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You Understand, So I Understand: How A "Community of Knowledge" Shapes Trust in Expert Evidence

Description
This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to…

This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.
ContributorsJones, Ashley C. T. (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Experts Screening Experts: Are Courts Effectively Gatekeeping Psychological Assessment Evidence?

Description
The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case established criteria for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. It holds that scientific evidence must be valid, reliable, and relevant, and judges are required to be “gatekeepers” of evidence by screening out evidence that has not been empirically…

The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case established criteria for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. It holds that scientific evidence must be valid, reliable, and relevant, and judges are required to be “gatekeepers” of evidence by screening out evidence that has not been empirically tested or vetted through the academic community. Yet, little is known about whether psychological assessment tools are subjected to scrutiny through the standards courts are supposed to apply. In three different studies, from the perspectives of judges, attorneys, and forensic mental health experts, the authors investigate whether psychological assessment evidence is being challenged. Information was collected on participants’ experiences with challenges to psychological assessments. Judges and lawyers completed a series of experimental case vignettes to assess their decision-making about legal admissibility of different qualities of psychological assessments. It was hypothesized they would not distinguish between low- and high-quality psychological assessments in admissibility. Bayesian model selection methods did not support the null hypothesis, however. It was found attorneys differentiate between the conditions. The rates in which legal professionals and forensic mental health evaluators experienced challenges were also higher than was expected. These positive findings show there is some degree of gatekeeping psychological assessment evidence in the courts.
ContributorsNeu Line, Emily C (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Horne, Zachary (Committee member) / Saks, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Can Jurors Disregard Inadmissible Evidence? Testing Interventions Derived from Cognitive and Social Psychological Theories

Description
For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional…

For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless of whether the jury actually disregards the inadmissible evidence. This study tested four interventions derived from psychological research to identify the combination that most effectively helped jurors disregard inadmissible evidence (operationalized by lower conviction rates). It was hypothesized that the most effective interventions identified in Study 1 would yield significantly lower conviction rates when compared to traditional instructions to disregard in Study 2. The interventions were tested in Study 1 using Multiphase Optimization Strategy (MOST) methodology to identify the optimized intervention package through regression analysis. Study 2 served as a randomized controlled trial in which treatment as usual (a judge’s instructions to disregard) was compared to the optimized intervention package. Participants were randomly assigned to either (1) be exposed to no inadmissible evidence, (2) receive inadmissible evidence and treatment as usual, (3) receive inadmissible evidence, treatment as usual and the optimized intervention package, or (4) receive the inadmissible evidence without objection. Logistic regression revealed that jurors who were given an instruction to disregard produced lower conviction rates when they also received the optimized intervention package. Interpretation, limitations, and calls to action are discussed.
ContributorsSandberg, Pamela Nicole (Author) / O'Hara, Karey L. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023