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- All Subjects: Social Psychology
Description
This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.
ContributorsJones, Ashley C. T. (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Catastrophe events occur rather infrequently, but upon their occurrence, can lead to colossal losses for insurance companies. Due to their size and volatility, catastrophe losses are often treated separately from other insurance losses. In fact, many property and casualty insurance companies feature a department or team which focuses solely on modeling catastrophes. Setting reserves for catastrophe losses is difficult due to their unpredictable and often long-tailed nature. Determining loss development factors (LDFs) to estimate the ultimate loss amounts for catastrophe events is one method for setting reserves. In an attempt to aid Company XYZ set more accurate reserves, the research conducted focuses on estimating LDFs for catastrophes which have already occurred and have been settled. Furthermore, the research describes the process used to build a linear model in R to estimate LDFs for Company XYZ's closed catastrophe claims from 2001 \u2014 2016. This linear model was used to predict a catastrophe's LDFs based on the age in weeks of the catastrophe during the first year. Back testing was also performed, as was the comparison between the estimated ultimate losses and actual losses. Future research consideration was proposed.
ContributorsSwoverland, Robert Bo (Author) / Milovanovic, Jelena (Thesis director) / Zicarelli, John (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
We conducted an international survey in which forensic examiners who were members of professional associations described their two most recent forensic evaluations (N=434 experts, 868 cases), focusing on the use of structured assessment tools to aid expert judgment. This study describes:
1. The relative frequency of various forensic referrals.
2. What tools are used globally.
3. Frequency and type of structured tools used.
4. Practitioners’ rationales for using/not using tools.
We provide general descriptive information for various referrals. We found most evaluations used tools (74.2%) and used several (on average 4). We noted the extreme variety in tools used (286 different tools). We discuss the implications of these findings and provide suggestions for improving the reliability and validity of forensic expert judgment methods. We conclude with a call for an assessment approach that seeks structured decision methods to advance greater efficiency in the use and integration of case-relevant information.
ContributorsNeal, Tess M.S. (Author) / Grisso, Thomas (Author)
Created2014-09-25
Description
Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness of a novel way to phrase jury instructions to debias jurors inspired by moral foundations theory. In two experimental studies, participants read a transcript of a sexual assault (Study 1: n = 544) or an assault and battery criminal case (Study 2: n = 509). In each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read either a case with or without prejudicial evidence. Participants exposed to prejudicial evidence were either given standard jury instructions to disregard the evidence, no instructions, or novel jury instructions inspired by moral foundations theory. Individual differences in moral foundations affected how susceptible people were to prejudicial evidence and case facts in general. This pattern emerged regardless of the type of jury instructions in most cases, suggesting that the moral foundation inspired instructions failed to help jurors disregard prejudicial evidence. The impact of people’s moral foundation endorsement has direct implications for how attorneys may phrase evidence to cater towards these moral biases and select ideal jurors during the voir dire process. To further advance people’s understanding of the effects of prejudicial evidence and jury instructions in legal settings, a third study looked at how attorneys (n = 138) perceived the prevalence and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases and the effectiveness of jury instructions. Over three quarters of the sample (77.54%) reported having experienced prejudicial evidence in their cases and expressed concern that prejudicial evidence is influential to jurors with jury instructions being ineffective. Taken altogether, the results of this project show the potential impact moral foundation endorsement can have on case judgments and how jurors are differently influenced by prejudicial evidence. In addition, data from attorneys showing the perceived prevalent and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases further
justifies the need to continue researching safeguards against prejudicial evidence.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen Marie (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Stolzenberg, Stacia N (Committee member) / Fox, Kate A (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
Biases have been studied in many legal contexts, including sexual assault cases. Sexual assault cases are complex because there are many stages that biases can come into play and have lasting effects on the rest of the case proceedings. One aspect that has not been widely explored is how people perceive institutions’ liability in sexual assault cases based on an obligation to create non-discriminating environments for members and employees according to laws like Title VII and Title IX. The current project focused on how and why cognitive biases affect laypeople’s judgment. Specifically, laypeople’s ability to discern the strength of evidence in civil sexual assault cases against institutions. This was addressed in a series of two studies, with samples collected from Prolific Academic (n = 90) and Arizona State University students (n = 188) for Study 1 (N = 278), and Prolific Academic in Study 2 (N = 449). Both studies used Latin-square design methods, with within and between subject elements, looking at how confirmation bias influenced decisions about whether an institution demonstrated negligence, and thus liability, in the way they responded to sexual assault allegations within their institution. Results from these studies suggest that jurors are overall accurately able to differentiate between weak and strong cases. However, consistent with previous literature, jurors may be susceptible to confirmation bias from outside information (e.g., news stories) and negatively influenced by their personal attitudes (e.g., rape myth acceptance). Given the increased attention of the Me Too movement, these results provide an initial insight into how individuals may be judging these types of cases against institutions.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica M (Committee member) / Davis, Kelly C (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020