can interact with a system, I propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning approach that finds the optimal movement strategy. Third, I investigate the novel use of MTD in three domains-- cyber-deception, machine learning, and critical infrastructure networks. I show that the question of what to move poses non-trivial challenges in these domains. To address them, I propose methods for patch-set selection in the deployment of honey-patches, characterize the notion of differential immunity in deep neural networks, and develop optimization problems that guarantee differential immunity for dynamic sensor placement in power-networks.
First, I argue that naive movement strategies for MTD systems, designed based on intuition, are detrimental to both security and performance. To answer the question of how to move, I (1) model MTD as a leader-follower game and formally characterize the notion of optimal movement strategies, (2) leverage expert-curated public data and formal representation methods used in cyber-security to obtain parameters of the game, and (3) propose optimization methods to infer strategies at Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium, addressing issues pertaining to scalability and switching costs. Second, when one cannot readily obtain the parameters of the game-theoretic model but can interact with a system, I propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning approach that finds the optimal movement strategy. Third, I investigate the novel use of MTD in three domains-- cyber-deception, machine learning, and critical infrastructure networks. I show that the question of what to move poses non-trivial challenges in these domains. To address them, I propose methods for patch-set selection in the deployment of honey-patches, characterize the notion of differential immunity in deep neural networks, and develop optimization problems that guarantee differential immunity for dynamic sensor placement in power-networks.
ContributorsSengupta, Sailik (Author) / Kambhampati, Subbarao (Thesis advisor) / Bao, Tiffany (Youzhi) (Committee member) / Huang, Dijiang (Committee member) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020