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In this paper, I defend the Electoral College system used to elect the President of the United States against criticisms that the system should be more democratic. I first take a look at federal republican theory and the contemporary issues which influenced and persuaded the Founding Fathers to adopt this

In this paper, I defend the Electoral College system used to elect the President of the United States against criticisms that the system should be more democratic. I first take a look at federal republican theory and the contemporary issues which influenced and persuaded the Founding Fathers to adopt this theory \u2014 not only as the foundation of the presidential election system, but also as the foundation of the United States Constitution. I describe that the purpose of federal republicanism is to ensure that power is distributed such that no group of people is too powerful to oppress others. I then provide a basic description of the Electoral College and demonstrate how the system is not purely democratic. From here, I defend the Electoral College's partially undemocratic nature on the grounds that state representation is a fundamental part of federal republicanism. I subsequently address four issues alleged by critics concerning the Electoral College: discouraged voter participation, unrepresented state minorities, the creation of battleground states and safe states, and the entrenchment of the two-party system. With respect to discouraged voter participation, I argue that the issue is not unique to the Electoral College system. With respect to unrepresented state minorities, I argue that if states distribute College electors proportionally to give state minorities representation, it would strengthen national interests at the expense of state interests and hurt the federal system of government. With respect to battleground states and safe states, I argue that they do not cause presidential candidates to ignore voters any more than under a national popular vote system. And, with respect to the two- party system, I argue that it does little harm to representation because the Democratic and Republican parties are internally diverse. Finally, I use federal republican theory to challenge the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) \u2014 a purely democratic solution to reform the Electoral College without Constitutional amendment \u2014 on the grounds that it would throw away state representation, eliminate the federal aspect of the election system, and face legal controversy.
ContributorsLachance, Yann (Author) / Simhony, Avital (Thesis director) / Herrera, Richard (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
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How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and

How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and democracy has focused primarily on the latter. Furthermore, these studies claim that membership in these formal international institutions (a.k.a. international organizations) increases the likelihood of the democratic survival of a newly democratic regime. Membership in these organizations provides a seal of approval that the newly democratic country intends to remain democratic. This kind of external validation should dissuade spoilers from undermining the transition and encourage ordinary people to support the transitional regime. This argument assumes that the domestic audience trusts this organization and believes it plays a vital role in society. Whether elites have confidence that the regional organization can positively impact democratic consolidation and how they perceive different types of regional organizations promoting democracy are empirical questions. This project seeks to answer these questions through a small sample and non-population-based elite survey experiment in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I also run a laboratory survey experiment with a larger sample of university students, giving me the opportunity for statistical power. The results suggest that political elites are skeptical of regional intergovernmental bodies promoting democracy. Meanwhile, non-elites consider regional institutions promoting democracy illegitimate when they are informal, i.e., no written shared expectations, rules, and permanent secretariat. When regional interstate cooperation on democracy operates under a formal procedure or codified in an international treaty and supported by a permanent secretariat, non-elites tend to consider them more legitimate.
ContributorsSari, Angguntari Ceria (Author) / Thies, Cameron G. (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Neuner, Fabian (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
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This work explores the underlying dynamics of democracies in the context of underdevelopment, arguing that when society has not attained a substantial degree of economic independence from the state, it undermines democratic quality and stability. Economic underdevelopment and political oppression are mutually reinforcing, and both are rooted in the structure

This work explores the underlying dynamics of democracies in the context of underdevelopment, arguing that when society has not attained a substantial degree of economic independence from the state, it undermines democratic quality and stability. Economic underdevelopment and political oppression are mutually reinforcing, and both are rooted in the structure of the agriculture sector, the distribution of land, and the rural societies that emerge around this order. These systems produce persistent power imbalances that militate toward their continuance, encourage dependency, and foster the development of neopatrimonialism and corruption in the government, thereby weakening key pillars of democracy such as accountability and representativeness. Through historical analysis of a single case study, this dissertation demonstrates that while this is partly a result of actor choices at key points in time, it is highly influenced by structural constraints embedded in earlier time periods. I find that Ghana’s historical development from the colonial era to present day closely follows this trajectory.
ContributorsEllis, Alicia N (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019