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- All Subjects: Dodd-Frank
- All Subjects: Law
- Member of: Barrett, The Honors College Thesis/Creative Project Collection
Description
Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
The purpose of this paper is to review the effects of the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations on the Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and to analyze if the benefits of the Title VII regulations have outweighed the costs in the OTC derivatives market by reducing systematic(market) risk and protecting market participants or if the Title VII regulations’ costs have made things worse by lessening opportunities in the OTC derivatives market and stifling economics benefits by over regulating the market. This paper strives to examine this issue by explaining how OTC are said to have played a part in the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we give a general overview of financial securities, and what OTC are. Then we will give a general overview of what the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acts are, which are the regulations to come out of the 2008 Financial crisis. Then the paper will dive into Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations and how they regulated OTC derivatives in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we discuss the Clearing House industry. Then the paper explores the major change of central clearing versus the previous bilateral clearing system. The paper will then cover how these rules have affected OTC derivatives market by examining the works of authors, who both support the regulations and others, who oppose the regulations by looking at logical arguments, historical evidence, and empirical evidence. Finally, we conclude that based on all the evidence how the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations effects on the OTC derivatives market are inconclusive at this time.
ContributorsCharette, John (Co-author) / Thacker, Harshit (Co-author) / Aragon, George (Thesis director) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Dean, W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
For decades, firms and individuals have utilized written documents to aid in the negotiation of, and completion of, business transactions. One such document is known as a "letter of intent." A letter of intent is often in the form of a letter that serves to evidence preliminary discussions and aid in negotiations between parties. They are generally intended to be "non-binding," meaning neither party will be bound by terms or conditions set forth in the letter of intent unless formal documents are later prepared and executed by the parties. Letters of intent take myriad forms and names, such as "memorandum of understanding," "proposal letter," and "letter of interest." They have been used in many areas of business, including finance, real estate, and supply chain management. Parties often choose to use a letter of intent for varied benefits it may provide, memorializing preliminary discussions, establishing a timeline for negotiations, seeing whether there are any "deal breakers" among terms being proposed, confirming that a party is serious about a deal, or putting moral pressure on the other party to continue negotiations. However, letters of intent carry with them a significant level of risk, which raises the question of whether or not they should be used at all. Many of the risks associated with the use of a letter of intent stems from the potential for a court to find that a letter of intent constitutes a binding agreement, or creates a duty of the parties to continue negotiations in good faith. Parties to a letter of intent may later disagree as to whether they intended all of the terms, or a particular provision, to be legally binding and enforceable, resulting in legal action. Even if a court finds that a letter of intent does not constitute a binding contract, a party may be able to recover damages under a number of legal theories, such as breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith or promissory estoppel. The use of letters of intent is therefore risky, and ultimately, the risks may outweigh the benefits of utilizing letters of intent. This thesis studies the types, uses, benefits, and risks associated with the use of letters of intent, including an examination of statutes and cases that have been applied by courts in disputes surrounding their use. Ways to mitigate the risks of use are also examined including simple practices such as not signing a letter of intent and using a separate document for any terms which must be binding, such as a "no shop" clause. A proposed legislative solution is also discussed that would prevent letters of intent not explicitly intended to be binding and meeting statutory requirements from being enforced in court, thereby substantially reducing the risks associated with the use of letters of intent.
ContributorsGilman, Alexander James (Author) / Birnbaum, Gary (Thesis director) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Claus, Scot (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / Department of Supply Chain Management (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05