Matching Items (6)
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- All Subjects: Political Science
- Creators: Warner, Carolyn
Description
What does it mean to speak of governance in the absence of states? This dissertation seeks to answer this question through an empirical examination of the founding of two unique agricultural settlements constructed by the Jewish community of Palestine, also known as the Yishuv: the kibbutz and the moshav. Commonly, in order to be considered effective, states must, at minimum, provide their population with two critical public goods: the satisfaction of their material needs and their physical protection through a military or police force. Dominant assumptions across multiple subfields of both Comparative Politics and International Relations content that because weak and failed states cannot provide their civilian populations with these critical public goods, that governance in the absence of effective, sovereign, and territorial states is a myth. It is often argued that violence, anarchy, and human suffering inevitably follow in the wake of state collapse and that in order to alleviate these problems, state building practices must focus on creating a fully sovereign state that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its borders. This dissertation questions these assumptions. Through quantitative analysis of an original dataset constructed from Israeli archival sources as well as a qualitative historical examination of declassified Israeli archival material from 1920-1948, this dissertation demonstrates that it is possible for non-state actors to construct institutions of governance within the context of a weak or failing state. The Jewish community, through its organs of governance, utilized the kibbutzim and the moshavim to provide the all important public goods of military defense and economic growth respectively. It is shown in this dissertation how political institutions can be crafted endogenously within weak and failing states and how these institutions may actually serve to increase political stability, staving off anarchy and violence.
ContributorsMuchlinski, David (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Hechter, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
Why do religious organizations facilitate secular political activism in some settings and not others? This dissertation uses regional variation in political activism across Mexico to elucidate the relationship between religious organizations and political activism, as measured through associational activity and involvement in political protests. I utilize a quantitative analysis of 13,500 data observations collected from the nationally representative National Survey of Political Culture and Citizenship (ENCUP), supplemented by municipal and diocesan-level data from a variety of governmental and Church statistical databases, to test several theories describing religion's potential impact on political activism. I also utilize a qualitative comparative analysis examining the relationship between the Catholic Church and political mobilization in the Mexican States of Chiapas, Morelos, and Yucatán. I present an agent-based model developed to delineate the micro-level mechanisms linking Church institutional configurations and religion's pro-social effects to individual incentives to politically organize. The predictions of the agent-based model are assessed against my statistical dataset. The study finds where religious institutions devolve decision-making, monitoring, and sanctioning authority to the laity, individuals develop capacities to overcome collective action problems related to political activism. Religious ideology is also found to influence capacities for political activism.
ContributorsHale, Chris (Christopher) (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Hechter, Michael (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Hinojosa, Magda (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
Political and economic competition, so goes the broad argument, reduce corruption because competition increases the cost of actors to engage in corrupt practices. It increases the risk of exposure, provides non-corrupt alternatives for consumers, and introduces non-corrupt practices into the political and economic domains. Why then, has corruption persisted in the Central Eastern European countries decades after the introduction of political and economic competition in the early 1990s?
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing.
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary.
The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor.
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing.
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary.
The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor.
ContributorsKartner, Jennifer Joan (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Thies, Cameron (Committee member) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Berliner, Daniel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This work explores the underlying dynamics of democracies in the context of underdevelopment, arguing that when society has not attained a substantial degree of economic independence from the state, it undermines democratic quality and stability. Economic underdevelopment and political oppression are mutually reinforcing, and both are rooted in the structure of the agriculture sector, the distribution of land, and the rural societies that emerge around this order. These systems produce persistent power imbalances that militate toward their continuance, encourage dependency, and foster the development of neopatrimonialism and corruption in the government, thereby weakening key pillars of democracy such as accountability and representativeness. Through historical analysis of a single case study, this dissertation demonstrates that while this is partly a result of actor choices at key points in time, it is highly influenced by structural constraints embedded in earlier time periods. I find that Ghana’s historical development from the colonial era to present day closely follows this trajectory.
ContributorsEllis, Alicia N (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Why do some local religious organizations, particularly Christian foreign mission groups, send missionaries to culturally and politically risky states where they face personal high risks and political entanglements? I argue that local religious groups’ goals and motivations are driven by their involvement in international religious networks, which is a key factor in dispatching missionaries to high-risk countries. These religious activities are driven by constituted identities and expected behaviors from the international networks. I utilized a qualitative analysis of documented sources from domestic and international religious networks and 37 semistructured interview records with South Korean Protestant missionaries and church leaders to probe international influence on local actors’ motivations of religious activities. I also used quantitative data of the number of Korean missionaries collected from the Korea World Missions Association and the Korea Research Institute for Mission to assess several hypotheses describing the influence of global religious discourse on local actors’ motivations and practices. I built a framework of an interaction pattern of local actors and international religious networks and depicted how the shared idea of reaching high-risk countries among global religious actors influenced national actors. The study findings indicate that motivations of religious actors risking their lives in high-risk countries are connected to the power of discourse of “unreached people groups” shaped among global actors, and such discourse is actively constructed by global, national, and local actors.
ContributorsJung, Jihye (Author) / Thomas, George (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Kittilson, Miki (Committee member) / Bruner, Jason (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
How do religion and ethnicity shape the sustainability of peace after civil wars? Ethnic and religious conflicts have been rising in prevalence over the last half-century, generating larger headlines as they influence every corner of the world. These conflicts occur across faiths, sects, and nations, and they appear to reignite in intervals, devolving into conflict again and again with spells of relative peace in between. With some notable exceptions, previous research on conflict recurrence has focused primarily on either ethnicity or religion, resulting in limited understanding of the ways that religion and ethnicity may interact. Moreover, many studies simplify the study of religion, ethnicity, and conflict by reducing it to an issue of shared identity, i.e., whether the two warring parties are from the same nominal religious or ethnic group. This project explores the role that religion and ethnicity play in three major causes of conflict recurrence: post-war autonomy, peacetime discrimination, and territorial claims. The primary argument is that religious and ethnic identities drive conflict recurrence through territorial claims, achieving autonomy, and their reactions to discrimination. Using a stratified Cox Proportional Hazard model, I analyze global data on all post-intrastate armed conflict peace years between 1980 and 2006. The results suggest that the indivisibility of territory in religious conflicts makes conflict more likely to recur, but only in cases where the fundamental question at hand is the role of religion in government. In addition, conflicts organized around ethnicity are increasingly unlikely to respond to discrimination by returning to war. The extreme scarcity of post-war autonomy arrangements rendered robust conclusions about its effect difficult to discern.
ContributorsTarr, Nathan (Author) / Siroky, David (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022