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- Creators: Schweitzer, Nicholas
Description
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence has been shown to have a strong effect on juror decision-making when presented in court. While DNA evidence has been shown to be extremely reliable, fingerprint evidence, and the way it is presented in court, has come under much scrutiny. Forensic fingerprint experts have been working on a uniformed way to present fingerprint evidence in court. The most promising has been the Probabilistic Based Fingerprint Evidence (PBFE) created by Forensic Science Services (FSS) (G. Langenburg, personal communication, April 16, 2011). The current study examined how the presence and strength of DNA evidence influenced jurors' interpretation of probabilistic fingerprint evidence. Mock jurors read a summary of a murder case that included fingerprint evidence and testimony from a fingerprint expert and, in some conditions, DNA evidence and testimony from a DNA expert. Results showed that when DNA evidence was found at the crime scene and matched the defendant other evidence and the overall case was rated as stronger than when no DNA was present. Fingerprint evidence did not cause a stronger rating of other evidence and the overall case. Fingerprint evidence was underrated in some cases, and jurors generally weighed all the different strengths of fingerprint testimony to the same degree.
ContributorsArthurs, Shavonne (Author) / McQuiston, Dawn (Thesis advisor) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
A between-subjects online survey was conducted to explore the extent to which female victims of kidnapping crimes are blamed for the crimes committed against them and why. Scenarios involving victims aged 8 years old and 30 years old were constructed using various routes of escape. Routes of escape included a control condition in which it was not clear whether or not the victim would have escaped given the opportunity, a condition in which the victim had a clear opportunity to escape and took it, a condition in which the victim had a clear opportunity to escape and chose not to take it, and a condition in which the victim did not have an opportunity to escape. The results of the study demonstrated that the 30-year old kidnapping victim was consistently blamed more than the 8-year old victim. These victim blame measurements were exacerbated when the participant maintains a high belief in a fair and just world. A second study was constructed to determine if the victim's actions preceding the kidnapping influence victim blame attributions, and to determine if providing additional details on the victim's mindset or intentions to escape would affect the amount of blame attributed.
ContributorsTrow, Ashley Cheyenne Lacy (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis director) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Kirsch, Sharon (Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
Scientists, lawyers, and bioethicists have pondered the impact of scientifically deterministic evidence on a judge or jury when deciding the sentence of a criminal. Though the impact may be one that relieves the amount of personal guilt on the part of the criminal, this evidence may also be the very reason that a judge or jury punishes more strongly, suggesting that this type of evidence may be a double-edged sword. 118 participants were shown three films of fictional sentencing hearings. All three films introduced scientifically deterministic evidence, and participants were asked to recommend a prison sentence. Each hearing portrayed a different criminal with different neurological conditions, a different crime, and a different extent of argumentation during closing arguments about the scientifically deterministic evidence. Though the argumentation from the prosecution and the defense did not affect sentencing, the interaction of type of crime and neurological condition did.
ContributorsMeschkow, Alisha Sadie (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis director) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / Patten, K. Jakob (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Risk assessments are key legal tools that can inform a number of legal decisions regarding parole sentencing and predict recidivism rates. Due to assessments being
historically performed by humans, they can be prone to bias and have come under various
amounts of scrutiny. The increased capability and application of machine learning
technology has lead the justice system to incorporate algorithms and codes to increase
accuracy and reliability. This study researched laypersons’ attitudes towards these algorithms
and how they would change when exposed to an algorithm that made errors in the risk
assessment process. Participants were tasked with reading two vignettes and answering a series
of questions to assess the differences in their perceptions towards machine learning and
clinician-based risk assessments. The research findings showed that individuals lent more trust
to clinicians and had more confidence in their assessments when compared to machines, but
were not significantly more punitive when it came to attributing blame and judgement for the
consequences of an incorrect risk assessment. Participants had a significantly more positive
attitude towards clinician-based risk assessments, noting their assessments as being more
reliable, informed, and trustworthy. Participants were also asked to come to a parole decision
using the assessment of either a clinician or machine learning algorithm at the end of the study
and rate their own confidence in their decision. Results found that participants were only
significantly less confident in their decision when exposed to previous instances of risk
assessments with error, but that there was no significant difference in their confidence based
solely on who conducted the assessment.
ContributorsMa, Angeline (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Powell, Derek (Committee member) / Smalarz, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
Civil juries are becoming an increasingly rare means of resolving civil disputes. One reason for this is widespread mistrust in jury decision-making do to highly publicized nuclear verdicts where verdicts do not seem to match the alleged harm suffered by a plaintiff. Critics allege that jurors are biased against defendants with deep pockets. This research aims to test whether there is evidence of so-called deep-pocket bias in juror decision-making. Previous research has compared how the wealth of defendants impacts jurors’ verdicts while other studies have compared how jurors’ verdicts are impacted when the defendant is an individual versus a corporation. The first aim is to explore the impact of defendant wealth and corporate identity on jurors’ liability verdicts and damage awards. The second aim is to explore whether the theory of dyadic morality helps to explain any potential observed deep-pocket biases. The study tested the hypothesis that perceptions of a defendant’s moral agency (in other words, their responsibility and intentionality) would predict jurors’ liability verdicts while perceptions of a defendant’s moral patiency (in other words, their vulnerability and capacity for suffering) would predict jurors’ damage awards. In a study of mock juror decision-making, results concluded that when assessing the same alleged wrongdoing and harm, jurors were more confident in a liable verdict against wealthy defendants and corporate defendants compared to poor defendants and individuals as defendants. Higher perceptions of a defendant’s moral agency did explain these effects. However, there was no evidence that defendant wealth or corporate identity influenced damage awards. Ultimately, in cases where plaintiffs portray themselves as a small and vulnerable “David” taking on a large and resourceful “Goliath,” juror decision-making on liability verdicts is likely to unfairly punish “Goliath” defendants, revealing deep-pocket biases against wealthy defendants and corporations.
ContributorsRosales, Breanna Olson (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Thesis advisor) / Smalarz, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2024
Description
Emotions are an important part of persuasion. Experimental research suggests that White and male jurors can use emotion to increase their influence, while other jurors cannot. This research builds on prior research by examining the relationship between naturally occurring emotion during mock jury deliberations and the influence that jurors hold. Participants (N = 708) in 153 mock juries watched a murder trial video and deliberated on a verdict. Participants self-reported their experienced emotions and rated their perceptions of the other jurors’ emotion and influence. After data was collected, I extracted acoustic indicators of expressed emotion from each deliberation and used a speech emotion recognition model to classify each mock juror’s emotional expression. I hypothesized that there would be an overall effect of emotional expression on influence such that as mock jurors’ emotion increased, their influence would also increase. However, I hypothesized that a juror’s race and gender would moderate the relationship between emotion and influence such that White male jurors will be seen as more influential when they are more emotional, and that female jurors and jurors of color will be seen as less influential when they are more emotional. I also hypothesized that female jurors of color will be doubly penalized for being emotional, due to their “double-minority” status. Bayesian model averaging suggested that the data was most probable under models that included perceived emotion, race, and the interaction between the two, compared to models that did not. Consistent with the hypothesis, as participants were perceived as more emotional, their influence increased. In contrast to the hypotheses, being perceived as more emotional increased influence for both White and non-White mock jurors but the effect was stronger for non-White jurors. In other words, while all jurors benefited from being perceived as more emotional, non-White jurors benefited more than White jurors. Male jurors were more influential than female jurors, and gender did not interact with emotion.. Although being perceived as more emotional predicted increased influence for all participants, this research demonstrates that there are racial and gender disparities in the level of influence that someone might hold on a jury.
ContributorsPhalen, Hannah J (Author) / Salerno, Jessica (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Duran, Nicholas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
Recent advances in hierarchical or multilevel statistical models and causal inference using the potential outcomes framework hold tremendous promise for mock and real jury research. These advances enable researchers to explore how individual jurors can exert a bottom-up effect on the jury’s verdict and how case-level features can exert a top-down effect on a juror’s perception of the parties at trial. This dissertation explains and then applies these technical advances to a pre-existing mock jury dataset to provide worked examples in an effort to spur the adoption of these techniques. In particular, the paper introduces two new cross-level mediated effects and then describes how to conduct ecological validity tests with these mediated effects. The first cross-level mediated effect, the a1b1 mediated effect, is the juror level mediated effect for a jury level manipulation. The second cross-level mediated effect, the a2bc mediated effect, is the unique contextual effect that being in a jury has on the individual the juror. When a mock jury study includes a deliberation versus non-deliberation manipulation, the a1b1 can be compared for the two conditions, enabling a general test of ecological validity. If deliberating in a group generally influences the individual, then the two indirect effects should be significantly different. The a2bc can also be interpreted as a specific test of how much changes in jury level means of this specific mediator effect juror level decision-making.
ContributorsLovis-McMahon, David (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Saks, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / MacKinnon, David (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought.
ContributorsHafdahl, Riquel J (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
In 2009, Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. was arrested when he was mistaken for a burglar outside his home. When he went to the media, claiming to be a victim of racism, he faced backlash from other African Americans. The current research attempts to explain why he faced this backlash in terms of racial ingroup betrayal. Participants read a vignette that was similar to the Gates Jr. case, with SES and Job Stereotypicality being modified to be stereotypical or counter-stereotypical to one’s race. Data analyses revealed support for my hypotheses of Whites participants. There was a significant interaction, such that White participants felt more betrayed by low (versus high) SES ingroup members who achieved their financial means through counter-stereotypical careers, which in turn led to reduced ingroup protectiveness for the ingroup member (i.e., a shorter suspension for the policeman who mistreated the ingroup member). In contrast, they did not feel more betrayed by low (versus high) SES ingroup members when they had stereotypical jobs. Minority participants, (i.e., African-American and Hispanic participants) felt more betrayed by an ingroup member who had a stereotypical career compared to a counter-stereotypical career. In sum, I found that among White participants only, they feel betrayed when an ingroup member violates their expectations for what they believe an ingroup member should be in terms of SES and career choice, which might lead them to be less protective when an ingroup member is mistreated.
ContributorsAnderson, Kyle Matthew (Author) / Salerno, Jessica (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Protectors who do harm are often punished more severely because their crime is perceived as a betrayal of trust. Two experiments test whether this will generalize to protectors who incur harm while serving in their protective role, and if not, whether collective guilt for the harm they suffered provides an explanation. Study 1 tested competing hypotheses that a veteran (versus civilian) with PTSD would be punished either more harshly because of the trust betrayal, or more leniently because of increased guilt about the harm the veteran suffered during war. Men and women were both more lenient toward a veteran (versus civilian) but this effect was mediated by collective guilt only among men. In Study 2, guilt inductions increased leniency among participants less likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (women, low national identifiers), but not in those who are more likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (men, high national identifiers), who were lenient without any guilt inductions.
ContributorsJay, Alexander Charles (Author) / Salerno, Jessica M (Thesis advisor) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015