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The demographics of Arizona are changing as Hispanics children are passing through their youth and into adulthood. Yet, even with this changing population Arizona has demonstrated an unwillingness to provide adequate educational opportunities for Hispanic school children. The state has perpetuated fear throughout the Hispanic community in an attempt to

The demographics of Arizona are changing as Hispanics children are passing through their youth and into adulthood. Yet, even with this changing population Arizona has demonstrated an unwillingness to provide adequate educational opportunities for Hispanic school children. The state has perpetuated fear throughout the Hispanic community in an attempt to marginalize and stigmatize the race. Such attempts have extended to youth in schools creating an environment of fear. This fear limits the academic potential of young Hispanics who are wary of government officials and institutions. Arizona has also failed to provide appropriate funding for programs used predominantly by Hispanic students leaving them unprepared for a workplace that desperately needs them. Finally, Arizona has refused to allow course content with a record of increasing academic achievement and graduation rates amongst Hispanics to be taught in schools. Taken as a whole Arizona's efforts are creating a cadre of unskilled and unprepared laborers who will be desperately needed to take jobs in the Arizona economy in the coming years. This blatant disregard for the educational needs of a large segment of the population will have a devastating impact on Arizona's future.
ContributorsSmith, Jason Ryan (Author) / Davis, T. J. (Thesis director) / Ovando, Carlos (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2013-12
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Contributing to the small but growing body of research on linguistic discrimination in legal settings, this thesis conducts a sociolinguistic investigation of the impact of an individual's accent on juror perceptions of defendant favorability and innocence. The study used an online questionnaire in which sixty mock jurors were each asked

Contributing to the small but growing body of research on linguistic discrimination in legal settings, this thesis conducts a sociolinguistic investigation of the impact of an individual's accent on juror perceptions of defendant favorability and innocence. The study used an online questionnaire in which sixty mock jurors were each asked to evaluate the audio testimony of a defendant representing one of three English ethnolects: African American, British South African, or Caucasian American. In addition to rating the defendant's persuasiveness, honesty, credibility, trustworthiness, and guilt, participants were also asked to determine an appropriate punishment (if any) for the defendant. Results indicate a preference of participants to issue an unsure or caveat opinion for the African American speaker but not to the British South African or Caucasian American speaker. The implications of these findings, as well as the correlations between each variable are discussed. The paper concludes with a recommendation for legal training and a revision of courtroom practices.
ContributorsMaerowitz, Max Robert (Author) / Prior, Matthew (Thesis director) / Adams, Karen (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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Description
The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between architecture and history in Virginia from 1607 to the eve of the American Revolution to create a complete historical narrative. The interdependency of history and architecture creates culturally important pieces and projects the colonist's need to connect to the

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between architecture and history in Virginia from 1607 to the eve of the American Revolution to create a complete historical narrative. The interdependency of history and architecture creates culturally important pieces and projects the colonist's need to connect to the past as well as their innovations in their own cultural exploration. The thesis examines the living conditions of the colonists that formed Jamestown, and describes the architectural achievements and the historical events that were taking place at the time. After Jamestown, the paper moves on to the innovations of early Virginian architecture from Colonial architecture to Georgian architecture found in Williamsburg. Conclusively, the thesis presents a historical narrative on how architecture displays a collection of ideals from the Virginian colonists at the time. The external display of architecture parallels the events as well as the economic conditions of Virginia, creating a social dialogue between the gentry and the common class in the colony of Virginia.
ContributorsChang, Hosu (Author) / Gray, Susan (Thesis director) / O'Donnell, Catherine (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor)
Created2015-05
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Bad Samaritans are bystanders who omit from preventing some foreseeable harm when doing so could have been accomplished with little risk. Although failing to intervene to prevent a harm often renders Bad Samaritans morally culpable, under current common law in the United States they could not be held criminally liable

Bad Samaritans are bystanders who omit from preventing some foreseeable harm when doing so could have been accomplished with little risk. Although failing to intervene to prevent a harm often renders Bad Samaritans morally culpable, under current common law in the United States they could not be held criminally liable for any harm that resulted to the victims of that harm. In this paper I argue for the criminalization of individuals who fall under this label; I argue for the adoption of Bad Samaritan laws. To accomplish this, I first argue for the conclusion that omissions can causally contribute to harm. From here I am able to reach three further conclusions relative to Bad Samaritan legislation. These three conclusions are that Bad Samaritan laws are justified, that the punishment for the violation of a Bad Samaritan law should be proportional to the degree culpability for the harm caused, and that if "commission by omission" statutes are justified, then so too are Bad Samaritan laws.
ContributorsCallahan, Ty William (Author) / Sigler, Mary (Thesis director) / Murphy, Jeffrie (Committee member) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Chemical Engineering Program (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2013-05
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Description
Protection orders are a common remedy for victims of domestic violence in Arizona, but problems of access and unnecessary complexity can prevent these orders from achieving their full potential impact. Through interviews with court officials and advocates, data collected from survivors of domestic violence and observation of court proceedings, this

Protection orders are a common remedy for victims of domestic violence in Arizona, but problems of access and unnecessary complexity can prevent these orders from achieving their full potential impact. Through interviews with court officials and advocates, data collected from survivors of domestic violence and observation of court proceedings, this study takes a comprehensive look at how to make protection orders as effective and accessible as possible. This analysis concludes with a series of recommendations to improve the protection order process and guidelines for the information to be included in a comprehensive resource to help plaintiffs through the process.
ContributorsDavis, Lauren Elise (Author) / Durfee, Alesha (Thesis director) / Messing, Jill (Committee member) / Buel, Sarah (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2013-05
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On 26 May 1994, US President Bill Clinton signed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in to law, which federally criminalized acts of obstruction and violence towards reproductive health clinics. The law was a reaction to the increasing violence toward abortion clinics, providers, and patients during the 1990s.

On 26 May 1994, US President Bill Clinton signed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in to law, which federally criminalized acts of obstruction and violence towards reproductive health clinics. The law was a reaction to the increasing violence toward abortion clinics, providers, and patients during the 1990s. That violence included clinic blockades and protests, assaults on physicians and patients, and murders. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act established
criminal and civil penalties against people who obstructed or committed violence towards reproductive health clinics, and has supported women's access to safe reproductive healthcare.

Created2017-05-25
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The 1973 case Nelson v. Planned Parenthood Center of Tucson established the legality of abortion in Arizona. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the Arizona Revised Statutes 13-211, 13-212, and 13-213, collectively called the Arizona abortion statutes, were unconstitutional. The statutes had made illegal receiving, providing, or advertising abortions.

The 1973 case Nelson v. Planned Parenthood Center of Tucson established the legality of abortion in Arizona. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the Arizona Revised Statutes 13-211, 13-212, and 13-213, collectively called the Arizona abortion statutes, were unconstitutional. The statutes had made illegal receiving, providing, or advertising abortions. After the Arizona Appeals Court heard the case, it decided that the Arizona abortion statutes were constitutional. However, two weeks later the US Supreme Court decided in Roe v. Wade (1973) that abortion was constitutional at the federal level. The Arizona court followed the precedent set by the US Supreme Court and amended its decision to rule that the Arizona abortion statutes were unconstitutional. Afterwards, Planned Parenthood, other family planning clinics, and hospitals were legally allowed in Arizona to advertise, discuss, and offer abortions as an option to their patients.

Created2016-11-13
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In the 2002 case Simat Corp v. Arizona Health Care Containment System, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona Health Care Containment System must pay for abortions when they are necessary to preserve the health of pregnant women in the system. In the case, the Court ruled that the

In the 2002 case Simat Corp v. Arizona Health Care Containment System, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona Health Care Containment System must pay for abortions when they are necessary to preserve the health of pregnant women in the system. In the case, the Court ruled that the Arizona Revised Statutes 35-196.02 and the Arizona Health Care Containment System (AHCCCS) policies, which banned public funds from being used for abortions, were unconstitutional. AHCCCS is Arizona's Medicaid insurance system, which enables low-income residents to receive medical care. The decision in Simat Corp v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System required AHCCCS to pay for abortions in cases for which pregnancies put women's health at risk, allowing low-income women greater access to therapeutic abortions.

Created2016-11-13
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The case Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden (2004) established that some of Arizona's abortion clinic laws violated physicians' and patients' rights to privacy, and it required those laws to be rewritten. The laws required most abortion providers to be licensed with the Arizona Department of Health Services and to submit

The case Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden (2004) established that some of Arizona's abortion clinic laws violated physicians' and patients' rights to privacy, and it required those laws to be rewritten. The laws required most abortion providers to be licensed with the Arizona Department of Health Services and to submit to all the regulations the Department established for abortion clinics. The regulations allowed the state to search abortion clinics without warrants and to access patient records and ultrasound prints, among other provisions. Following the US Court of Appeals decision in Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, the settlement agreement rewrote the regulations to create rules that lessened the burden on women's access to abortions, while still allowing the Department to oversee abortion clinics.

Created2016-11-14
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In the 2013 case Isaacson v. Horne, the US Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit ruled that Arizona House Bill (HB) 2036, which prohibited abortions after twenty weeks of gestation, was unconstitutional. The Arizona State Legislature passed the law in 2012, which was then challenged by three physicians who

In the 2013 case Isaacson v. Horne, the US Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit ruled that Arizona House Bill (HB) 2036, which prohibited abortions after twenty weeks of gestation, was unconstitutional. The Arizona State Legislature passed the law in 2012, which was then challenged by three physicians who filed a lawsuit against the state, arguing that the law violated women's constitutionally protected rights to abortions, rights that may only be infringed once fetuses are viable outside of the womb. In hearing the case, the Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set by the US Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade (1973) that ruled that states could not constitutionality prohibit abortions prior to fetal viability at twenty-four weeks. The case Isaacson v. Horne strengthened the precedent in Arizona that laws prohibiting abortion prior to fetal viability are unconstitutional, and it upheld women's rights to decide to terminate their pregnancies prior to fetal viability.

Created2016-11-16