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- All Subjects: International relations
- All Subjects: Sexual Violence
- All Subjects: Violence
- Creators: Wright, Thorin
Description
The civil war in Syria has caused over one million Syrians to flee to bordering countries seeking protection. One of the major causes of this exodus is the reality and fear of sexual violence. Sexual violence against Syrian women is life altering because of the high value the culture places on virtue and modesty; a woman who is known to have been raped faces shame, possible disenfranchisement by her family, and is at high risk for suicide and in some extreme, but few cases, being murdered by a family member in an honor killing. However, once these refugees arrive they are still threatened not only with sexual violence, but also with sexual exploitation. Sexual violence is devastating to women and families. The international community must work to combat it by helping host countries to prevent the violence, assist victims, prosecute perpetrators, and create safe environments for female refugees. Human rights advocates should look within the philosophy of Islam to encourage gender equality ethics already present therein.
ContributorsJohnson, Michelle Anne (Author) / Larson, Elizabeth (Thesis director) / Wheeler, Jacqueline (Committee member) / Rothenberg, Daniel (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
The purpose of this honors thesis is to explain the varying levels of sexual violence against women across time, location and conflicts. Violence against civilians is utilized as an independent variable to measure if the level of violence of a pre-conflict environment widens the space for the exploitation of sexual violence. Women's status is used as an additional independent variable in order to measure if a pre-conflict environment that promotes gender equality moderates the presence of sexual violence as it discourages unequal power dynamics. GDP per capita and population will be used as control variables in order to include consideration of state capacity. Sexual violence will be the dependent variable. In order to statistically measure and depict the relationships between these variables, bivariate correlations and multivariate linear regressions will be utilized. The bivariate correlations showed that as civilian violence increased, sexual violence increased as well, but as women's status increased, sexual violence decreased. The linear regression models found that state actors and rebel groups yielded differing results. For state actors, the increase in women's status failed to moderate the level of sexual violence as an increase in civilian violence and women's status resulted in an increase in sexual violence. However, for rebel groups, an increase in civilian violence and women's status led to a decrease in sexual violence, thereby depicting women's status as a moderating factor. This creates a problem in identifying one or a few factors that predominately lead to an increase in sexual violence; such identification is key for the development of preventative policy.
ContributorsWinans, Sierra Brooke (Author) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis director) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
In this dissertation, I investigate the causes of differences in the use of suicide terror by non-state armed groups, including magnitude of use, targeting decisions, and how reliant groups are on suicide attacks. I develop and test the propositions that the age of groups and the capability of the state military they face significantly impact the scale of use and targeting selection of their suicide attacks. Older groups are predicted to carry out a decreased number of suicide attacks in comparison with younger groups, but increase their focus on attacking hard targets and decrease their focus on attacking soft targets, due to older groups being more likely to possess skilled terror operatives and to follow traditional guerrilla warfare practices. Groups that began using suicide terror later in their existence are predicted to carry out less suicide attacks than groups that adopt the tactic earlier in their histories, due to organizations having increased reliance on established practices and procedures. Groups fighting strong state militaries are predicted to carry out more suicide attacks, a higher proportion of attacks on soft targets, and be more reliant on suicide terror than are groups fighting weak militaries, as increased military pressure on groups decreases the effectiveness of their individual attacks, reduces their ability to train skilled operatives, and increases their desperation and incentive to use unconventional tactics. I conduct a quantitative analysis of 140 groups from 1998-2012 and find that older groups and groups that adopt suicide terror later in their existence carry out less suicide attacks than younger groups and groups that adopt suicide terror earlier in their histories. I also find that groups respond to increases in state military personnel by carrying out more suicide attacks overall, a higher proportion of suicide attacks against soft targets, a lower proportion against hard targets, and by becoming more reliant on suicide terror. These dynamics are also illustrated in depth through case study analysis of suicide terror campaigns by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which represent two distinct models of suicide terror.
ContributorsGoldenberg, Samuel Klapper (Author) / Wood, Reed (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Peterson, Timothy (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and democracy has focused primarily on the latter. Furthermore, these studies claim that membership in these formal international institutions (a.k.a. international organizations) increases the likelihood of the democratic survival of a newly democratic regime. Membership in these organizations provides a seal of approval that the newly democratic country intends to remain democratic. This kind of external validation should dissuade spoilers from undermining the transition and encourage ordinary people to support the transitional regime. This argument assumes that the domestic audience trusts this organization and believes it plays a vital role in society. Whether elites have confidence that the regional organization can positively impact democratic consolidation and how they perceive different types of regional organizations promoting democracy are empirical questions. This project seeks to answer these questions through a small sample and non-population-based elite survey experiment in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I also run a laboratory survey experiment with a larger sample of university students, giving me the opportunity for statistical power. The results suggest that political elites are skeptical of regional intergovernmental bodies promoting democracy. Meanwhile, non-elites consider regional institutions promoting democracy illegitimate when they are informal, i.e., no written shared expectations, rules, and permanent secretariat. When regional interstate cooperation on democracy operates under a formal procedure or codified in an international treaty and supported by a permanent secretariat, non-elites tend to consider them more legitimate.
ContributorsSari, Angguntari Ceria (Author) / Thies, Cameron G. (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Neuner, Fabian (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
How do religion and ethnicity shape the sustainability of peace after civil wars? Ethnic and religious conflicts have been rising in prevalence over the last half-century, generating larger headlines as they influence every corner of the world. These conflicts occur across faiths, sects, and nations, and they appear to reignite in intervals, devolving into conflict again and again with spells of relative peace in between. With some notable exceptions, previous research on conflict recurrence has focused primarily on either ethnicity or religion, resulting in limited understanding of the ways that religion and ethnicity may interact. Moreover, many studies simplify the study of religion, ethnicity, and conflict by reducing it to an issue of shared identity, i.e., whether the two warring parties are from the same nominal religious or ethnic group. This project explores the role that religion and ethnicity play in three major causes of conflict recurrence: post-war autonomy, peacetime discrimination, and territorial claims. The primary argument is that religious and ethnic identities drive conflict recurrence through territorial claims, achieving autonomy, and their reactions to discrimination. Using a stratified Cox Proportional Hazard model, I analyze global data on all post-intrastate armed conflict peace years between 1980 and 2006. The results suggest that the indivisibility of territory in religious conflicts makes conflict more likely to recur, but only in cases where the fundamental question at hand is the role of religion in government. In addition, conflicts organized around ethnicity are increasingly unlikely to respond to discrimination by returning to war. The extreme scarcity of post-war autonomy arrangements rendered robust conclusions about its effect difficult to discern.
ContributorsTarr, Nathan (Author) / Siroky, David (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
ABSTRACT
Although the US government has been using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), more commonly referred to as drones, to conduct military strikes against terrorists and insurgents since at least 2001, only around 2011 did media outlets and polling organizations began assessing the attitudes of Americans towards the use of drones as a weapon of war. Initially, public support for drone strikes was robust with nearly 70 percent of Americans expressing approval. As the discussion of drone strikes intensified however, public support declined over 10 percentage points.
Only a handful of studies have examined public opinion and drone strikes, and all have focused exclusively on explaining support. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature and explain opposition to drone strikes. The primary argument put forth in this dissertation is that people’s beliefs determine their opinions, and their morality determines their beliefs. Although independent opinion formation is often considered a cognitive process, I argue that, at least in the case of drone strikes, the opinion formation process is largely an affective one.
By examining media coverage and elite discourse surrounding drone strikes, I isolate three narratives which I believe communicate certain messages to the public regarding drone strikes. I argue that the messages produced by elite discourse and disseminated by the media to the public are only influential on opinion formation once they have been converted to beliefs. I further argue that conversion of message to belief is largely dependent on individual moral attitudes.
To test my arguments, I conduct a survey-experiment using subjects recruited from Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies student subject pool. My research findings lead to two key conclusions. First, opposition to drone strikes is largely the product of the belief(s) that drone strikes are not necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack, and that drone strikes kill more civilians than do strikes from conventional aircraft. Second, whether an individual expresses support or opposition to drone strikes, moral attitudes are a relatively good predictor of both beliefs and disposition.
Although the US government has been using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), more commonly referred to as drones, to conduct military strikes against terrorists and insurgents since at least 2001, only around 2011 did media outlets and polling organizations began assessing the attitudes of Americans towards the use of drones as a weapon of war. Initially, public support for drone strikes was robust with nearly 70 percent of Americans expressing approval. As the discussion of drone strikes intensified however, public support declined over 10 percentage points.
Only a handful of studies have examined public opinion and drone strikes, and all have focused exclusively on explaining support. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature and explain opposition to drone strikes. The primary argument put forth in this dissertation is that people’s beliefs determine their opinions, and their morality determines their beliefs. Although independent opinion formation is often considered a cognitive process, I argue that, at least in the case of drone strikes, the opinion formation process is largely an affective one.
By examining media coverage and elite discourse surrounding drone strikes, I isolate three narratives which I believe communicate certain messages to the public regarding drone strikes. I argue that the messages produced by elite discourse and disseminated by the media to the public are only influential on opinion formation once they have been converted to beliefs. I further argue that conversion of message to belief is largely dependent on individual moral attitudes.
To test my arguments, I conduct a survey-experiment using subjects recruited from Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies student subject pool. My research findings lead to two key conclusions. First, opposition to drone strikes is largely the product of the belief(s) that drone strikes are not necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack, and that drone strikes kill more civilians than do strikes from conventional aircraft. Second, whether an individual expresses support or opposition to drone strikes, moral attitudes are a relatively good predictor of both beliefs and disposition.
ContributorsDavis, Christopher Todd (Author) / Wood, Reed (Thesis advisor) / Fridkin, Kim (Committee member) / Kubiak, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Operational code analysis (OCA) is a common method of content analysis within the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature used to determine the “operational code” of state leaders and, by extension, the foreign policy behaviors of their respective state. It has been tried and tested many times before, on many different world leaders from many different time periods, to predict what the foreign policy behavior of a state/organization might be based on the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of their leader about the political universe. This paper, however, questions if there might be types of politicians that OCA, conducted using the automated Verbs In Context System (VICS), has problems delivering accurate results for. More specifically, I have theoretical reasons for thinking that populist leaders, who engage in a populist style of communication, confound VICS’ analysis primarily because the simplistic speaking style of populists obscures an underlying context (and by extension meaning) to that leader’s words. Because the computer cannot understand this underlying context and takes the meaning of the words said at face value, it fails to code the speeches of populists accurately and thus makes inaccurate predictions about that leader’s foreign policy. To test this theory, I conduct the content analysis on speeches made by three individuals: Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Narendra Modi, before and after they became the executives of their respective countries, and compared them to a “norming “ group representing the average world leader. The results generally support my hypotheses but with a few caveats. For the cases of Trump and Johnson, VICS found them to be a lot more cooperative than what I would expect, but it was also able to track changes in their operational code - as they transition into the role of chief executive – in the expected direction. The opposite was the case for Modi’s operational code. All-in-all, I provide suggestive evidence that OCA using VICS has trouble providing valid results for populist leaders.
ContributorsLuengas, David Leonardo (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Lewis, Paul (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
This thesis compares and contrasts attitudes on the issue of gun control between the general population and a student sample in the United States today. Through a comparative survey analysis design, this study aims to better understand attitudes towards gun control in the United States. Due to the fact that students may believe they are at a higher risk of gun violence, and because of their increased participation in gun control activism, this thesis hypothesizes that students will be more likely to favor restrictions on gun regulation. Although both samples share similar attitudes, these results show that students held much more passionate, negative, and dissatisfied attitudes and opinions on the current gun climate in the United States, relative to the general public. However, students are less in favor than the sample of the general public in supporting gun-safety policies when in the context of school-settings.
ContributorsDeutsch, Ryan Michael (Author) / Fridkin, Kim (Thesis advisor) / Kenney, Patrick (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
Numerous scholars have studied the experiences of women in zones of conflict, often with a focus on women as victims or as the makers of peace. One element that has been largely understudied is leadership—specifically, the gender dynamics of leadership during times of violence. I theorize that gender socializations are emphasized when the state faces conflict, extending gender role perceptions to the political realm. I hypothesize that heightened violence causes fewer women to run for political office while causing equal or greater numbers of men to run. Using a case-study analysis of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I analyze the percent of candidates in each administrative area that are female in relation to the number of overall and civilian deaths in the province. The results show some support for my hypothesis, suggesting that civilian deaths have a negative impact on female candidacy. The results also show that levels of violence do not generally lessen the overall number of candidates, demonstrating that men run at similar or heightened rates during times of conflict. These findings show the need for further research on the relationship between violence and candidacy, specifically as it impacts female candidates. This research has important implications for democratic systems in nations with ongoing violence, as it demonstrates the possible need for additional measures to ensure equal political participation.
ContributorsStratton, Victoria (Author) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Hinojosa, Magda (Committee member) / Kittilson, Miki (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021